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Over the last decade, sharply rising numbers of asylum seekers
have placed great strains on the Western democracies' venerable
practice of granting political asylum. In part, the new difficulties
derive from the growing penetration of law into what once had been
a largely discretionary practice; in part, they result from improved
global mobility and communications. None of the challenged adjudication and protection systems have responded well, and some have
responded abysmally.
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Critics abound, offering widely variant views on what are the
most serious problems besetting these systems. Some find the major
problem to be that "economic migrants" or "false refugees" are able
to gain years of delay, no matter how weak their asylum claims, by
abusing the asylum process's abundant procedural protections,
adopted to ensure against returning someone to immediate persecution. Others find the most serious failings to lie in g6vernments'
reflexively negative reactions to new arrivals, at least if they are of
the wrong ideological stripe. Overly restrictive legal doctrine,
impossibly demanding standards for factual proof, and a proliferating array of barriers and deterrents are seen as the major problems.'
In this country, controversy over political asylum waxed and
waned throughout the 1980s. The decade opened with bitter contention, when the 1980 boatlift of 125,000 Cubans from the port of
Mariel coincided with high levels of asylum applications from Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Iranians. In the succeeding years, the Reagan Administration implemented new restrictive policies, including
detention of many asylum applicants and the interdiction on the high
seas of boats coming from Haiti. It thereby managed, through the
middle of the decade, to keep application levels relatively modest
and to relegate asylum to the shadows occupied by low-priority political issues. Refugee advocacy groups nonetheless kept up a volley of
denunciations aimed at the new restrictions. They charged that
these policies, and the low acceptance rates of applicants from Central America and the Caribbean, reflected political manipulation or
racism or simple heartlessness. These groups complained that the
government's practices violated legal obligations founded in statute
and treaty. 2 In a pattern that has been long familiar in American
asylum policy, several rounds of relatively unproductive litigation
1 See generally Martin, The New Asylum Seekers, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS:
REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980s 1 (D. Martin ed. 1988) (tracing the history of refugee

protections from World War II ':o the present, highlighting new problems, and
suggesting solutions).
2 See, e.g., G. LOESCHER & J. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND
AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 170-208 (1986) (recounting

controversies over asylum policy that brought into question the Carter and Reagan
Administrations' commitment to the ideological neutrality of the 1980 Refugee Act);
Meissner, Reflections on the Refugee Act of 1980, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE

LAW INTHE 1980s 63-64 (D. Martin ed. 1988) (criticizing the failure "to administer a
judicious political asylum policy" for Salvadoran refugees, as prescribed by the 1980
Refugee Act); Scanlan, Regulating Refugee Flow: Legal Alternatives and Obligations Under
the Refugee Act of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 618, 620-23 (1981) (discussing alleged
violations of treaty).
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resulted, frequently marked by interventionist judicial rulings and
unwise government reaction. 3
In late 1988, these controversies returned to the front pages.
Whereas this country received about 3000 asylum applicants per
year in the 1970s, by December 1988, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was receiving 2000 applicants per week in South
Texas alone, nearly all of them from Central America. Neither the
basic paperwork nor even minimally decent food and shelter could
keep pace. Some commentators concentrated on the humanitarian
plight of the individuals. Others worried about the burdens placed
on state governments and local communities, especially since they
3 Class-action suits over Haitian asylum seekers presented the first major
challenges to the government's procedures for asylum adjudication and ultimately
resulted in years of litigation, blocking return of nearly all affected persons. The first
round, begun in 1975, focused on procedures for considering asylum claims lodged
by excludable aliens. (Excludable aliens are those apprehended at the border before
making an entry into the United States. When the government seeks to remove
aliens who have entered, it must do so through deportation rather than exclusion
proceedings.) The litigation history, including citations to the several reported
decisions that resulted, is summarized in Sannon v. United States, 631 F.2d 1247,
1249-50 (5th Cir. 1980). The second round derived from a 1977-78 campaign by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to hasten removals of Haitian asylum
applicants. Ultimately this "Haitian Program" was declared unlawful, and the court
ordered INS to reprocess all class members' asylum claims. See Haitian Refugee
Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). Moreover, the plaintiffs
received a major attorneys' fee award under the Equal Access to Justice Act. See
Haitian Refugee Center v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir.), vacated in part on other
grounds, 804 F.2d 1573 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
In 1981, the Administration embarked on a new detention policy meant largely
to deter asylum applications. See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS
AND POLICY 722-24 (1985). Litigation challenging the detention policy went all the
way to the Supreme Court in Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). Although the
government won some important victories with regard to legal doctrine, the plaintiffs
prevailed sufficiently on their statutory and regulatory claims to delay asylum
processing for lengthy periods, see, e.g., Louis v. Meissner, 532 F. Supp. 881, 883-84,
889 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (refusing to dismiss refugees' claim that they were denied access
to counsel contrary to INS regulations); Louis v. Nelson I, 544 F. Supp. 973, 993-96
(S.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that detention policy was illegal because it was a substantive
rule that was not promulgated as required by the Administrative Procedure Act);
Louis v. Nelson II, 544 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that detained Haitians
were entitled to release on parole pending determination of their claims for
admission), and ultimately to gain a sizable attorneys' fee award. See, e.g., Jean v.
Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 769-80 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. grantedsub nom. INS v.Jean, 58
U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S.Jan 23, 1990) (No. 89-601). Similar challenges to INS handling
of Salvadoran and Guatemalan claims have likewise won initial successes. See, e.g.,
Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1511 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (granting
permanent injunction); Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 380 (C.D.
Cal. 1982) (granting preliminary injunction); Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 587
(S.D. Tex.) (also granting preliminary injunction), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th
Cir. 1982).
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believed that most of the applicants were abusing the system and that
their success would only encourage more to come.4 In response,
INS quickly sought ways to deter new arrivals. Despite lawsuits and
temporary restraining orders, by early spring 1989, INS implemented a policy providing fbr initial asylum decisions within one day
of application, coupled with detention of all unsuccessful applicants
in South Texas.5
This action sharply reduced the concentrated influx, eased local
alarms, and thereby succeeded in draining off much media interest.
One might almost have thought that the annual application level
dropped back to the politically tolerable mid-decade rate of around
20,000 per year. It did not. The inflow remained exceptionally high,
but simply spread more widely throughout the country. In fiscal year
1989, the district offices of[NS received over 100,000 applicationsa record-and many thousands more were filed before immigration
judges. 6 This pace continues. It would not be surprising to find the
issue bursting into prominence again in the early 1990s, as the full
extent of the new asylum caseload becomes apparent.
In nearly all Western countries, the asylum adjudication systems
now employed were cobbled together in an era that permitted leisurely consideration of modest caseloads. In general, they have
adapted poorly to an era when claims are numerous and subject to
sudden escalation. Moreover, because most Western adjudication
systems were built on the rough assumption (a product of the Cold
War) that few claimants would be rejected, they avoided difficult
questions about effective information-gathering and evaluation.
Today's dilemmas require instead a sustained and sophisticated
capacity to screen out unqualified applicants; hence, the difficult,
previously latent questions have become inescapable. If adjudication
4 See, e.g., Suro, Aliens Say New Curbs Won't Halt Them at Border, N.Y. Times, Feb.
27, 1989, at A14, col. 1; Suro, U.S. Set to Detain Refugees in Tents Beginning Today, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 21, 1989, at Al, col. 4; Schmalz, Miami, Saying It's Overburdened, Tells
Nicaraguansto Stay Away, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1989, at A1, col. 3; Applebome, South
Texans Fearan Influx of Aliens, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1988, at A22, col. 1.
5 See, e.g., South Texas Asylum Applicants Face Detention Under New INS Policy, 66
INTERPRETER RELEASES 217 (1989); Frelick, South Texas Detention Plan Goes Forward,
REFUGEE REPORTS, Feb. 28, 1989, at 1 (discussing the new INS plan to restrict
allegedly frivolous asylum claims and the resulting criticism from private agencies);
Applebome, Judge Halts Rule StrandingAliens in Rio Grande Valley, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10,
1989, at A14, col. 1; Applebome, Suit Attacks Policy That Keeps Aliens in Texas, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 7, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
6 See infra Table I following note 150. Immigration judges, originally known as
special inquiry officers, are the federal officials who preside over deportation and
exclusion proceedings. See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 87-91.
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systems are to say no to large numbers of applicants-as virtually all
Western countries are now doing-they must either cultivate callousness to the risk of returning true refugees, or else demand assurance
that their outcomes are precise and reliable.
The search for effective reforms continues, but in a highly
polarized environment. In this Article, I attempt to advance that
search, with special attention to the political asylum adjudication system of the United States. The analysis and recommendations offered
here are based on several years of research and observation in the
United States, Canada, and several European countries-including
attendance at numerous hearings and extensive interviewing of participants in asylum processing systems, principally government officials, private attorneys, and other workers with refugee assistance
7
and advocacy organizations.
I open with a general look at the basic legal standards and then
at the highly charged policy context in which all asylum decisions are
currently made. To lay a foundation for the recommendations at the
end, there follows an overview of the United States' current, tangled
adjudication procedures and a brief history of past procedures,
explaining how the present system evolved. I conclude by suggesting numerous changes in structure and process, some of them
quite ambitious, while rejecting others that have been prominently
advocated. I offer these proposals with the conviction that a wellfunctioning adjudication process provides the indispensable ingredient for alleviating the many ills now attributed to the system, even
though the various participants in the current debate tender widely
differing diagnoses of what are the most serious ailments.
I.

THE SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A.

InternationalProvisions

Classically, the right of asylum under international law belonged
to states and not to individuals. 8 Sovereigns were considered to
have the right or prerogative to grant protection against return to
7 The longer version of this study, forthcoming from the Yale University Press,
contains considerably more detail on the Canadian and European systems. See supra

note t. I will refer directly to those systems only occasionally here, but the
suggestions I make draw in large measure on what I learned in studying them.
8 See G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101-02 (1983); 2
A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN
Melander, Refugees and International Cooperation, 15
(1981).

INTERNATIONAL LAW 6
INT'L MIGRATION REV.

(1972);
35, 35

1254

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:1247

those they chose to shelter. This framework shamed itself in the
world's woefully inadequate response in the 1930s and 1940s to
those who were fleeing Nazi persecution. From the ashes of World
War II arose an international structure that signalled a determination, measured but genuine, to do more for refugees.
Most enduring of the post-war measures were two instruments
adopted under United Nations auspices. The first, accepted in late
1950, created a new post of UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). Initially expected to be temporary, the Office of the
UNHCR, staffed by approximately 2300 employees, has by now
become a permanent fixture on the international scene.' Under its
original statute and subsequent General Assembly resolutions, the
office bears responsibility for providing protection and material
assistance to refugees throughout the world. 10 In connection with its
protection function, UNHCR monitors asylum adjudication systems
worldwide, and occasionally plays a direct role in individual
determinations.
The second legal instrument, the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees," remains of surpassing importance, for it
established a definition that has become the centerpiece of most
Western asylum adjudication systems, including that of the United
States. Under that definition, as improved by the Convention's 1967
Protocol,'2 a refugee is a person outside her home country, unwilling or unable to return or otherwise claim that country's protection
because of a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion."'"
9 See Overview of UNHCRActivities: Reportfor 1987-88, at 87, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/
709 (1988) (Table IX).
10 See Statute of the Office of the UNHCR, G.A. Res. 428, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
20) at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). Later changes in the scope of UNHCR
responsibility are traced in Aga Khan, Legal Problems Relating to Refugees and Displaced
Persons, 1976(I) RECUEIL DES CouF:s 287, 301-09.

11July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention] (adopted in
Geneva).
12 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. The 1951
definition covered only those persons who feared persecution "[a]s a result of events
occurring before 1January 1951." 1951 Convention, supra note 11, art. 1(A)(2), 189
U.N.T.S. at 152. The main function of the 1967 Protocol was to remove this dateline.
The United States became a party to the Protocol in 1968, thereby becoming
derivatively bound by all the significant operative provisions of the 1951 Convention.
See 1967 Protocol, supra, art. I(1), 19 U.S.T. at 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, at 2, 606
U.N.T.S. at 268.
'3 1951 Convention, supra note 11, art. 1(A)(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152. The
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The 1951 Convention, a cautious and more limited treaty than is
often appreciated, 4 provides relatively few actual guarantees to refugees illegally present in the country of haven (as most asylum seekers now are).' 5 In particular, it does not guarantee asylum, in the
sense of a durable lawful residence status, even for those duly
adjudged to be refugees under its provisions. Thus even today there
is no individual right of asylum under international law. 6 What the
1951 Convention does require, however, even for refugees illegally
present, is nonrefoulement-a technical term for protection, deriving
from Article 33 of the Convention, against return to a country
"where [the refugee's] life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion."' 7 Article 33 affords a limited and
country-specific protection, and the receiving nation technically
definition also contains "cessation" and "exclusion" clauses that remove certain
persons, such as those guilty of war crimes, or those who have taken on a new
nationality, from the Convention's coverage. See id. art. I(C)-(F), 189 U.N.T.S. at
154-56.
14 See Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 840-41 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Edwards, J., concurring and dissenting) (concluding that the Refugee Act's
applicability to aliens in both exclusion and deportation proceedings is more
generous than required by the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol).
15 The 1951 Convention does provide a host of impressively detailed
guarantees for refugees lawfully present, but a decision that the person is a
Convention refugee does not ipso facto result in lawful presence. See Report of the Ad
Hoc Comm. on Statelessness and Related Problems 47, U.N. Doc. E/1618/Corr. 1; E/
AC.32/5/Corr.1 (1950). See generally Weis, The InternationalProtection of Refugees, 48
AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 193-207 (1954) (outlining the protection provisions of the 1951
Convention). The major purpose of the Convention, as the name suggests, was to
clarify questions of status for the World War II refugees already in place. As
Professor Goodwin-Gill has explained:
The 1951 Convention was originally intended to establish, confirm or
clarify the legal status of a known population of the displaced. This met
the needs of the time, and most provisions focus on assimilation, or are
premised on lawful residence or tolerated presence. There is nothing on
asylum, on admission, or on resettlement.
Goodwin-Gill, The Future of InternationalRefugee Law, REFUGEES, Oct. 1988, at 27, 28.
16 An abortive effort was made in the 1970s to draft a convention that would go
further toward international legal guarantees of political asylum for refugees. This
effort was abandoned when a 1977 conference of government representatives
appeared likely to weaken even those minimal guarantees derived from the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol. See Weis, The Draft United Nations Convention on
TerritorialAsylum, 50 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 151, 159, 169-71 (1979).
17 1951 Convention, supra note 11, art. 33(1), 189 U.N.T.S. at 176. Paragraph
(2) of this article authorizes narrow exceptions to the nonreturn obligation,
essentially for spies and dangerous criminals.
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remains free to send a refugee on to other countries, rather than
granting asylum on its soil. 18
Nevertheless, since :[951 most Western countries, to their
credit, have set up asylum claims systems that essentially combine
the determination of refugee status under the 1951 Convention definition with the discretionary act of providing durable status, or asylum. An affirmative refugee status determination thus routinely
leads not only to the limited protection against return contemplated
by Article 33, but also to the full range of protections embraced
within the notion of asylum."9 In this sense, we have come close to a
system that guarantees an.individual right of asylum to those who
somehow establish physical presence on the soil of such Western
countries and also prove that they satisfy the 1951 Convention
definition.
18 See Melander, supra note 8, at 36. The country is also free, of course, to grant
asylum to others it deems worthy, even if they do not satisfy the 1951 Convention
definition. Western European countries have done this more extensively than the
United States, through so-called "B-status" refugee provisions or the acceptance of
"de facto refugees." See generally D. GALLAGHER, S. MARTIN & P. FAGEN, TEMPORARY
SAFE HAVEN: THE NEED FOR NORTH AMERICAN-EUROPEAN RESPONSES (Refugee Policy
Group 1987). The United States occasionally provides such protection, without a
determination of refugee status, through the use of "extended voluntary departure"
(EVD). See generally T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 726-43 (explaining
EVD protection and the debates surrounding it); Note, Temporary Safe Haven for De
Facto Refugees from War, Violence and Disasters, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 509, 512 (1988)
(arguing for the adoption of alternative methods of offering a temporary safe haven
rather than the currently inadequate EVD system). Under current law, EVD is
provided as a matter of grace by the political branches, according to ad hoc criteria
that are essentially beyond the reach of judicial review. See Hotel and Restaurant
Employees Union Local 25, v. Smith, 594 F. Supp. 502 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 846 F.2d .1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 902, 101 Stat.
1331 (1987) (establishing limited procedure for eventual permanent resident status
for certain beneficiaries of EVD for the years 1982-87).
Although I believe that this country should extend such protection on carefully
chosen occasions to potential victims of civil strife or human rights violations, I do
not address here either the standards or procedures for such decisions. This study
focuses instead on what are supposed to be nonpolitical procedures for
implementing binding, neutral criteria adopted to shield those most seriously
jeopardized by granting them full asylum or, at a minimum, nonrefoulement.
19 See Hofmann, Asylum and Refugee Law, in THE LEGAL PosrmoN OF ALIENS IN
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LW 2045, 2058-59 (J. Frowein & T. Stein eds. 1987).
In fact, Western nations (with a few exceptions, like Austria, traditionally viewed as
transit countries) rarely find third countries willing to take refugees off their hands.
Given that the refugees are present and, under Article 33, cannot be sent to the only
country normally obligated to take them (the country of nationality), it is clearly
better if they quickly attain a secure new status that allows them to rebuild normal
lives. See Martin, supra note 1, at 18 n.26.
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That these admirable features of the system go beyond the strict
requirements of international law, however, should remind us of
their fragility. They cannot be taken as inevitable constants.
Instead, it must be an ever-present concern of wise policy to shape
asylum measures, including adjudication systems, so as to maximize
continued domestic support. The systems' inability to cope effectively with growing numbers of asylum seekers over the last decade
now threatens that foundation.2 °
B. American Legal Provisions

The American legal framework follows these general outlines,
but the details require some additional attention. Although the
United States played a significant role in the conferences that led to
adoption of the final text of the 1951 Convention, this country never
became a party to that treaty. During that era, bitter battles over the
Genocide Convention and the Bricker Amendment had resulted in
ill-considered executive promises against sending any human rights
treaties to the Senate for ratification. 2 ' Nevertheless, the United
States regarded itself as a leading player in finding solutions to refugee problems. From the end of World War II, under a variety of
20 A recent book by a former UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees
underscores these risks. Richard Smyser writes:
The structure of refugee law and care, which has been generously
assembled since the dawn of our culture and particularly in the twentieth
century, cannot remain in place if it is abandoned by political and popular
opinion. If the people of the world decide that they no longer wish to
receive and help refugees, all the international conventions and
organizations will be rendered useless and will prove unequal to the task
of saving even a single life. That is a danger that must be averted.
W. SMYSER, REFUGEES: EXTENDED EXILE 2 (1987); see also Martin, supra note I, at 1115 (noting that "[p]olicy initiatives that will impose costs and difficulties on those
publics in a highly visible way must ultimately be grounded in a widespread public
acceptance of the need for that policy").
21 See generally Kaufman & Whiteman, Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the
United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HUMAN RIGrrs Q. 309, 31012 (1988) (discussing the Bricker Amendment and the executive branch's response).
Public explanations of the U.S. position regarding the refugee treaty usually focused,
with some justification, on how the 1951 Convention better fit European legal
systems, where the status of an alien depended on reciprocity-unlike the United
States, where refugees received a status equivalent to other permanent resident
aliens. See Hoffman, UN Refugee Code Near Completion: Watered-Down Bill of Rights Applies
Mainly to Europe-Some Basic Gains Made, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1951, at 4, col. 2. At
other times American spokesmen stated that this country would not adhere because
the treaty touched largely on matters within the jurisdiction of the states rather than
the federal government. See Eleven Nations Sign Refugee Rights Act, N.Y. Times,July 29,
1951, at 15, col. 3.
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statutory and administrative schemes, it had generously resettled
hundreds of thousands of the displaced persons uprooted by that
conflict.2 2 That experience imprinted on American policy debates a
distinctive perspective that predominated until quite recently:
Responding to refugees meant resettling displaced persons from refugee camps overseas, rather than dealing with populations already
23
on national territory.
Even during this period, however, some provision was made for
the handful of individuals who somehow made it to American territory on their own and then asked not to be returned to face persecution. Congress enacted the first express statutory provision in
1950,24 directing the Attorney General not to deport aliens to coun' 25
tries where they "would be subjected to physical persecution.
In a more explicitly discretionary form, this provision was incorporated as section 243(h) of the newly codified Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) in 1952. It granted the Attorney General the
discretion to "withhold deportation" of persons who would be subjected to physical persecution upon return. 2 6 In 1958, the Supreme
Court ruled that this statutory provision applied only to deportation
and was not available to aliens in exclusion proceedings, 27 but the
INS made equivalent protections available to excludable aliens
22 A comprehensive account appears in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH LIBRARY FOR
THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE UNITED STATES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REVIEW OF U.S. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS AND POLICIES (Comm. Print

1980). For a more critical review, see G. LOESCHER &J. SCANLAN, supra note 2, at 167.
23 See Meissner, Reflections on the Refugee Act of 1980, in THE NEW ASYLUM
SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980s 57, 60 (D. Martin ed. 1988). Sharply different
policy constraints operate in the two settings, despite similarities in the governing
threshold standards. See infra note 38.
24 Related provisions had appeared, however, since 1875. They provided an
exception to exclusion based on pre-entry conviction of a criminal offense, if the
crime constituted a political offense. See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at
638 & n.13.
25 Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010
(repealed 1952).
26 Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988)). In 1965, Congress deleted the reference to
"physical persecution," replacing it with "persecution on account of race, religion, or
political opinion." Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11 (f), 79 Stat. 911, 918.
The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107, gave the
section its present shape, more closely tracking the language of Article 33 of the 1951
Convention.
27 See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
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through the use of the parole power, likewise an expressly discretionary remedy.

28

By 1968, the earlier resistance to human rights treaties had softened sufficiently for the Johnson Administration to send the 1967
UN Protocol to the Senate, where it secured speedy ratification.
Because the 1967 Protocol incorporates by reference all of the
important operative provisions of the 1951 Convention, with one
important modification in the definition of "refugee," 29 ratification
was tantamount to acceding to the earlier instrument. But this somewhat circuitous route toward accepting the 1951 obligations apparently helped avoid reopening any of the previous decade's treatypower battles.
The Administration had promoted the 1967 Protocol primarily
as a way of signalling U.S. leadership on worldwide refugee issues
and encouraging other nations, regarded as less supportive of refugees, to improve protections. For that reason, political asylum issues
drew little attention during the Senate's brief deliberations on the
treaty.3 0 An unexamined assumption that U.S. practices conformed
fully to the 1951 Convention's requirements permeated the proceedings, and executive spokespersons assured the Senate that the 1967
Protocol could be implemented without changes in the statutes.
Although this was true, the record suggests that the Senate probably
did not fully appreciate the significance of the treaty with respect to
the withholding of deportation. After accession to the 1967 Protocol, the United States came under a firm legal obligation to implement § 243(h), a discretionary provision, so as not to conflict with
the mandatory requirements of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention,
the nonrefoulement provision. In any event, the treaty deliberations
clearly did not provoke consideration of any difficult issues concerning the substantive legal provisions or the adjudication procedures
that would be used to implement them. No changes were made at
the time in the substantive statutory requirements affecting political
asylum.
There matters stood until Congress considered the bills that
28 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.3(e), 253.1(f) (1978) (referring to limited circumstances in which otherwise excludable refugee aliens may benefit from parole). The
general authorization for parole appears in INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)
(1988). See generally T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 3, 232-36.
29 See supra note 12.
30 See S. EXEC. Doc. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (transmittal materials from
executive branch); S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (Committee
report on the 1967 Protocol, including a transcript of the hearings).
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were to become the Refugee Act of 1980. The political branches
took up refugee issues at that time primarily because of the difficulties encountered in coping with the massive refugee outflows from
Indochina-classic overseas refugee issues. 3 Even though asylum
applications were increasing throughout the period of legislative
deliberation and a significant political and judicial controversy was
brewing in Florida regarding Haitian asylum seekers, asylum was
again largely a legislative afterthought. Nevertheless, Congress
made some important improvements in the asylum realm, urged on
by UNHCR and by activists who were becoming more vocal about
domestic asylum issues. First-a matter of particular UNHCR concern-Congress changed INA § 243(h) to a mandatory form, leaving
no doubt about the obligatory character of the nonrefoulement provisions in domestic law, and specifying that the provision applies to
both exclusion and deportation. 2 Second, Congress finally added
an express "asylum" provision to the INA, in the form of a new
§ 208." a It replaced earlier haphazard administrative practice with a
new, express, and clarified immigration status for those recognized
as refugees after applications filed in this country.
Section 208 states that the Attorney General has discretion to
grant asylum to aliens who meet the definition of refugee provided in
the new INA § 101(a)(42) (A).3 4 That section, in turn, tracks the
1951 Convention definition; the central qualification is a "wellfounded fear of persecution" on account of the same five factors
listed in the Convention.3 ' The new immigration status, called
"asylee" in the regulations, clarifies the alien's entitlements to certain benefits in this country. It also enables him, after a minimum of
one year as an asylee, to obtain full lawful permanent resident status
"31 See Anker & Posner, The Fori' Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of
1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 30 (1981); Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and
Future, in MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES: TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 91, 92-96 (1982).
32 It now provides: "The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien
...
to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom
would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(I)

(1988).
33 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988).
34 See id.; see also 8 U.S.C.

§

101(a)(42)(A)).
35 See id.

§ 1101(a)(42)

(1988)

(for the

new INA
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through a statutorily authorized adjustment procedure.3 6 No such
regular adjustment procedure for asylees existed theretofore. 7
Again Congress paid little attention to details of adjudication
procedures or substantive standards,-3 but one theme is clear from
36

See 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 209 (1989). The statute imposes an annual ceiling of

5000 on adjustments of asylees to permanent resident status. See 8 U.S.C, § 1159(b)
(1988). This is a ceiling on adjustments only; it does not limit the number of people

who may receive asylum in a given year. See generally Martin, supra note 31. Because
asylum grants have run considerably above 5000 for the last several years, a backlog
has developed and asylees must now wait much longer than one year before
adjusting and thus receiving a "green card." See December Visa Numbers Move Only
Slightly, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1269-70 (1989).
37 This statement must be qualified in one minor respect. The principal
provision expressly meant for refugees from 1965 to 1980 was INA § 203(a)(7), 8
U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976). It allowed the use of six percent of the "preference"
admission spaces each year for people who fled persecution in communist countries
or the general area of the Middle East. The overwhelming majority of these refugee
spaces (a total of 17,400 annually in the late 1970s) were used for overseas refugee
programs, principally for the admission of Eastern Europeans selected in Western
Europe, and in the late 1970s for Indochinese processed in Southeast Asia. See T.
ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 620-23.
A statutory proviso to § 203(a)(7), however, permitted use of a portion of these
admission spaces to grant permanent resident status to aliens who met the basic
requirements but had been physically present in the United States for at least two
years before applying for such adjustment of status. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.4 (1971). For
example, a Polish national who overstayed a nonimmigrant visa could receive this
status through a petitioning process carried out entirely in this country, if she proved
the requisite two years' presence and flight from persecution. In a sense, she thus
could be considered an asylee who graduated to full immigrant status under a
permanent legislative provision. But the term "asylee" was never formally applied to
the status of those who benefited from this proviso, and successful applicants moved
directly to permanent resident status, usually from some sort of irregular status.
Moreover, the qualifying standards departed somewhat from the provisions of the
1951 Convention (most graphically in the geographic limitations).
38 Congress also applied the UN refugee definition to overseas refugee
programs under INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1988), which usually operate by way of
INS interviews and screening in refugee facilities in third countries, such as Thailand
or Austria. Because of this similarity in qualifying standards, one might assume that
the system proposed here for asylum adjudications should therefore be applied to
"refugee" adjudications in the overseas program. I would argue against such a
conclusion. The widely different functional constraints operative in the overseas
program counsel against identical determination systems.
First, simply because of physical location, the United States is able to apply
numerous other screening criteria, as well as numerical ceilings, before deciding
which refugees will be offered resettlement in the United States as part of the
overseas programs. Historically, screening and selection for these programs have
been based most importantly on these other criteria, such as family or other ties in
the United States, rather than on satisfaction of the refugee definition. Therefore,
pouring extensive resources into the adjudication of the latter issue often is not
advisable. Second, in most such overseas circumstances, a decision to exclude
certain applicants from the U.S. refugee program, on whatever grounds, does not
necessarily mean return to their home country. Typically, such persons remain the
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the legislative history. Congress intended the refugee standards to
be applied neutrally and without ideological bias, in contrast to certain repealed refugee provisions that had made special provision for
persons fleeing Communist countries.3 9 Although occasional arguments have appeared, particularly during the Reagan Administration, for a more overtly political selection system, 40 neutral
application represents by far the fairer and wiser policy. In the long
run, favoring some groups in the asylum process only increases the
political costs of returning other individuals, even when their claims

are accurately rejected under an appropriately demanding application
of the governing standards.

Full consideration of this complicated

responsibility of the first-asylum country, which may be able to find other
resettlement opportunities for them.
The procedures suggested here are crafted for the sharper choices faced in U.S.
asylum processing, wherein the government has essentially only two options once a
person is adjudged a refugee, owing to the person's presence on U.S. territory and
the usual unwillingness of third countries to contribute resettlement spaces: grant
asylum (or at a minimum nonrefoulement) and allow indefinite stay here or deny
protection and return the applicant to the home country. In that setting, greater
assurance of accuracy and professionalism in applying the refugee definition is
essential. I have elaborated on these distinctions in Martin, supra note 31, at 111-14.
39 See Anker & Posner, supra note 31, at 12, 14-18, 41-43, 60, 64. Most of the
congressional statements criticizing the earlier "discriminatory" provisions
specifically addressed the overseas refugee program, because asylum provisions
received little attention. There is no reason to doubt, however, that Congress
expected the same neutral application in asylum processing, where the case for strict
but evenhanded application of the refugee definition is probably far stronger. See
Martin, supra note 31, at 113-14.
40 In 1986, the Justice Department under Attorney General Meese was
reportedly drafting new asylum regulations that would have established a
presumption in favor of those fleeing "totalitarian" countries-apparently including
all Communist countries. See Pear, Plan to Give More Poles Asylum is Under Study by
Administration, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 4. No such regulations ever
appeared. In 1987, Mr. Meese did announce a set of steps relating to Nicaraguans.
Although he was under pressure from some conservative circles hostile to the
Sandinista government to grant blanket permission to stay ("extended voluntary
departure") to all Nicaraguans, his announcement nominally only restated
established standards for ordinary asylum determinations. In practice, however, that
statement encouraged more Nicaraguans to come forward and apply, and it has led
to a far higher grant rate for Nicaraguans applying for asylum in INS district offices.
Special review by the central office in Washington was also required before any
Nicaraguan was deported. As a result, such deportations became extremely rare,
even when asylum was denied. See REFUGEE REPORTS,July 10, 1987, at 7-8; REFUGEE
REPORTS, Aug. 14, 1987, at 8-10.
For broader consideration of the merits of a more expressly political refugee
program (arguments that carry more weight with respect to an overseas refugee
program rather than an asylum system), see M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 49-50 (1983); Suhrke, Global Refugee Movements
and Strategies of Response, in U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY: GLOBAL AND
DOMESTIC ISSUES 157, 157-62 (M. Kritz ed. 1983).
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debate is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, the study is
premised on the assumption that Congress's 1980 approach is to be
continued. It concentrates on finding effective ways to implement a
neutral system meant to protect those most seriously at risk of persecution, whatever the political orientation of the home-country
government.
In the early years of asylum adjudication under the Refugee Act,
immigration authorities and refugee advocates alike assumed that
the threshold standard for applying sections 208 and 243(h) was
identical.4 1 But the Act revived litigation over the precise understanding of that standard. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
the body that hears appeals from immigration courts 4 2 had traditionally required the applicant to show "a clear probability of persecution" in order to gain withholding of deportation under the pre1980 version of § 243(h), whereas refugee advocates had consistently urged the adoption of some more generous standard.43 When
the Board declined to change its "clear probability" formula after
enactment of the Refugee Act, numerous applicants challenged the
rulings in the appellate courts.4 4 The circuits divided on the question, and the issue reached the Supreme Court in 1984 in INS v.
Stevic.4 5 That Supreme Court ruling unexpectedly split the qualifying standards. It ruled that the Board's traditional "clear
probability" test still governs in order to claim the mandatory protection of § 243(h), while hinting, without expressly ruling, that
some easier standard might apply under § 208.46 Stevic, however,
did provide a softening gloss on the Board's "clear probability" test,
reading it to require a showing only that persecution is "more likely
47
than not.",
41

See, e.g., Helton, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca: The Decision and its Implications, 16

N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 35, 39 n.31 (1987-88); Scanlan, supra note 2, at 625.
42 See infra notes 171-174 and accompanying text (discussing the Board of
Immigration Appeals).
43 See, e.g., Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (ist Cir. 1971) ("The burden was ...
to prove that there is a clear probability that she will be subjected to persecution if
deported."); Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1967) (stating that
"only where there is a clear probability of persecution ... is this discretion to be
favorably exercised"), cert. denied 390 U.S. 1003 (1968); In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec.
310, 318-19 (1973) (reaffirming "clear probability of persecution" standard after the
U.S. became a party to the 1967 Protocol).
44 See, e.g., In re McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, 544 (1980) (reiterating the
"clear probability of persecution" standard).
45 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
46 See id. at 430.
47 Id. at 429-30.
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Three years later, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,4 8 the Court finally
ruled squarely on the threshold standard determining eligibility for a
discretionary grant of asylum under § 208. The majority overruled
the BIA's continued assertion that the two standards remained identical, and forcefully stated that the § 208 test is more generous than
the standard for § 243(h).49 The Court declined, however, "to set
forth a detailed description of how the well-founded fear test should
be applied," leaving that term to acquire "concrete meaning through
a process of case-by-case adjudication." 5 0 The § 208 test that has
come to govern in the wake of Cardoza-Fonseca is most helpfully
phrased as requiring "'areasonable possibility of persecution," or a
showing of a "good reason to fear persecution"-but even these
standards leave much leeway for application to the evidence
presented in a particular case. 51
These two Supreme Court cases bring curious results, to say the
least. To my knowledge, no other country draws this sort of distinction between the substantive standards for determining refugee status, on the one hand, and nonrefoulement on the other.5 2 Where there
are distinctions, they typically run in the opposite direction: toward
shielding more people against return, even if they do not strictly meet
the refugee definition and will not be granted the full range of bene480 U.S. 421 (1987).
id. at 423-24.
at 448.
51 See In re Mogharrabi, Interim Dec. No. 3028, slip op. (BIA June 12, 1987)
(implementing the Cardoza-Fonsecaruling and spelling out new guidelines for asylum
cases). Unfortunately, however, Mogharrabi followed the lead of a Fifth Circuit case,
Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986), and restated the standard as
follows: "[A]n applicant for asylum has established a well-founded fear if he shows
that a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution." Mogharrabi,
slip op. at 9.
This formulation is misleading and unhelpful. If there is any significant level of
persecution in a country, a reasonable person would fear becoming its victim, simply
because of residence in that society, even if the abuses, to date, have never been
directed at him or persons like him. He may recognize that the chances of actually
being persecuted are slim, but we surely would not count him out of the realm of
reasonable persons if he harbors a fear of persecution. In short, a "reasonable
person" would fear persecution well before the time when we would consider that
the persecution has become a "reasonable possibility."
The Board continues to invoke the "reasonable person" standard but appears in
practice to look for a "reasonable possibility of persecution"-a more objective
inquiry-before granting asylum. It would promote greater candor in adjudication
to revert to exclusive use of the "reasonable possibility" formulation, which is, after
all, the precise wording used by the Supreme Court in dictum in Stevic and CardozaFonseca.
52 See Helton, supra note 41, at 39, 53.
48

49 See
50 Id.
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fits that come with formal asylum.5" Moreover, this American bifurcation is subject to substantial objection on policy grounds. It would
permit American immigration authorities to deny asylum, perhaps
quite frequently, in the exercise of discretion. Indeed, the Supreme
Court in Cardoza-Fonsecawent out of its way to emphasize that the
Attorney General has discretion over these matters, and it plainly
considered that the holding would increase his "flexibility" in
responding to refugee crises.5 4 Ostensibly this means that the Justice Department could even deport to their home country persons
already judged to be "refugees" under the Cardoza-Fonsecastandard,
if they fall short of the showing required to claim the mandatory
nonrefoulement protection, as interpreted in Stevic.5 5
To their genuine credit, the immigration authorities to date
have avoided any such draconian use of the flexible discretion the
Supreme Court ratified in Cardoza-Fonseca. The BIA has even moved,
quite wisely, to limit discretionary denials of asylum and thus provide
the more complete protection of asylee status for nearly all who meet
the lower § 208 threshold.5 6 As a result of this administrative practice, the only important test, in the vast majority of today's asylum
cases, is the more generous § 208 standard, the "well-founded fear
of persecution" test. If the alien meets this threshold qualification,
and is also found worthy of the relief as a matter of discretion (as
now usually happens), then there is no reason to consider the issues
carries with
raised by § 243(h), because asylum status, by definition,
57
it protection against deportation or exclusion.
53 See, e.g., Goodwin-Gill, Non-Refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, 26 VA. J.
INT'L L. 897, 900-02 (1986) (describing
54 See 480 U.S. at 444-45, 449-50.

these practices).

55 These points are developed at greater length in T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTN,
supra note 3, at 664-67; id. at 79-80 (Supp. 1987).
56 See, e.g. In re Pula, Interim Dec. No. 3033, slip op. (BIA Sept. 22, 1987)
(holding that in the absence of adverse factors, asylum should generally be granted in
the exercise of discretion). For a comprehensive review of these issues, urging that
discretionary denials of asylum be used rarely if the individual is found to be a
refugee (an approach quite similar to that ultimately adopted in Pula), see Anker,
DiscretionaryAsylum: A ProtectionRemedy for Refugees under the Refugee Act of 1980, 28 VA.
J. INT'L L. 1 (1987). See also Anker & Blum, New Trends in Asylum Jurisprudence: The
Aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, I INT'LJ. REFUGEE
L. 67 (1989); Anker & McGrath, The New Battlegroundof Asylum Eligibility, in WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY-1988 IN REVIEW 29 (1989) (arguing that the BIA has begun to take
a narrower view of what constitutes persecution and has thus made it more difficult
for refugees from countries in the midst of civil war to gain refuge in the U.S.);
Helton, The Proper Role of Discretion in PoliticalAsylum Determinations, 22 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 999 (1985) (discussing the recent expansion of administrative discretion and
limits, both domestic and international, on the exercise of that discretion).
57 See In re Mogharrabi, Interim Dec. No. 3028, slip op. at 3 (BIAJune 12, 1987).
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Even if the bifurcation of standards someday becomes more
important in the administrative scheme, it will have no significant
bearing on the issues of procedural design considered in this study.
As the Board has recognized, "the core of evidence and testimony
presented in support of the asylum and withholding applications will
in almost every case be virtually the same." 5 8 Consequently, the
basic process of information gathering and evaluation will not differ,
whatever the final calibration of the substantive legal standard. In
principle, adjudicators must in either case first reach a judgment
about the level of danger faced by the applicant in the home country.
Only after making that combined factual and predictive assessment
will they apply the respective legal test in order to determine
whether to say yes or no to the application for the precise protection
at issue. In what follows, therefore, reference to "asylum" determinations should be taken to encompass the adjudication process necessary to apply the nonrefouh.ment standards as well.
II.

TH.E POLICY CONTEXT

A.

Angles of Vision

1. The Asylum Tradition
The commitment to affording asylum to the persecuted is deeply
rooted in American experience and tradition. The Statue of Liberty
is a treasured icon, perhaps the purest single symbol, in a richly
diverse nation, of our national self-identity. Furthermore, awareness
of the grave consequences that may await a refugee wrongfully
returned to the home country plainly deepens this commitment. No
successful policy can ignore the instinctively favorable reaction that
refugees evoke from the American public, politicians, and even (or
especially) judges. Refugee advocacy groups know that they have a
ready hold on public imagination, provided only that they can persuade their listeners that the objects of their advocacy are indeed
refugees. This is as it should be. It is a proud tradition, one that
should be preserved and strengthened.
Unfortunately, the very vigor of this tradition carries the seeds
of difficulty once it is translated into administrative operation. As
will be seen, accurate asylum determinations require the careful
application of expertise to a body of information about the individual
asylum seeker that is, at best, difficult to marshal. But few Americans
58 Id. at 12.
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think of this as a job for experts. Few are disposed to defer to the
59
judgments of the agency primarily responsible for these decisions
if the outcomes conflict with their own sense of obligation to
America's heritage. This attitude accounts, perhaps, for the ambitious interventionist stance sometimes taken by judges, 60 and for the
impulse toward sudden swings in policy that can come when a new
set of executive branch officials becomes involved in the process. 6 '
It also means that debates on asylum issues often become bitterly
polarized, for those who oppose deportation of unsuccessful asylum
applicants often see the matter as a life-or-death issue.
These attitudes have an important operative significance for asylum adjudication reform. Any reforms seen as substantially more
restrictive will face a heavy burden of proof in the public, the media,
and Congress. Numerous earlier reform efforts have been defeated
by resistance rallied in those forums by advocacy groups skillfully
drawing on the Statue-of-Liberty tradition. If stalemate or retrenchment is to be avoided, reforms cannot be done on the cheap. They
must include ample protections designed to win the support of relevant domestic audiences (including judges) by giving assurance that
any new restrictions will not fall unjustly on deserving asylum
seekers.
2.

The Need for Control; Asylum as a Loophole

There is, however, another important angle of vision on the
promise of asylum, and it prevails with some domestic constituencies. This outlook derives from the singular trumping power of a
successful asylum claim. Such a claim overcomes virtually all the
other qualifying requirements for immigration to the United States.
It also moves the applicant to the head of the line for early perma59 This reaction is no doubt fortified by the low esteem that immigration
agencies usually enjoy within the bureaucratic hierarchy. See M. MORRIS,
IMMIGRATION-THE BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY 87-94 (1985).
Sometimes this
attitude bursts forth in startling fashion. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 451-52 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (leveling harsh criticism at INS-the
wrong agency (it was the BIA)-in an opinion that takes little account of the
complexity of the issues at stake).
60 See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 455 (S.D. Fla.
1980), modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir.
1982).
61 For example, in his early months as Attorney General, Edwin Meese
reportedly sought ways to change asylum policy and make asylum more nearly
automatic for those fleeing Communist countries, as distinguished from those fleeing
"authoritarian" countries. See N.L. ZUCKER & N.F. ZUCKER, THE GUARDED GATE:
THE REALITY OF AMERICAN REFUGEE POLICY 143 (1987); supra note 40.
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nent residence rights, even if he first established his presence in the
territory in knowing violation of the regular provisions of the immigration laws. Viewed in narrow compass, this too is as it should be.
Those who have been victimized by persecution should indeed
receive, early on, a secure new status that will allow them to rebuild a
new life in a new homeland, without undue insistence on the bureaucratic niceties of ordinary immigration law.
There are millions of people around the world, however, who
face no substantial threat of persecution but who would value such a
chance at permanent residence in a stable and wealthy nation.6 2 In
an apt simile, Michael Walzer has compared the affluent Western
democracies to "6lite universities, besieged by applicants." 3 Lacking family ties or scarce job skills, most of these "applicants" have no
real prospect of success through any ordinary legal channel. It
should not be surprising, then, that those who learn about the power
of a claim to refugee status might choose to try their luck with an
asylum application. After all, the only clear requisites for such a filing are physical presence on the soil of a Western democracy and
persistence in asserting the claim. The potential is so promising that
it has called into being a new class of entrepreneur, "travel agents"
who arrange for transportation and also instruct their clients on how
to file for asylum once they encounter officials in the targeted Western country.' Seen in this light, asylum becomes a major loophole
62 Lest this sentence be thought unduly ethnocentric or alarmist, one should
add an important qualification. For most such people, their first choice would surely
be to enjoy stability and prosperity at home, in a political and cultural environment
with which they are familiar. Indeed, such attachments to home will doubtless always
hold most of the population there, even if Western countries suddenly become much
more hospitable to asylum claims. Alarmist cries suggesting that liberal asylum
policies may cause whole countries to empty out into a migrant stream to the North
are thus clearly exaggerated. Cf Rudge, Don't Blame the Victim, WORLD LINK, May
1988, at 68 (warning against "the apocalyptic scenario suggesting the whole world
plans to seek asylum" in the West). But, given that stability and prosperity are not
realistic medium-term prospects in many developing nations, it is quite natural that
some proportion of the population will begin looking elsewhere. And even if the
proportion is low relative to total home-country population, the absolute numbers of
migrants can become sufficiently high to pose a major political problem in the
receiving state.
63

See M.

64

See, e.g., E.

WALZER,

supra note 40, at 32.

RATUSHNY,

A NEw

REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION PROCESS FOR

20 (1984) (a report to the Minister of Employment and Immigration, noting
reports of such agents making arrangements for "multiple claimants who have read
in local newspapers of the ease of claiming refugee status in Canada"); Arbenz &
Ziircher, The Co-ordination of the Asylum Policies of the European States, in THE LAW OF
ASYLUM AND REFUGEES: PRESENT TENDENCIES AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 126, 127
(Council of Europe 1987) (reporting on travel agents taking asylum seekers to
CANADA
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that gravely threatens the overall structure of deliberate control over
immigration-control that is also highly valued by the public, and by
65
politicians and judges.
Two public values, not often well articulated or conscious, but
nonetheless strongly held, thus come into conflict in the asylum program. 6 6 On the one hand stands the promise of refuge to the persecuted, on the other the demand for reasonable assurance of national
control over the entry of aliens. If events force confrontation and a
stark choice between the two, it seems likely as a matter of practical
politics that the control principle would win over the refuge principle. 67 Refugee advocates should take this danger to heart. They too
have a major stake in minimizing the tension between the two goals
by helping to structure a workable and reassuring asylum system. As
a former UN Deputy High Commissioner, Richard Smyser, recently
observed in a perceptive book: "The public will not allow governEurope in the guise of tourists); Teitelbaum, PoliticalAsylum in Theory and Practice, 76
PUB. INT. 74, 79 (1984); Welcome and Goodbye, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 1989, at 35;
Applebome, Rings Smuggling U.S. Aliens Gain Sophistication, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1989,
at A23, col. 1. Most officials and a few private attorneys interviewed for this study
also had tales about the schemes carried out by arrangers or organizers.
65 See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 975 (11th Cir. 1984) (expressing
concern that plaintiff's position "would ultimately result in our losing control over
our borders"), modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note
3, at 723 (quoting Attorney General Smith as stating that we, as a nation, had "lost
control of our borders"); Public-OpinionPoll Reveals Supportfor Border Security, IMMIGR.
POL. & L., Apr. 20, 1989, at 5; see also Reitz, The InstitutionalStructure of Immigrationas a
Determinant of Inter-Racial Competition: A Comparison of Britain and Canada, 22 Ir'L
MIGRaTION REV. 117, 131 (1988) (discussing the importance of sustaining public
perception of control over immigration).
66 See E. HARWOOD, IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND IMMIGRATION
LAW ENFORCEMENT 10-15 (1986) (poll findings reflecting ambivalence on the part of
Americans regarding immigf-ation control); Pear, New Restrictions on Immigration Gain
Public Support, Poll Shows, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1986, at Al, col. 5 (reporting polls
indicating "that Americans have contradictory, ambivalent feelings about
immigration"). Even more debilitating, each of the respective attitudes is likely to
prevail at different points in the policy process: Restrictionism in the early stages of a
perceived massive influx can be replaced by doubt and generosity as the time nears
for placing identifiable individuals on a plane home. This is a recipe for stalemate.
See Martin, supra note 1, at 12-13.
67 In 1986, for example, the Swiss Parliament modified its law on asylum in
response to the substantial increases in asylum applications that country was
experiencing. In addition to enacting various procedural changes, Parliament made
it easier for the Federal Council to derogate from the ordinary statutory guarantees
of asylum. Theretofore such derogation was permissible only in times of armed
conflict; since the 1986 law, derogation is also authorized in peacetime when there is
an "extraordinary" influx of asylum seekers. See Loi sur l'asile du 5 octobre 1979,
Recueil officiel des lois et ordonnances de la Confed6ration suisse [RO] 1980 at
1717, amended Modification du 20juin 1986, art. 9(1), RO 1987 at 1674 (codified at
Recueil systematique du droit f~d~ral [RS] 142.31).
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ments to be generous if it believes they have lost control." 6 8 Asylum
will always be an inherently unruly component in an immigration
system that usually functions with tidy categories and elaborate
advance screening. But its unruliness can be curbed, and public support thereby increased, if we can create a system capable of saying
"no" to the unqualified-fairly, but firmly and expeditiously-while
promptly welcoming the meritorious applicant.6 9
B.

FactualIssues

In principle, it should be possible to distinguish between genuine refugees and those who do not qualify, thereby both honoring
the asylum tradition and closing the loophole to those whose claims
are meritless. But, for several important reasons, that task is far
more difficult than it might initially appear.
1. Lack of Clarity Concerning the Substantive Legal Standard
Although Americans (along with most of the Western world) are
virtually united in a commitment to protect refugees, they are far
from united in a common conception of "refugee." Everyday parlance tends to treat anyone fleeing life-threatening conditions as a
refugee, whether the source of the threat be natural disaster, foreign
invasion, civil unrest, or deliberate persecution. 70 The legal framework employs a narrower concept than this journalistic usage, and
the 1951 Convention definition might be expected to provide the
basis for a unified common understanding, built around the phrase
"well-founded fear of persecution." But this phrase can also take on
a variety of shapes, from highly expansive to narrowly crabbed, often
depending, it seems, on whether the speaker wishes to include or
exclude a particular group of claimants. 71
One common mistake, made by both the left and the right, is to
assume that the existence of serious human rights problems in a
country should translate into a finding that virtually all emigres from
68 W. SMYSER, supra note 20, at 119.
69 See also THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S.
IMMIGRATION

POLICY AND THE NATIONAL

INTEREST: FINAL REPORT

165 (1981)

[hereinafter SELECT COMMISSION] (reaching similar conclusions).
70 See generally Shacknove, Who is a Refugee?, 95 ETHICS 274 (1985) (discussing
the various conceptions of "refugee" held by society and selected international
organizations).
71 See C. KEELY, GLOBAL REFUGEE POLICY: THE CASE FOR A DEVELOPMENT-

ORIENTED STRATEGY 6-11 (1981).
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that country are refugees. 7 2 Indeed, the language of the 1951 Convention can be made to fit this conception: If persecution occurs in
the home country, any expatriate's claimed fear of it upon return is
well-founded. The fear is not fanciful; it is based upon proven fact.
If the legal standards conformed to this conception, adjudication
would be greatly simplified, for it could then be based on sweeping
categorical judgments that would be easy to pronounce and
administer.
The case law makes clear, however, that the "well-founded fear"
standard sets a higher threshold and ordinarily requires a far more
individualized inquiry. 7 1 Partisans in the debate over legal doctrine
usually accept this narrowing gloss, 7 4 even if it does not always pene72 Such a reading underlies oft-heard complaints that our asylum policy is "out
of sync" with our human rights policy, or more broadly, with our foreign policy. See,
e.g., Dreifus, No Refugees Need Apply, ATLANTc, Feb. 1987, at 32, 35 (quoting INS
General Counsel Inman to this effect); Pear, supra note 40 (quoting an unnamed
Reagan Administration official stating that deporting Nicaraguans was*inconsistent
with the lobbying effort to win support for the contras); Hansen, No Way to Treat
Solidarity Refugees, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1985, at A21, col. I (arguing that INS denials
of asylum to Poles undercut the credibility of our foreign policy).
73 See, e.g., Vilorio-Lopez v. INS, 852 F.2d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that there must be "'specific evidence . . . to support the alien's claim that
persecution likely would be directed toward him as an individual'" (quoting PlateroCortez v. INS, 804 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1986))); Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767
F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1985), aft'd, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS,
743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that an applicant must "present specific
facts establishing that he or she has actually been the victim of persecution or has
some other good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution...");
In re Mogharrabi, Interim Dec. No. 3028, slip op. at 4 (BIAJune 12, 1987) ("It is clear
that to a large degree the meaning of 'well-founded fear' can in fact only be
determined in the contexts of individual cases").
74 Some authors argue that protection of a wider range of endangered asylum
seekers, such as those fleeing civil war, is now required as a matter of customary
international law. See, e.g., Goodwin-Gill, supra note 53, at 902 (1986) (arguing that
customary international law incorporates this mandate as a component of
nonrefoulement); Perluss & Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm, 26
VA. J. IN'rL L. 551, 554-55 (1986) (arguing on the basis of an alleged "customary
norm of temporary refuge"); see also Organization of African Unity Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, June 20, 1974, art. 1,
1001 U.N.T.S. 46, 47 (This treaty's definition of "refugee" includes those covered by
the definition of the 1951 Convention definition as well as those who flee "external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public
order"). But these authors generally do not dispute the conclusion stated in the text
concerning the application of the 1951 Convention definition. See Hailbronner, Nonrefoulement and "Humanitarian"Refugees: Customary InternationalLaw or Wishful Legal
Thinking?, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 857, 880-87 (1986) (arguing that even states with
expansive refugee policies have not surrendered the discretion to retreat to the
narrower 1951 Convention standards). For a brief discussion of American practice in
this regard, using the device of "extended voluntary departure," see supra note 18.
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trate into public debate on the issue. Because legal standards
demand individualized scrutiny, adjudication obviously requires a
more sophisticated and difficult factual inquiry. The inquiry must
first strive to assure the marshalling of all accessible information that
might bear on the individual's circumstances and the conditions of
the country. But just gathering that information is not sufficient, for
in this contentious sphere, both governments and exiles may have
significant reasons to distort their accounts of the facts or manufacture them from whole cloth. Crucially, asylum adjudication must
therefore include the capacity to evaluate the assembled information
in order to decide which is trustworthy and which is doubtful. Adjudicators must have the authority, and the confidence, simply to reject
some of the information tendered to them.
The legal standards thus require that applicants show something
more than simply that human rights abuses occur in the home country. 75 That "something more" is usually understood as a showing
that the applicant is likely to be targeted by the persecutors upon
return. Even after the Supreme Court's Cardoza-Fonseca decision,
there remains considerable room for dispute over just how much
more of a showing this entails. Must the claimant show she would be
"singled out" by the persecutors? How sharply focused must the
threat be? What is relevant and probative evidence of such a threat?
Must the applicant's testimony be corroborated? And further, what
exactly is "persecution"? Is sustained discrimination sufficient, or is
76
something more such as a threat to life or freedom required?
These disputes continue in the literature, in public debate, and
in American and foreign case law. Although some progress has been
made in refining the standards and achieving a more unified conception, large differences of view abide. Ideally, the Board of Immigration Appeals, the principal specialized custodian of legal doctrine in
this field, would develop a body of doctrine that would refine and
unify the understandings of the standard. The Board, however, has
had difficulty playing this, role, in part because it receives little deference from the reviewing courts in this field. Hence, splits among the
75 See, e.g., Martinez Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that the reported anarchy in El Salvador, without other special
circumstances, is insufficient to preclude return of an alien to that country by the
INS).
76 For a thorough exploration of the case law on these issues, see Blum, The
Ninth Circuit and the Protectionof Asylum Seekers Since the Passageof the Refugee Act of 1980,
23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 327 (1986).
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circuits develop and persist,7 7 and the Supreme Court is not in a

position to resolve more than a handfil of such disputes.
2. ,The Coast of Bohemia
Compounding this substantive legal problem are the images we
(both citizens and government officials) bring to judgments about
asylum policy. The legal standard looks, in most cases, toward a
finely calibrated individualized judgment of the risk of persecution
the applicant would face in the homeland. The judgment must be
based, to some extent, on general information about human rights
conditions in the home country. But the primary reliance will fall,
most of the time, on information specific to that individual. 78
Public debate on asylum policy, however, proceeds in cruder
terms. Partisans are often ready to make sweeping judgments, by
nationality, about the merit of large groups of asylum seekers. Two
leading schools of thought have been prominent in the debate. The
first, which has long dominated actual outcomes, assumes that virtually anyone from a Communist country would face persecution upon
return. Holders of this view find it nearly unthinkable that the government could contemplate deportation. 79 A second school makes
77 For example, there is currently a circuit split as to the meaning of persecution
on account of a political opinion. Compare Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285,
289 (5th Cir.) (requiring personally-held political opinion to qualify for asylum), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987) with Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir.
1987) (allowing personal reasons to qualify the applicant for asylum). There is also a
split as to the circumstances under which threats by guerrillas are sufficient to
establish a "well-founded" fear. Compare Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1233 (9th
Cir. 1988) (finding well-founded fear) with Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998,
1006 (9th Cir. 1988) (failing to find a well-founded fear).
78 This statement must be qualified when the asylum claim is based on group
characteristics, such as persecution directed at all members of a religious minority, or
perhaps persecution that is so indiscriminate that virtually all who manage to escape
should be recognized as refugees (I have in mind Pol Pot's Cambodia). For a helpful
rethinking of definitional issues, see A. ZOLBERG, A. SUHRKE, & S. AGUAYO, ESCAPE
FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 2533, 269-75 (1989). The authors break down the sociological concept of refugees into
three subgroups: (1) activists, whose political actions draw the wrath of the
government; (2) targets, whose group affiliation (ethnicity, race, religion) is the
reason for their oppression; and (3) victims, who are caught in a civil war's crossfire
or are exposed to generalized social violence. See id. Only the first two readily fit into
the legal definition derived from the 1951 Convention.
79 See, e.g., Pear, supra note 40 (reporting that rules being considered by the
Reagan Administration "would establish a presumption that aliens fleeing
[communist] countries had 'a well founded fear of persecution' and therefore met the
statutory standard for obtaining asylum in this country"); Hansen, supra note 72
(suggesting that virtually all Polish nationals should qualify for asylum).
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similar assumptions about Central American countries, particularly
El Salvador and Guatemala. 80
a.

The Essential Problem

This kind of stereotyping or oversimplification is unfortunately
commonplace-and to a significant extent inevitable-in public
debate and policy decisions. In a classic work, Walter Lippmann
explored comprehensively the influence on policy of these "pictures
in our heads."'" In explaining how easily policymakers can err by
relying on their own misconceptions about foreign lands, he wrote:
[T]he real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too
fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with
so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. And although we have to act in that environment, we
have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage
with it. To traverse the world men must have maps of the world.
Their persistent difficulty is to secure maps on which their own
need, or 82
someone else's need, has not sketched in the coast of
Bohemia.

The "coast of Bohemia" problem bedevils both public debate
and adjudication in the asylum field. 83 But perhaps the image for
our purposes should be shifted from the littoral to the physiographical. Few nations enjoy a political geography characterized by a reliably fertile plain of steady human rights observance. Outcroppings of
abuses appear, sometimes intermittent hills, sometimes whole mountain ranges of severe persecution. The partisans in refugee
debates-as well as adjudicators and judges under the current system-are too often inclined, in looking at nations to which they are
favorably disposed, to mistake mountains for hills-or plains. The
same people, in looking at nations to which they are hostile or for
80 See, e.g., Barker, New Wave of Salvadoran Immigrants Revives Call for Refugee
Status, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1989, at B3, col. 1. (indicating that the flood of refugees
is caused by human rights violations).
81 W. LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 3 (1960).
82 Id. at 16. For those who are rusty on their Eastern European geography,
Bohemia is located in western Czechoslovakia. It has no coast.
83 The problem has been noted in a few cases, although not in these terms. See,
e.g., Perez-Alvarez v. INS, 857 F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting from dissenting
opinion of BIA Member Heilman, warning immigration judges against "assumptions
regarding the way other societies operate," for they are often "proven to be totally
wrong" upon a full hearing); Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 149697 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (finding that "impressions of INS agents and officials that
Salvadorans come to the United States solely for economic gain" created barriers to
the development of full and accurate information).
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whose exiles they have (understandably) developed sympathy, often
picture mountains where they should see hills, and then rush to the
conclusion that the nation's exiles are refugees. Whatever the actual
geography, it is also easy to forget that many people in those distant
nations continue to inhabit the valleys even when the mountains
loom large and forbidding.
b.

Boxes vs. Spectrums

A related and persistent misunderstanding compounds the difficulties in achieving a sensible and widely supported asylum policy,
and also occasionally complicates adjudication. Much of the debate
proceeds as though there are two sharply different categories of persons who find their way into the asylum adjudication system in this
country: refugees, on the one hand, and economic migrants (or simply "illegal aliens") on the other. A recent book on U.S. refugee
policy (in other respects quite thorough and insightful) reflects this
attitude:
Refugees are neither immigrants nor illegal migrants,
although, like immigrants, they have forsaken their homelands for
new countries and, like illegal migrants, they may enter those new
countries without permission. But a refugee is, in the end, unlike
either. Both the immigrant and the illegal migrant are drawn to a
country. The refugee is not drawn but driven; often, he seeks not to

better4 his life but to rebuild it, to regain some part of what he has
lost.

8

Even if this sharply dichotomous view might, at one time, have
captured the realities of refugee flows, it does not offer a helpful
approach to today's asylum caseload. Today's dilemma is both tragic
and surpassingly difficult precisely because, among current asylum
applicants, refugees are so much like illegal migrants. Only an indistinct and difficult line separates those who should succeed on their
asylum applications from those who should not. That is, most of
those applying in the United States today were both drawn and
driven, and they chose to come in response to a complex mix of
political and economic considerations. Asylum seekers are not so
different from the rest of us. We have a hard time deciding, particularly when we make difficult, life-altering decisions, and when.we
finally do choose a course of action, we act from a mix of motives.
Take the case of a hypothetical Haitian farmer. For years he has
84
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ZUCKER,

supra note 61, at xiv (emphasis added).

1276

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:1247

been anguished by the unbridled power that local officials, supported by militia units or bands of thugs, wield in the community.
He knows of occasions on. which they have terrorized those who
resist their decrees, by burning a hut or killing a farm animal. But he
also realizes that most people, who remain quiet, pay an occasional
tribute, and raise no opposition, will be left alone. He endures this
situation for many years, although he is more vocal than most of his
neighbors about the community's problems. One year, his meager
corn crop fails owing to the worst drought of the decade. He worries
how he will feed his children, already showing initial signs of malnutrition. Shortly thereafter, lie learns from friends about a boat that is
about to depart for Miami, where, it is said, jobs are available and
each day's pay exceeds a month's earnings in Haiti. They urge him
to come along.
The choice is not an easy one. He consults with his family, and
they talk about the crop failure and the political miseries of the
region. They discuss the pain that would come from lengthy separation. They wonder whether the stories can be true about the jobs in
Miami. Then they learn of a new episode of retribution visited on a
farmer in a nearby valley, who apparently ran afoul of the local hierarchy and was left maimed by a nighttime attack. Some family members believe that this episode presages another serious outbreak of
official violence; others think it is isolated and that things will quiet
down as before. Pondering all of these factors, at first he is sure he
will stay. Then, after a child endures a week of persistent illness, he
decides that he should leave, in an effort to earn enough to pay for
medical care and food for his offspring. The family ultimately concurs, even though it means scraping together nearly all their savings
to meet the boat captain's fee for thejourney. No thought is given to
moving the whole family; they could not possibly afford the captain's
charge.
Once this person arrives in Miami, should he be seen as a
"drawn" economic migrant or a "driven" refugee? He did not lack
choice. Although many considerations strongly pointed toward leaving, he weighed a variety of difficult factors and chose at this time to
travel to Miami. He could have stayed and remained subject to the
same range of political and economic risks, uncertainties, and privations. In fact, he was both drawn and driven, and the factors he considered were both economic and political. 85 Does the presence of
85 Further evidence of the mix of motives appears, for example, in an extensive
survey relating to Salvadorans in the United States. See S. MONTES Mozo & J.
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economic considerations undercut his refugee claim? Or should we
try to assess which was his primary or dominant motivation for leaving? 6 Or perhaps adjudication might center on the fact that the
need to earn money for medical care-an economic considerationwas the immediately precipitating factor.
Each of the perspectives implicitly underlying these questions is
misleading. We do not need to find that he was only driven, nor
assess what his primary motivation was, nor the immediately precipitating event. The best way to understand asylum adjudication is to
focus on the degree of risk he would face when he returns. If the risk
of persecution is sufficiently substantial, his fear is well-founded,
even if it was his need for funds to feed his children that sent him on
the particular boat trip at the particular time. That he stayed home
until economic considerations tipped the balance in his decision may
be relevant-but only for the light it casts on the separate question
concerning the degree of risk he truly faces. His refugee claim is not
forever tainted because he thought about jobs in Miami or the need
for money to feed his family.8 7 Indeed, this would be abundantly
clear if one could establish that shortly after his departure, which was
precipitated, let us stipulate, by economic concerns, the local authorities expanded their violent suppression and actually began killing or
jailing anyone who had ever publicly opposed the government or the
local leaders.
The 1951 Convention definition best translates into workable
adjudicative guidance only in this light. It does not ask how much of
a role economics played in the decision to leave; it asks about risk
levels upon return. The economic migrant/political refugee distinc88
tion, however phrased, is misleading and unnecessary.
VASQUEZ, SALVADORAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

11-14 (1988) (28.5 percent of Salvadorans surveyed said they emigrated exclusively

for political reasons; 20.6 percent claimed both political and economic reasons;
apparently the rest spoke only of economic or other nonpolitical reasons).
86 See Anker & Posner, supra note 31, at 68 (suggesting-erroneously, in my

view-that the applicant is a "refugee only if his 'primary motivation' is political").
87

See United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247, 252 (8th Cir. 1989).

88 The majority opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca states that the definition "makes

the

eligibility determination turn to some extent on the subjective mental state of the
alien," and it later refers to "the obvious focus on the individual's subjective beliefs."
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987). Other commentary on the
1951 Convention also claims equal status for "subjective" factors. See OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 11-12 (1979)[hereinafter UNHCR
HANDBOOK]. But no asylum adjudication system visited in the course of this study

devotes any significant resources to inquiries into the applicant's subjective state of
mind; the fact of application for asylum is taken as sufficient indication that the

1278

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:1247

If all asylum applicants did fit neatly into one of two boxesrefugee or economic migrant-the adjudicative task would certainly
be simplified. The job would simply be to unmask the impostors,
those economic migrants who are base enough to pose as something

they are not. Unfortunately, some people with authority over asylum
decisions in Western countries sometimes speak of adjudications as
though they did present such a morality play. They hasten to label as
abusive, frivolous, or lawless those claims that simply fall short of the
9
necessary showing.8
But the world is not that simple. Asylum adjudication, it must
be recognized, is at best a crude and incomplete way to respond to
the complex realities that the world presents. 90 Our legal structure,
for ultimately sound reasons, demands a simple yes or no answer to
the asylum claim. But the dichotomous character of the results
should not obscure the complexity onto which that yes-or-no grid is
forced. Asylum seekers present a spectrum of situations, with only
subtle shadings distinguishing the risk levels they face.9 ' Adjudication must draw a line at some point on that spectrum. Furthermore,
it must do so with care, so that it protects those whose risks exceed
the threshold, even if they happen to have joined a migration stream
applicant holds a subjective fear of return. Moreover, the central holding of CardozaFonseca clearly contemplates primary inquiry into the probability of persecution-an
objective determination. See Gibney, A "Well-Founded Fear" of Persecution, 10 HUMAN
RTS. Q 109, 110 (1988). A British court's effort to import a greater role for
subjective fears (even if they could be shown objectively to be exaggerated) was
overruled by the House of Lords in R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dept. e pare
Sivakumaran, 1 All E.R. 193 (H.L. 1988).
89 For example, in a 1988 article, the then Minister of the Interior for the
Federal Republic of Germany noted that only 9.3% of asylum seekers in 1987 were
recognized as refugees. He then commented: "This implies that 90.7% of all those
seeking asylum in West Germany unlawfully claimed to be politically persecuted."
Zimmermann, View From West Germany, WORLD LINK, May 1988, at 65 (emphasis
added); see, also INS Responds to Central American Influx, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1311-1312 (1988) (comments by INS Commissioner Nelson suggesting that
unsuccessful asylum claims are "abusive"). A perceptive critique of such attitudes
appears in Aleinikoff, PoliticalAsylum in the FederalRepublic of Germany and the Republic of
France: Lessons for the United States, 17 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 183, 191-93 (1984).
90 A pithy and revealing illustration of these complications, and of the effect of
the pictures inside immigration judges' heads, appears in Neier, Closing Remarks, 16
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 157 (1987-88) (recounting experiences of the author,
vice-chairman of Americas Watch, as an expert witness in asylum cases in which
similar home-country consequences were seen as economic phenomena in Central
America and political phenomena in Eastern Europe).
91 See N.L. ZUCKER & N.F. ZUCKER, supra note 61, at 149 (recognizing this feature
of much of refugee migration).
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made up principally of those less severely threatened, who therefore
lack, in this technical sense, a well-founded fear of persecution.
c. Lessons
These observations suggest two lessons with respect to asylum.
The first focuses on the nature of public debate. Every effort should
be made to avoid the use of dichotomous images and to break the
ready links people rush to forge between human rights policy and
asylum determinations. Obviously, an important relationship exists
between human rights abuses in the home country and the merits of
asylum claims by that country's nationals. But it is hardly a one-toone correlation. Returning a high percentage of asylum seekers to a
certain country is not necessarily inconsistent with a vigorous human
rights diplomacy. Return pronounces no blessing on the home government's overall practices; it simply indicates that these particular
applicants did not make the requisite showing of the risk of persecution. Similarly, granting asylum is not inconsistent with a policy of
alliance and support for a democratically elected government. Many
such regimes, particularly when newly installed, are only beginning a
difficult process of curbing human rights abuses committed by the
military, the police, or nongovernmental factions. We can support
these efforts while still shielding the truly jeopardized targets of
those incompletely controlled elements.
Second, and more important for the immediate object of this
study, the adjudication process must be shaped with attention to the
"coast of Bohemia" problem. Asylum adjudicators are given an
extremely difficult job, particularly in light of the inaccessibility of
the facts they must develop, the potential consequences of their
judgments, and the public ambivalence concerning their task. No
wonder they may be tempted to retreat into categorical images about
safety and danger in foreign countries that will make the sorting process easier.9 2 Asylum reforms must therefore make allowance for
this phenomenon and afford every opportunity, through initial training, continuous supply of reliable information, and well-crafted monitoring, for a redrawing of the pictures inside the adjudicators' heads
to conform more closely to the reality of political life in the home
countries.
92

See W.

LIPPMANN,

supra note 81, at 73-74.
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Limited Accessibility of the Facts on Which
to Base an Adjudication

Little has been done to analyze carefully the various elements
that go into the difficult determination of whether an asylum seeker
has a well-founded fear of persecution, but such analysis is integral
to designing an effective adjudication structure. In rough fashion,
the determination may be broken down into three parts: (1) classical
retrospective factfinding about past events specific to the claimantadjudicative facts, in the terminology of Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis;9 3 (2) broader determinations about the practices of the government or other alleged persecutors in the home country (often
referred to as "country conditions")-legislative facts; and finally (3)
an informed prediction (not truly a finding)9 4 about the degree and
type of danger the particular applicant is likely to face upon return, a
prediction based on a combination of the first two elements. These
are not three separate steps performed sequentially. They are
closely interwoven, and it will appear that acquaintance with the second element is especially helpful in performing the first task effectively. Each step presents unique challenges, unlike those faced in
other administrative adjudications. Indeed, of all such adjudications,
asylum may rest on uniquely elusive factual foundations.
a.

Adjudicative Facts

To begin with, applicants typically base their claims on events in
a distant land about which the U.S. government may have no
independent information-matters such as their own past political
activities, or specific abuses or threats directed at them or their families and friends. Of course, it is theoretically possible for the government to develop more information in an individual case, particularly
once the applicant provides details, by assigning diplomatic person93 See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.2, at 138-42 (2d ed.
1980); Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 364 (1942). This framework has been criticized, particularly because in some
circumstances it may be difficult to tell whether specific matters constitute
adjudicative or legislative facts. Se-, e.g., Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy:
Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U.
PA. L. REV. 485, 536-37 (1970). Nevertheless, the distinction is sufficiently crisp to be
quite illuminating in this setting. Judge Friendly used Davis's framework to make
sense of the asylum adjudication process, and also to set forth limits on the
appropriate use of State Department information in Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055,
1062-63 (2d Cir. 1976).
94 See Washington Post Co. v. United States Dept. of State, 840 F.2d 26, 40-41
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (Bork, J., dissenting).
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nel posted to that country to investigate. But sheer expense precludes such an effort except in a handful of cases, and the State
Department freely admits that it rarely resorts to field checking.
Such checking makes sense only where the information is likely to be
reasonably accessible: for example, when it involves a well-known
figure or relates to a large-scale event, such as a claimed political
demonstration in the capital city, which can be readily confirmed or
disproved. Moreover, even if the U.S. government would decide to
dedicate greater resources to investigating more such cases, the
investigations might yield little reliable information. If an ongoing
threat of persecution truly exists, persons interviewed in the home
country can hardly be expected to speak with candor to an unknown
foreigner about such sensitive and dangerous matters.
In short, even the straightforward retrospective factfinding
involved in asylum determinations is difficult to accomplish. Bona
fide applicants are unlikely to have left their homelands with corroborating documentation or with eyewitnesses to critical events.
On the other hand, fraudulent applicants can probably count on the
government's inability to produce evidence disproving their
stories.

95

Asylum determinations thus often depend critically on a determination of the credibility of the applicant, for he will usually be the
only available witness to the critical adjudicative facts of the case. 98
Because that person also has substantial incentives to lie or to
embroider the truth (and few disincentives), 9 this makes for a sys95 At one time, administrators and courts tended to react to this problem with a
dogmatic insistence on detailed corroboration of the applicant's claims. See Nasser
v. INS, 744 F.2d 542, 544 (6th Cir. 1984); Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079, 1084 (9th
Cir. 1983); Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379-80 (7th Cir. 1977). Wisely, most U.S.
authorities now recognize that the individual's own account may be the only available
evidence regarding his own situation and that it should be accepted if reasonably
detailed and consistent. See, e.g., Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th
Cir. 1985), aff'd, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 628
(1st Cir. 1985); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984); In re
Mogharrabi, Interim Dec. No. 3028, slip op. at 10 (BIAJune 12, 1987) (stating that
often the only evidence available is the applicant's own testimony, which is to be
credited if it is "believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible
and coherent account of the basis for his fear").
96 See generally Watkins, Credibility Findings in Deportation Proceedings: "Bear[ing]
Witness Unto the Truth, 2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 231 (1987) (the author is an immigration
judge in San Diego).
97 In principle those who falsify their applications are subject to criminal
prosecution under statutes punishing false statements. But the inaccessibility of the
factual information obviously makes proof of knowing falsehood quite difficult, and
prosecutions are rarely, if ever, brought. The only sanction, then, is expulsion from

1282

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:1247

tern vulnerable to manipulation. I was struck, however, by the frequent comments from several participants I interviewed, particularly
government decisionmakers and INS trial attorneys, indicating that
the asylum system is saved from complete collapse largely by the
admirable honesty of most of the applicants.
Again and again in the course of the interviews carried out for
this study, participants in the process, on all sides of the issue,
emphasized one fact: In the vast majority of cases, the only useful
detailed evidence respecting adjudicative facts comes from the
mouth of the applicant. This feature must therefore figure prominently in any serious effort at procedural and structural reform. The
system must be designed to mine as much useful information as possible from the limited vein provided by the applicant's own testimony
98
and his availability for questioning during any interview or hearing.
b.

Legislative Facts

The second critical element of factfinding requires determinations about broader patterns of governmental behavior in the home
country. For example, the asylum applicant may prove to the
factfinder's satisfaction, through his own detailed testimony, that he
was active as a union organizer for two years before leaving for the
United States and that he heard stories of arrests of organizers in
nearby towns before he left. But in order to assess the risk that the
individual would face on return, the adjudicator must also learn from
some source about relevant legislative facts. Does the government
regard union organizers as opponents, subject to suppression? If so,
what forms does the suppression take? Loss of a job or limitation of
schooling options for organizers' children might not amount to persecution (even though it would constitute a human rights violation),
but beatings, jailings, or killings in reprisal for peaceful union activity certainly would. If there have been some reports of such violence, how widespread are the abuses? Were they based on the
victim's union affiliation or on some other characteristic? In other
words, is the current applicant relevantly similar to other persecution
victims? And has there been a material change in the country since
those events, such as a complete revamping of the police forces
the country following denial of the asylum claim-the same consequence faced if
asylum had never been sought.
98 The BIA in essence recognized the importance of this process in a recent
precedent decision that requires the asylum applicant to testify under oath at the
hearing before the immigration judge; he cannot simply rest on the papers
presented. See In re Fefe, Interim Dec. No. 3121, slip op. (BIA Aug. 1, 1989).
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responsible for the earlier abuses, including reliable disciplining of
the violators?
Each of these questions will be difficult to answer, both because
such patterns change over time, sometimes quite quickly, and
because persecutors do not spell out the range of characteristics they
seek in their victims. If the available information shows any substantial level of persecution of union activists, then uncertainties should
be resolved in the individual's favor. Thus, the claimant should
receive the "benefit of the doubt" commonly prescribed in works on
refugee law.9 9 But the benefit of the doubt is hardly a magic
formula, somehow dispensing with a need to reach ajudgment about
country conditions.' 0 0
The individual applicant will not necessarily be in a position to
provide insight on these wider matters, although the process should
certainly allow for whatever assistance he or his counsel can provide.
Most Western countries therefore support their adjudicators with
well-supplied documentation centers staffed by professionals in
information science. Fortunately, the last twenty years have seen a
welcome proliferation of human rights reporting, both by governments 0l t and private human rights organizations, t° 2 as well as
99 See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 88, at 48.
100 The UNHCR Handbook, for example, at one point states that adjudicators
"are not required to pass judgment on conditions in the applicant's country of
origin," although it does suggest that some such knowledge may help in the
assessment of the applicant's credibility. Id. at 12-13. This is simply wrong. Such
knowledge is useful, to be sure, in the latter setting. But the adjudicator cannot avoid
passing judgment more broadly on country conditions as an unavoidable part of the
ultimate decision on the merits. In the example in text, the applicant's credibility
may be relevant only in deciding whether in fact he engaged in the union organizing
activities he claims. The adjudicator might then proceed to recognize him as a
refugee because he credits, wholly apart from anything the applicant says, numerous
human rights reports describing a campaign of persecution directed against union
leaders.
101 The most comprehensive is the annual series of human rights country
reports prepared by the U.S. State Department. See, e.g., SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS AND HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 101ST CONG., 1ST
SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1988 (Comm. Print

1989).
102 In addition to comprehensive annual volumes published by Amnesty
International covering most countries of the world, see, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
1988 ANNUAL REPORT, many organizations publish topical reports on conditions in a
single country or region as the need arises. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
BURMA: EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTION AND TORTURE OF MEMBERS OF ETHNIC MINORITIES
(1988); INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW GROUP, A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 19801985 (1985); LAWYERS COMMrITEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EL SALVADOR: HUMAN RIGHTS
DISMISSED-A REPORT ON 16 UNRESOLVED CASES (1986); ROTH, REPRESSION
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increasingly sophisticated efforts to systematize the informationgathering process and facilitate sharing.'0 3 To minimize distortions
in decisions about country conditions wrought by the needs of diplomacy, many countries assure clear separation of adjudicators from
their foreign ministries, so that diplomats become only one source of
input. 10 4 Of course, such systems presuppose that adjudicators are
equipped to sort through competing accounts and reach their own
judgments about country conditions.
Legislative facts should not be regarded, however, as simply
something the adjudicator looks up or examines after he has completed the proceedings addressed to finding the adjudicative facts,
even though much of his knowledge about country conditions will
doubtless come from documentary sources rather than live testimony. Knowledge of political developments and patterns of persecution contributes toward making the final predictive judgment
about risks faced if the individual returns home, but perhaps more
importantly, such knowledge can also play a useful role in developing and assessing the adjudicative facts themselves.
This second use of knowledge about country conditions is often
overlooked, but it remains crucial. An adjudicator thus equipped can
better pick out those parts of the applicant's story that are most relevant, and can ask specific questions that will flesh out the testimony
in the most helpful fashion."0 5 Such expert questioning can also
help expose inconsistencies and falsehoods more effectively. Since
there are so few other checks on the asylum seeker's story (given that
he is likely to be the only available witness to the key events), the
system badly needs to make use of whatever other tools might be
available for such assessment. But equipping adjudicators with such
expertise is not just a device for spotting weaknesses or magnifying
contradictions. Properly applied, it can also assist confused or inarDISGUISED AS LAw: HUMAN RIGHTS (N POLAND (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights

1987).

103 See, e.g., Thoolen, Refugees and Information Technology, REFUGEES, Oct. 1988, at
34. Nongovernmental organizations have taken the lead in this sharing process with
the active cooperation of the UNHCR, which has recently become the focal point for
an international network. See Int'l Refugee Documentation Network, Circular No. 3
(Mar. 1989) (reporting, inter alia, on recent efforts to strengthen the network,
including training courses for documentalists and an internship program at
UNHCR's Centre for Documentation on Refugees (CDR) in Geneva).
104 See Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 234.
105 See Martin, Comparative Policies on PoliticalAsylum: Of Facts and Law, in 9 IN
DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 105, 109-11 (1987); Martin, The End of De Facto Asylum: Toward
a Humane and Realistic Response to Refugee Challenges, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 161, 167-69
(1987-88) [hereinafter Martin, The End of De Facto Asylum].
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ticulate applicants in presenting fully the particularized information
that will cast positive light on their claims. All this argues for making
sure, to the maximum extent possible, that the adjudicators are
themselves highly knowledgeable about country conditions.
c.

PredictiveJudgment

Finally, the information on the adjudicative and legislative facts
must somehow be put together to reach a judgment as to the likely
threat to the particular individual. For most of the countries from
which current applicants come, it will be clear that persecution
occurs at the hands of the government or societal elements beyond
fully effective control of the government. But what is the threat to
this particular individual upon return? One must venture into the
realm of prediction to decide. Cumulative expertise would also be of
assistance here; such a judgment is not something that emerges routinely from the evidence placed on record in the case before a passive adjudicator.
It is also clear, however, that room for controversy will almost
always remain. This is not a scientific prediction based on regular
laws or formulas; it is an assessment that should be based, as much as
possible, on conscientious attention to country condition information and individual facts. As a result, the measure of an adjudication
system's success cannot be the attainment of nearly universal acceptance of the rightness of the results, particularly negative results leading to deportation from the country. Success consists instead in
achieving sufficient acceptance of the process, including respect for
the judgment and fairness of the decisionmakers, so that final grants
and denials are regarded as authoritative.
4.

Difficulties of Cross-Cultural Communication

One final complication deserves emphasis. As is apparent, much
of the adjudication process will turn on assessment of the credibility
of the applicant. Ordinarily, a decisionmaker judges credibility by
probing the internal consistency and detail of the testimony about
past events, observing the demeanor of the witness, and comparing
the testimony to that person's earlier accounts or to other evidence
regarding the events described. But because asylum applicants usually come from cultures sharply different from that of the United
States, these ordinary guideposts to decision may not work well-or
at least they must be applied with considerable allowance for cross-
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cultural complications. 1 1 6 These complications have been ably catalogued and illustrated in a helpful article by Professor Kilin that
should be read by all asylum adjudicators.10 7 Persons interviewed
for this study, particularly JNHCR personnel and attorneys for asylum applicants, frequently stressed that adjudicators must have the
capacity to refrain from immediately applying tests10and
expectations
8
derived solely from the culi:ure of the haven state.
Many asylum seekers come from societies where the population
inherently distrusts or fears government officials (and often lawyers).
Nothing in their past experience prompts them to open up readily to
strangers, particularly when speaking of highly sensitive events.
Thus, it is not surprising that in their first hours or even weeks or
months in the United States they might fail to appreciate the new
climate here that allows them to speak more freely and assertively.
Many private attorneys interviewed for this study reported their own
difficulties in winning trust and thus gaining candid accounts from
their own clients. One experienced asylum attorney provided a
graphic example. He reported that after spending nearly thirty
hours with a reticent client, a Haitian asylum seeker, he believed he
was prepared for a hearing. The day before the hearing, the client
supplied some new information that revealed an entire new dimension to the story that she had been afraid to discuss earlier. Many
more hours of patient inter-viewing were required to piece together
the newly revealed true story, and concomitantly to bolster the client's trust in the attorney that would be needed for effective direct
examination.
Furthermore, psychological studies indicate that some of the
strongest candidates for asylum may be those applicants with the
greatest difficulties presenting their cases. Those who have been tortured or have witnessed the brutal slaying of friends or loved ones
may have great difficulty retelling the key elements of their accounts.
106 See generally Note, Credibility Findings in INS Asylum Adjudications: A Realistic
Assessment, 23 TEX. INT'L LJ. 139, 142-43 (1988).
107 See KNlin, Troubled Communication:Cross-CulturalMisunderstandingsin the AsylumHearing, 20 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 230 (1986).
108 A UNHCR officer in Canada suggested that the most important quality to be

sought in an adjudicator is empathy: "Can this person understand what real refugees
go through?" He emphasized, however, that people with this quality "can still be
firm in saying no" when that is warranted; failure to reject the unqualified, she
stressed, also "screws up the system." Interview with Paul LaRose Edwards, in
Ottawa, Canada (Dec. 20, 1988).
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At times, post-traumatic stress disorder may even block consistent
memory of past events. 10 9
American decisionmakers unaware of these complications are
likely to seize upon inconsistency and reticence (particularly about
matters that most Americans would regard as of the greatest importance) as evidence of dissembling-for reasons that usually hold
good within our own cultural context. These actions are not such
ready signals of dissembling, however, when the individuals involved
come from sharply different cultural backgrounds. A reformed system must equip its decisionmakers to avoid snap judgments and
make adequate allowance for cross-cultural difficulties. But such
awareness must also be employed with care. Some of the writings
about cross-cultural sensitivity seem almost to assume that there is
an innocent explanation for any stumble, vagueness, or change of
story." 0 This is not necessarily the case. A reformed system must
also equip its adjudicators to sort through such phenomena and still
be able to spot false tales-because sometimes inconsistency and reticence really do result from falsehood and not from more innocent
explanations. The line to be walked is a fine one.
C.

The Imperative of Speedy Final Decisions

The foregoing problems suggest genuine, indeed profound, difficulties in applying the legal standards with precision and fidelity.
As long as these problems impair accurate decisionmaking, the system will have its own built-in magnet effect. When the process cannot reliably sort the qualified from the unqualified, asylum applicants
drawn to the system will include not only those with a reasonable
chance of qualifying, but also others whose claims are marginal or
nonexistent. They will come hoping to take advantage of these very
weaknesses to gain an undeserved benefit, namely, the award of asylum status and possibly eventual permanent residence.
In later sections, I propose measures to make the maximum use
109 See, e.g., Allodi, Randall, Lutz, Quiroga, Zunzunegui, Kolff, Deutsch & Doan,
Physical and PsychiatricEffects of Torture: Two MedicalStudies, in THE BREAKING OF BODIES
AND MINDS: TORTURE, PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE, AND THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS 58, 65-72

(E. Stover & E. Nightingale eds. 1985); Note, supra note 106, at 148-50; Rovner, The
Torture of the Refugee: Why Judges Don't Believe, Wash. Post, Sept. 2, 1986 (Health

Section), at 10, 11.
110 For a court decision that verges on this approach, rejecting the immigration
judge's negative credibility finding and asserting that earlier untrue statements and
changed stories actually supported the persecution claim, see Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d
1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1987).
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of the available information sources in service of the goal of accuracy. One might think that such an achievement would suffice to
accomplish the fundamental. objectives of our asylum program and
also curb the magnet effect--by providing asylum to the persecuted
and saying "no" to those who seek to use asylum mainly as a loophole. If accuracy were all we had to accomplish, we could embrace
elaborate schemes that promise to serve that goal, even if they consumed a large amount of time to reach final decisions and employed
multiple layers of administrative and judicial consideration as a check
against error. Unfortunately, however, the magnet problem is more
complex, in ways that demand an end to undue layering so as to preserve the capacity for speedy final and enforceable determinations.
1. The Scope of the Magnet Effect
The magnet effect is not solely the product of perceived chances
to gain full asylum despite a weak case. Benefits that applicants can
expect to enjoy before a final ruling is issued in the case-a period that
now can stretch for months, and usually lasts years-also contribute
importantly to that phenomenon. Of course, to some extent both
accuracy and speed are goals of any administrative adjudication system. But the need for expeditious finality is more intense here. In
other adjudication processes, such as those governing disability
claims or public welfare or licensing, the applicant ordinarily does
not enjoy the benefit sought until there has been a determination on
the merits that he fully qualifies. Nothing in the application and
waiting process itself tempts the unqualified to clog the system. With
political asylum, in contrast, the simple act of applying has usually
brought important benefits that magnify the attractions, whatever
the ultimate determination on the merits. With a few recent exceptions, the very act of applying for asylum has resulted, after a brief
delay, in the issuance of preliminary papers that both authorize
employment and permit free movement within U.S. territory. These
two features comprise the bulk of the main benefits expected from
asylum itself, particularly for those who know they have at best weak
claims. "1
The longer the period of enjoyment that comes simply from the
II1 To be sure, the uncertainty about the duration of such benefits is a
disadvantage. But it is a disadvantage that is doubtless felt more acutely by true
refugees for whom there are genuinely grave risks if they return. Those who know
they face little risk at home harbor fewer concerns about what will transpire once the
asylum-seeker stage ends. In the meantime, they have nearly complete access to the
job market and the other features of life in a stable, wealthy, and free society.

1990]

REFORMING ASYLUM ADJUDICATION

1289

act of applying for asylum, obviously the greater the attraction in filing a marginal claim. When word gets back to the home countries of
those who initially benefit from such arrangements during the asylum-application stage, more and more people with marginal or nonexistent claims are likely to come, hoping to achieve at least the
benefits of years of productive working life in a wealthy country,
whatever the ultimate outcome. 112 A successful asylum system must
thus place a high priority on speed in adjudications (including all
stages of review) in order to avoid these incentives for marginal asylum seekers.
2. The Alternativ& of Deterrent Measures
Of course, speedier final decisions are not the only way to eliminate the artificial attractions of the asylum-seeker stage. One could
simply end the provision of free movement and work authorization
during this period. Many Western countries have been moving in
this direction, imposing a variety of restrictions and deterrents that
have raised the concern of UNHCR and provoked harsh condemnation from the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that support
asylum seekers and advocate refugee causes. These restrictive practices include denials of work authorization, enforced housing in austere communal facilities, other limits on freedom of movement, and
sometimes full-scale detention in jail-like facilities." 3
112 Canada, for example, experienced an exponential growth in asylum claims
filed by nationals of Trinidad and Tobago throughout 1987-88 (reaching 2739 such
applications in 1988). Once its new system was implemented on January 1, 1989,
promising swift rejection of manifestly unfounded claims, applications from Trinidad

dropped to 15 in the first quarter of the year. See 63

DOCUMENTATION-RgFUGIgS

1, 6

(Jan. 25-Feb. 3, 1989); Refugee Determination in Canada: First Quarter Review 9
(Apr. 25, 1989). For a more complete description of the new Canadian adjudication
system, which appears to hold considerable promise, see the expanded version of this
study (forthcoming Yale University Press). See also Blum & Laurence, Cold Windsfrom
the North:An Analysis of Recent Shifts in North American Refugee Policy, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 55 (1987-88); Hathaway, Postscript, 34 McGILL L.J. 354 (1989);
Hathaway, Selective Concern: An Overview of Refugee Law in Canada, 33 McGILL L.J. 676
(1988); Rusu, The Development of Canada'sImmigration and Refugee Board Documentation

Center, I

INT'LJ. REFUGEE

L. 319 (1989).

See generally Fullerton, Restrictingthe Flow of Asylum-Seekers in Belgium, Denmark,
the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands: New Challenges to the Geneva
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights,
29 VA. J. INT'L L. 35 (1988); Martin, supra note 1. The United States has also
employed Coast Guard interdiction of vessels coming from Haiti. Although the
interdiction process is designed to include screening to permit persons with valid
refugee claims to come to the United States, interdiction has evoked severe criticism.
See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 724-26; Helton, PoliticalAsylum under
the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 243, 254-56 (1984).
113
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Considerable misunderstanding has arisen regarding the use of
deterrent measures and restrictive practices. NGOs sometimes act as
though any deterrent steps are illegitimate-sheer vindictiveness visited upon innocents, many of whom may prove to be bona fide refugees. Some perspective is needed. Designing policy to discourage
the unqualified from even applying for a benefit is a perfectly legitimate policy objective, particularly when existing statistics demonstrate that a high percentage of applications lack merit. 1 4 To the
extent that current measures are meant to encourage self-selection,
so that only those with strong cases bother to leave their home countries, they address an unimpeachable administrative aim. In design,
at least, these restrictive practices are meant to send a "general
deterrence" message to persons still in the home country.
The message grows more complex in practice. At this preliminary stage, deterrent measures almost inevitably apply to all asylum
applicants, whatever the strength or weakness of their claims. (To
sort the strong from the weak at this stage-save for screening out
wholly frivolous applications-would simply be too cumbersome,
because of all the factual difficulties canvassed in the previous section.) Thus, the burdens of these measures often fall on genuine
refugees."1 ' It is not wholly surprising, then, that some judges might
view these measures as penalties for filing an asylum claim, or as
coercion meant to force current applicants to withdraw their applications and return home, rather than as deterrents addressed to those
still in the home country, designed to convince them (if they are not
substantially threatened) to decide against coming to the United
States. If they see such measures this way, courts are likely to declare
the deterrents invalid for conflicting with the statutory right to apply
6
for asylum."
114 Naturally, a major part of the NGO criticism stems from a belief that existing
grant rates are woefully inadequate. But unless the grant rate should approach 100
percent, encouraging self-selection remains a legitimate aim.
115 Some interviewed for this study, however, who advocated the detention of
asylum seekers, argued (with some measure of plausibility) that the true refugee
should be the least affected by such deterrents. They should see humane detention
in the United States, for a limited period that will definitely end with a final
adjudication, as a small price to pay to escape from actual persecution in the
homeland. True refugees, such persons argued, would not begin to think about
withdrawing the application and returning home, for the fate there is clearly worse.
Only those facing little real risk at home might be tempted ("coerced," as the other
camp would describe it) to withdraw an application in order to end the detention. If
the fate at home is that much less intimidating than a few months in detention here,
detention advocates argue, then such persons do not merit asylum in any event.
116 See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1510 (C.D. Cal.
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The basic problem is that these deterrent measures and restrictive practices are indiscriminate in their impact. By their very nature,
they fall equally on deserving refugees and the most flagrant abusers
during the asylum application stage. A case could even be made that
they fall with more debilitating effect on true refugees, because
lengthy uncertainty over their ultimate fate, coupled with enforced
idleness and perhaps prison-like detention, will carry the most severe
psychological impact for those who know with substantial assurance
that persecution awaits them at home. (It may be even more devastating for those who have already been tortured or severely mistreated.) For these reasons, such deterrents plainly should be
avoided if workable alternatives are available.' 17 At best these deterrent measures are crude tools, meant to send a message to marginal
applicants discouraging them from leaving the home country, but
capable of implementation only by imposing harshness on true refugees as well, those who will ultimately be found to merit asylum.
3.

Toward a Better-Targeted Deterrent

We need instead a discriminate deterrent, more precisely
focused on the marginal cases, and one that takes away the artificial
attractions of the asylum applicant stage of the proceedings. .Such a
deterrent is available, if we can change the adjudication system to
achieve one crucial result: the prompt reappearance in the home village of applicants whose cases were at best marginal. Such an event
makes apparent to others similarly situated that such a trip is not
worthwhile; they will not be able to work long enough even to repay
the "travel agent's" fee." 8 Speedy finality is the essential precondi1988) (granting injunction because INS practices and procedures at detention
centers "discourage class members from exercising and pursuing asylum"); Nunez v.
Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 586 (S.D. Tex.) ("The present procedures do not
sufficiently assure that genuine asylum claims will be heard ....
), appeal dismissed,
692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982). Other courts, however, have been more willing to
sustain detention schemes, including their use for explicit deterrent purposes. See,
e.g., Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 1987); Singh v. Nelson, 623 F.
Supp. 545, 556-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See generally Helton, The Legality of Detaining
Refugees in the United States, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 353 (1986); Schmidt,
Detention of Aliens, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 305, 329-33 (1987) (discussing detention of
asylum applicants).
117 For an elaboration of these points, see Martin, supra note 1.
I 18 Some critics of an earlier version of this study made much of the lack of
proof that such returns would really deter other migrants. It is true that no empirical
studies support this claim. Nor are there any, to my knowledge, that disprove it.
Reliable testing procedures would be difficult to develop.
Suggestive support can be found, however, in much recent social science
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tion of this deterrent. The message is lost if two or three years pass
between departure and return, particularly if the applicant has been
working while the application was pending.
How much speed is necessary? We lack empirical data to calculate the outside limits with any kind of accuracy (and anyway the calculations would vary by country and by travel agent). But if all but
the most complicated cases could reach finality within six to nine
months, including all the stages of consideration and review, little in
the application process would add artificially to the attractions of the
asylum system.
NGOs that strongly oppose indiscriminate deterrent practicesfor good and worthy reasons-should remember that the best way to
help avoid them, or reduce their harmful impact, is to cooperate with
the government in fashioning a speedy and accurate system that can
accomplish discriminate deterrence. This point cannot be overemphasized. In the absence of the capacity to make final decisions quickly,
officials have no way to respond to legitimate public concerns over
massive influxes, unless they turn to the deterrent measures and
restrictive devices that NGOs and the UNHCR condemn. To defeat
prudent streamlining of the adjudication process is to invite reliance
on cruder measures of deterrence. Mere nominal acceptance of the
need for expeditious proceedings is not enough. Refugee advocates
literature. Criticizing simplistic: "push-pull" models of migration, these works
emphasize the role of social networks in encouraging and sustaining migration. That
is, if the first emigrants from a particular community succeed in establishing
themselves in a new country, their experience, communicated homeward (often
along with significant remittances), encourages others from the same locale to make
the trip. Moreover, their presence in the target city or town within the new country
helps others during the difficult early months. See, e.g., Boyd, Family and Personal
Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments and New Agendas, 23 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 638 (1989); Massey, Understanding Mexican Migration to the United
States, 92 AM. J. Soc. 2 (1987); Portes & B6r6cz, ContemporaryImmigration: Theoretical
Perspectives on its Determinantsand Modes of Incorporation, 23 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 606

(1989).
Although such studies generally address "guest workers" and similar economic
migration and do not focus on asylum-seeker networks, there is no reason to believe
that this phenomenon would fail to operate in the latter context. Much anecdotal
evidence about the role of asylum "travel agents" and similar entrepreneurs fits
readily within these network theories. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the disparate caseload patterns in adjoining asylum countries also suggest
a network effect. In 1989, for example, Canada received 1,966 Sri Lankan asylum
seekers, see [Canadian] Immigration and Refugee Board, News Release of Jan. 19,
1990, at 4; the United States only 40. See INS, ASYLUM CASES FILED WITH DISTRICT
DIRECTORS, FISCAL YEAR 1989 THROUGH SEPT. 1989 (CORAP table). Swift

deportation of unsuccessful asylum seekers would seek to break that chain and would
be designed to send a very different message back to the source communities.
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will have to join in making difficult decisions about the trimming of
certain procedures (which will undeniably carry some costs to the
goal of accuracy) in order to achieve truly speedy determinations.
A second point concerning restrictive measures and deterrents
may be more immediately relevant. From the government's standpoint, most of these other restrictions do not eliminate the priority
for speed; they simply create other reasons for embracing it as a vital
goal. The U.S. government probably cannot simply deny work
authorizations (now seen by some as a major contributor to an artificial magnet effect) to asylum applicants without establishing some
other public scheme to provide for the subsistence needs of the idled
asylum seekers until they are either recognized as refugees or
removed from the country. Whether such provision is made in communal facilities or in actual detention centers, it will still require a
substantial commitment of public resources. Every day of added
delay, therefore, compounds the expense imposed on the public
treasury.'

19

There is a final reason for embracing speedy procedures,
derived from the perspective of the legitimate and meritorious claimant-for whose benefit, after all, asylum protections were initially
adopted. Initial decisions in many district offices now take six to
eight months, largely because of backlogs created by the overload of
asylum applications. Bona fide applicants with qualifying cases
should not have to wait so long to have the burden of uncertainty
lifted from their shoulders. As indicated, their primary need is to
find the calm and security that will enable them to rebuild some semblance of a normal life. They are much more likely to make a successful transition (including recovering from past episodes of torture
or other traumatic mistreatment) if security, in the form of a settled
and reasonably permanent immigration status, comes quickly after
arrival.
119 See Appendix (for cost estimates). In fact, truly expeditious and accurate
procedures might further support the use of detention or enforced housing
arrangements and denial of work authorization during the asylum-seeker stage. The
main objection to these measures has been their baleful impact on bona fide
claimants. But if most bona fide claimants can be recognized in the first-round
proceeding and thus need wait only a short period (say two to three months) in such
a setting, much of the unintended coercive impact disappears. The Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy in fact recommended such
arrangements, focusing on accommodation in "federal asylum processing centers" in
its recommendations
for coping with "asylum emergencies."
These
recommendations appear to have presupposed speedy determinations. See SELECT
COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 165-68.
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Speedy finality is imperative. It must not be achieved at the
complete expense of either accuracy in outcomes or fairness in the
process, but some tradeoffs will be necessary. Speed here is not simply the kind of virtue it may be in some other administrative settings--desirable but optional, a ,pleasing accomplishment if
achievable, but not gravely damaging if other aims preclude its
attainment. Speedy denials of unworthy asylum applications, followed by prompt deportation, are indispensable if we are to implement the only really humane deterrent available to the system. In
time of large-scale influx, the inability to deport the unqualified in
fairly short order will lead governments to resort to other costly and
troublesome deterrents which indiscriminately burden genuine
refugees.
III.

THE AMERICAN ADJUDICATION SYSTEM

A.

Historical Background

The earliest American regulations establishing procedures for
asylum and related adjudications appeared in 1953, implementing
the 1952 version of § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA). 2 ' They provided for "interrogation under oath by an immigration officer" to examine the claim that the alien would be subject
to physical persecution if deported. The regulations permitted the
presence of an attorney, at the alien's expense, but said nothing
more about the attorney's role during the interrogation. Final decisions, presumably based on the record of the interview, were to be
rendered by the Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner-a cumbersome requirement changed a year later to vest that authority
instead in regional commissioners of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).' 2
In 1962, new regulations took effect establishing different
arrangements for persecution claims in deportation proceedings.
They established specific procedures for the immigration judge (then
called a special inquiry officer) to designate an alternate country of
deportation, in case the country the alien chose refused to accept
him, and they required the judge then to advise of the possibility,
under § 243(h) (which was then still a discretionary provision), of
withholding deportation to that country. If the alien chose to claim
that protection, he received ten days to file an application docu120 See 18 Fed. Reg. 4925 (1953) (adding 8 C.F.R. § 243.3(b)(2)).
121 See 19 Fed. Reg. 9172, 9179 (1954) (amending 8 C.F.R. § 243.3(b)(2)).
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menting his persecution claims, after which he would be examined
under oath on these issues as in a deportation proceeding.1 2 2 Later
amendments made clear that an INS trial attorney could also intro12 3
duce evidence bearing on the persecution claim.
By 1962, then, the two basic patterns for asylum and related
adjudications that our system has known had already emerged. On
the one hand, INS made some determinations based on a nonadversarial interview or interrogation carried out by an immigration
officer. In other settings, immigration judges decided whether to
provide relief from deportation after more formalized trial-type proceedings. In succeeding years, INS refined the nonadversarial procedures, vesting the ultimate decisionmaking authority not in the
regional commissioners or higher officials, but in the district directors, who of course relied in practice, most of the time, on the immigration officer who conducted the interview. As INS discovered
more and more settings (outside the deportation procedure) in
which persecution claims might arise, it adopted a variety of new regulations and instructions specifying that district directors, rather
than immigration judges, were to hear and determine those matters.
For example, district directors received authority to make final decisions on persecution claims by alien crewmen, 124 excludable
aliens,' 2 5 and applicants for the special benefits of INA § 203(a)(7)
1 26
who were already in the United States.
122 See 26 Fed. Reg. 12,110, 12,112 (1961). With a few modifications, this
provision, 8 C.F.R. § 242.17, remains in the regulations and affords one avenue for
consideration of withholding by the immigration court. Most applicants today,
however, affirmatively apply for asylum much earlier in the immigration court
proceedings, under other regulations.
123 See 39 Fed. Reg. 25,642 (1974) (amending 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c)).
124 See 32 Fed. Reg. 4341, 4342 (1967) (amending 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)). This

assignment of authority to the district directors, to the exclusion of special inquiry
officers (now called immigration judges), was approved, over vigorous dissent, in INS
v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62 (1969). Interestingly, this provision, which provides
protections only to those fearing persecution in Communist countries, was not

amended in the wake of the Refugee Act of 1980, which mandated neutral and
apolitical standards in refugee matters. It survives as a kind of dinosaur in the Code
of Federal Regulations. Crewmen from other countries, however, may still claim

asylum under other provisions.

This was initially established in the less formal "Operations Instructions,"
States, 547 F.2d
1281, 1285 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
126 See 30 Fed. Reg. 14,772, 14,779 (1965) (adding 8 C.F.R. § 245.4), amended,
34 Fed. Reg. 19,799 (1969). INA § 203(a)(7) was enacted primarily to authorize
overseas refugee programs for the resettlement of persons who fled persecution in
Communist countries or countries "within the general area of the Middle East." See
8 U.S.C. § I153(a)(7) (1976). But a proviso allowed for adjustment of status to
125

and enshrined in the regulations only in 1974. See Pierre v. United
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In 1970, a Lithuanian seaman named Simas Kudirka was forcibly
returned to a Russian vessel a few hours after he had escaped to a
U.S. Coast Guard cutter. Although INS had not been involved in
this extraordinary incident, the ensuing outcry launched a complete
review of asylum procedures used by all agencies.' 27 Eventually INS
promulgated new asylum regulations, permitting both excludable
and deportable aliens to apply to the district director for asylum on a
new form, Form 1-589. These 1974 regulations also made specific
provision for a practice that had already taken root. They required
the district director to seek the views of the State Department on an
asylum claim, while also giving the alien an opportunity to explain or
rebut any State Departmen: comments before a decision could be
based thereon. Such comments were not binding on the adjudicator,
but if the district director decided to deny an application despite a
favorable State Department letter, he had to certify his ruling to the
28
regional commissioner for final decision.'
Under the 1974 regulations, any deportable alien denied asylum
could, in essence, renew the claim in deportation proceedings by
applying to the immigration judge for protection under § 243(h).
For excludable aliens, however-those aliens apprehended at the
border before making an entry into the United States-the district
office remained the only venue for an asylum claim. Within a few
years, excludable Haitians challenged, on due process grounds, the
regulations' failure to permit an "evidentiary hearing" (of the type
provided in immigration court proceedings) when so much was
potentially at stake. 129 District courts split on the issue, but the Fifth
Circuit eventually ruled for the government, approving the regulations.1t a While the asylum seekers' certiorari petition was pending
in the Supreme Court, however, the newly installed Carter Adminispermanent resident of those who had been physically present in the United States for
two years and could prove that they qualified. See generally T. ALEINIKOFF & D.
MARTIN, supra note 3, at 622-23 (discussing this version of INA § 203(a)(7)).
127 The State Department's resulting policy was announced in 1972 and
remains in force today with slight changes. See Public Notice 351, Request for
Asylum-Policy and Procedures, 37 Fed. Reg. 3447 (1972), modified, Public Notice
728, Requests for Asylum, 45 Fed. Reg. 70,621 (1980).
128 See 39 Fed. Reg. 41,832 (1.974) (adding 8 C.F.R. pt. 108), amended, 40 Fed.
Reg. 3407, 3407-08 (1975).
129 This had long been a matter in contention; it was the central dispute
between the majority and dissent in a Supreme Court case construing the regulations
governing asylum claims filed by alien crewmen. See INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62
(1969).
130 See Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281, 1290 (5th Cir.), vacated and
remanded to consider mootness, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
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tration decided to accede to the plaintiffs' demands; finding merit in
the due process concerns and seeing no major costs if the change
13
were made. '
In considering new regulations to implement that 1977 concession, INS attempted to take to heart the vigorous objections to district director adjudications that had been voiced throughout the
earlier litigation-assertions which made it sound as though such a
setting could never provide justice in asylum cases.' 3 2 In consequence, the agency promulgated regulations in 1978 that would have
made the immigration court, with very limited exceptions, the only
of such asylum claims, for either excludable
forum for consideration
3
3

or deportable aliens.1

To INS's legitimate surprise, refugee advocates suddenly displayed a change in perspective. They filed comments on the regulations, as well as briefs in litigation, that revealed a remarkable
rediscovery of the virtues of nonadversarial proceedings before the
district directors, exactly the officials whose decisions had been so
heavily criticized in the course of the earlier litigation. Nonadversarial hearings in the district office, it was asserted, would be less
frightening for the applicants, particularly those with meritorious
cases who were probably the most easily intimidated. Such proceed13 4
ings would also allow for swift grants when they were warranted.
131

See Memorandum of Solicitor General Suggesting Mootness, Pierre v.

United States, 434 U.S. 962 (1977) (No. 77-53).
132 See, e.g., Petition for Certiorari at 18-22, Pierrev. United States, 434 U.S. 962
(1977) (No. 77-53).
'33 See 43 Fed. Reg. 40,801, 40,802 (1978) (amending 8 C.F.R. pts. 108 and
236) (affecting excludable aliens and intended to take effect immediately), modified, 43
Fed. Reg. 48,620 (1978) (in response to litigation, INS stayed the initial rulemaking
to allow public notice and comment). Also, at the time of the first rulemaking, INS
promulgated proposed rules intended to work the same changes for deportable
aliens; that is, to make the immigration court the only venue for asylum claims. See 43
Fed. Reg. 40,879 (1978).
134 See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 21,253-56 (1979) (summarizing comments received on

1978 proposed rules). Similar sentiments were expressed with regard to the 1980
interim rules:
A number of commenters suggested that all applications for asylum,

whether filed before or after the institution of exclusion or expulsion
proceedings, should be decided by the district director. Proceedings

before the district directors were viewed as less adversarial in nature and
were providing the applicants with a freer atmosphere within which to
present their claims. It was pointed out that many applicants have fled

from countries where the judicial process is suspect and feared by them
and, they would not feel free to present their claims with the same candor
that they could in a proceeding before a district director.
48 Fed. Reg. 5885 (1983).

1298

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:1247

Feeling somewhat blindsided, the agency nonetheless largely acquiesced. The final rules retained the same two-tier de novo consideration for deportable aliens, although the rules did insist on
channeling all claims by excludable aliens into the immigration
35

courts. 1

Refugee advocates were not entirely satisfied. Because legislation that became the Refugee Act of 1980 was then proceeding
through Congress, hearings on that bill provided a forum to continue the pressure for a mo:re extensive role for the district directors
in considering asylum claims. Eventually, their lobbying secured a
measure of congressional support for such changes.' 3 6 INS paid
heed to these messages, and its interim rules implementing the asylum provisions of the Refugee Act granted both excludable and
deportable aliens an opportunity to be heard first in nonadversarial
proceedings before the district director, provided no charging document had yet issued.' 3 7 If unsuccessful, the claimants retained the
right to renew their asylum claims before the immigration judges in
exclusion or deportation proceedings. 13 8 With minor changes, these
interim asylum rules were made final in 1983, retaining
the opportu9
nity for two rounds of de novo consideration.'3
B.

The Current System

Current regulations thus establish a complex system-rendered
even more intricate when one takes account of all the layers of
review, both mandatory and advisory. The following description,
'35 See 44 Fed. Reg. 21,253, 21,258 (1979). These provisions adopted final
rules requiring that asylum claims by excludable aliens be heard exclusively by
immigration judges, but permitted deportable aliens not yet in proceedings to file
before the district director, without prejudice to later consideration of the claim by
the immigration judge. If an order to show cause had already issued, however,
asylum and related claims could be heard only by the immigration judge. See id
136 See, e.g., The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Operationsof the House Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 89-93 (1979)
(testimony of Dale F. Swartz, Director of the Alien Rights Law Project of the Lawyers'
Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law); S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979)
(stating Senate Committee's preference for allowing asylum applicants the
opportunity to have their claims considered outside exclusion or deportation
proceedings, provided no order to show cause had issued).
137 See 45 Fed. Reg. 37,392 (L980) (interim regulations adding, inter alia, a new
8 C.F.R. pt. 208 governing asylum).
138 See 45 Fed. Reg. 37,392, 37, 395 (1980) (codified 8 C.F.R. § 208.9 (1989)).
139 See 48 Fed. Reg. 5885 (1983) (codified 8 C.F.R § 208.1(b) (1989)) (final rule
amending the earlier regulations to make clear that jurisdiction vests in the
immigration judge once a charging document is served, even if the asylum claim was
already pending in the district office).
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which draws heavily upon the interviews and field observations conducted for this Article,1 40 sketches the stages of consideration
through which an asylum application can proceed.
1. District Office
Spontaneous asylum claims, often called "walk-ins" by INS
officers, receive initial consideration in the district office. To start
the process, the asylum seeker files the basic application form, Form
1-589, along with any supporting documents. The four-page form
asks numerous questions, including queries about past political
activities, membership in organizations, current whereabouts and
status of family members, and the applicant's reasons for fearing persecution. Officials sometimes complain that many completed forms
provide only the scantiest information or seem to follow formulaic
patterns.'41 Other applications, usually prepared with the assistance
of counsel, are accompanied by stacks of documents, including both
affidavits and more generalized information such as news accounts
and reports from human rights organizations. INS charges no fee
for filing the 1-589.
All district offices provide for an interview by an examiner, but
they vary in the precise arrangements. INS places some emphasis on
having the interviews conducted by experienced examiners (usually
at the GS- 11 grade or higher), who have received special training for
this task. 142 Offices with heavy walk-in traffic have several such
140 Interviews were conducted with: INS Central Office officials (Sept. 1985,
July 1988, and Aug. 1988); with personnel of the Executive Office of Immigration
Review (EOIR-the unit of the Justice Department that includes the BIA,
immigration judges, and certain administrative law judges) in Falls Church, VA (Aug.
1988); with other Justice Department officials and State Department officials (July
1988 and Aug. 1988). I also interviewed immigration judges, INS district office
officials, private attorneys and voluntary agency representatives, at the following
locations: Miami (Nov. 1985); San Diego (Feb. 1987); Washington (Oct. 1988); New
York (Nov. 1988). These visits were supplemented by telephone conversations at
various times to clarify matters, by conversations at numerous immigration-law
conferences, and by telephone conversations with officials and attorneys in other
locations.
141 See Dietrich, United States Asylum Policy, in THE NEw ASYLUM SEEKERS:
REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980s 67, 70 (D. Martin ed. 1988); P. Fagen, Applying for
Political Asylum in New York: Law, Policy and Administrative Practice 31 (Occasional
Paper No. 41, New York Research Program in Inter-American Affairs 1984).
142 The training program has recently been refined under the guidance of a new
officer in the INS Central Office who formerly worked with the UNHCR. The
program now includes sessions on the legal provisions and country conditions, and
usually permits trainees to conduct simulated interviews, followed by critique. These
measures represent a considerable improvement over earlier practices, when asylum
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examiners, who do nothing but asylum and related refugee work
during their rotation into this assignment (lasting twelve months or
more). Smaller offices, however, may of necessity assign these functions to an examiner who has not had the special training and who
may devote as little as twenty-five percent of her time to asylum.
Some districts hold the interview at the time of the filing, but
most offices with a high volume of asylum traffic schedule interviews
some weeks or months after receiving the application. New York is
typical of the latter. When visited for this study in November 1988,
the New York office had one supervisor and four experienced examiners who had been doing this work for several years. A fifth examiner in the Refugee, Asylum and Parole section had less experience
and so was usually assigned to more routine functions, such as
processing renewals of asylum status or adjustments to permanent
residence of persons admitted through the overseas refugee program. The office ordinarily had been able to schedule asylum interviews within sixty days of filing (a date that has significance for work
authorization purposes), 14 3 but recent increases in applications had
jeopardized that timing. In an effort to keep up with applications,
the office began scheduling twenty interviews per day per available
examiner, although not all of the scheduled applicants were
expected to show up. The press of business eliminated any opportunity for examiners to specialize by region of origin of the applicants;
when one interview was finished, the examiner simply proceeded to a
central table and picked out the file of the person who had been waiting the longest. This caseload permitted only about twenty minutes
per interview, although examiners had discretion to take more time if
the case required it.
The interviews usually concentrate on filling in any gaps in the
training was minimal and examiners had to rely on "on-the-job learning." See
IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS: AN EVOLVING
CONCEPT AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 33

(June 1982) [hereinafter ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS] (a quasi-official internal INS study).
This 1982 internal study recounted one almost touching vignette that indicates the
inadequacies that have beset INS adjudications: "One officer said that when she was
assigned to asylum work, she bought a subscription to Newsweek magazine to 'learn
more about' countries overseas." Id. at 33 n.*. The officer's initiative is to be
applauded. But the fact that asylum adjudication might be assigned to someone who
does not already keep up with international affairs at a level represented by weekly
general circulation magazines is disheartening. That she had to pay for her own
Newsweek is perhaps even more revealing.
143 See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) (1989) (requiring adjudication of an application
for employment authorization within 60 days or else interim employment
authorization, good for 120 days, is to be granted).
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information presented on the 1-589, primarily with a view toward
transmitting it all to the State Department for its advisory opinion.
Typically, the examiner records right on the form in red pen any
supplementary information developed, although some examiners
also write out a few sentences of interview notes on a separate sheet
as well. There is considerable variety in the conduct of the interview,
depending on the style of the examiner, availability of interpreters
(or examiners with foreign language skills), and related factors. INS,
of course, assumes responsibility for making translation avaifable,
but the interpreter for a particular language may be tied up in immigration court when needed for an asylum interview in the district
office. For that reason, INS occasionally relies on family members or
friends of the applicant for these purposes. Interviews also vary considerably in thoroughness. One examination I attended in Miami in
late 1985 (when caseloads were less demanding) lasted nearly an
hour. The examiner spoke fluent Spanish and was trying with some
creativity to flesh out the full dimensions of the story told by the
Nicaraguan applicant. But another examiner in the same office
engaged in only perfunctory questioning, concentrating on the
applicant's manner of entry and other administrative details, rather
than on the persecution claim. He completed his sessions in about
fifteen minutes.
In Miami, at that time, few applicants appeared with counsel. In
New York in 1988, however, the asylum supervisor estimated that
perhaps eighty percent of applicants were represented, although asylum attorneys in New York thought that number a bit high. Attorneys usually play only a bystander's role, partly because examiners
wish to hear directly from the applicant, and partly because, as one
attorney explained it, not much happens: The interview is "an untaxing experience." Although relations with attorneys appear to be satisfactory much of the time, most attorneys interviewed recalled
particular instances where they were thwarted from playing a needed
role, or occasionally where the examiner was abusive or hostile in
14 4
dealings with the applicant.
The regulations mandate issuance of work authorization to
"nonfrivolous" asylum applicants, and require that such authorization be provided during all stages of administrative and judicial
144 The American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) collected affidavits
recounting some of these complaints and filed them as part of their opposition to the
proposed regulations promulgated in August 1987, described infra notes 194-99 and
accompanying text (affidavits on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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review. 14 5 Many attorneys expressed frustration, however, that INS
rarely issues such authorization at the time of filing, no matter how
solid the case. 146 Instead, the applicant almost always must wait
until the interview, which may be sixty days away. 14 7 A substantial
portion of the interview time is therefore consumed with work
authorization, including the rather cumbersome physical process
required to replace the old 1-94 form in the applicant's passport with
a new one stamped "employment authorized." Obviously, this preoccupation further impairs the opportunity to use the interview to
examine in detail the particulars of the applicant's persecution
claim-one important reason why the interviews are often
"untaxing."
Not infrequently, applicants receive no ruling on their asylum
applications by the time ,the original employment authorization
period expires. They may then have considerable difficulty gaining
extensions, for few district offices have clear channels for making
such decisions. Under the prodding of the immigration bar, INS is
now trying to improve arrangements for such extensions, as well as
for work authorizations for denied applicants who wish to renew
their applications in immigration court proceedings.' 4 8 The fruits of
the interview-the annotated 1-589 with attachments plus any sepaSee 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.12(c)(8), 274a.13(a) (1989).
146 See Memorandum from Richard E. Norton, INS Associate Commissioner for
Examinations (July 9, 1987), reprinted in 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES app. III, at 886,
886-87 (1987) (setting forth standards for deciding on "frivolity"). In December
1988, in an apparent attempt to curb the attraction of asylum filings, INS issued
instructions to field offices stating that the 1-589 was not to be taken per se as a work
authorization request; a separate application would have to be filed. See INS Clarifies
Work Authorization Proceduresfor Asylum Applicants, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 130, 131
(1989). INS has also clarified the steps necessary to continue work authorizations if
the alien wishes to renew the asylum claim in immigration court proceedings. See INS
Advises on Work Authorizationfor Denied Asylum Applicants, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 718
(1988).
147 Some offices fell much further behind in scheduling interviews and issuing
work authorizations, prompting litigation seeking, among other things, to mandate
compliance with the 60-day limit in the regulations. See Mendez v. Thornburgh, No.
88-04995JJH (C.D. Cal. amended complaint filedJan. 30, 1989), summarized in Asylum
'45

Litigation Update, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 151, 152 (1989).

148 See INS Advises on Work Authorization for Denied Asylum Applicants, 65
INTERPRETER RELEASES 718 (1988); see also Alfaro-Orellana v. Ilchert, 720 F. Supp.

792, 798 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (finding that work authorizations granted to nonfrivolous
asylum applicants do not terminate upon district office denial of asylum, but continue
during the entire time that applications are being pursued, up until either
abandonment or final adverse decision); Doe v. Meese, 690 F. Supp. 1572, 1577 (S.D.
Tex. 1988) (requiring INS to grant to alien interim employment authorization where
agency had failed to complete action on his request for work authorization within
period specified by its own rule); Diaz v. INS, 648 F. Supp. 638, 656 (E.D. Cal. 1986)
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rate interview notes-are collected for transmission to the State
Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
(BHRHA), under a standard cover sheet containing blanks that allow
the examiner to provide some additional insights. For example, the
examiner is asked to characterize the verbal testimony (convincing,
unconvincing, specific, generalized, etc.) and to provide a preliminary assessment (grant, deny, non-committal). State Department
officers said that examiners often fail to fill out these portions of the
form.
After the State Department's views are returned to INS, the
applicant receives some form of notice, depending on what the district office intends to do with the case. If asylum is to be granted, the
applicant receives a letter calling him in to complete the paperwork
for asylee status. If denial is indicated, the applicant receives notice
of intent to deny, along with a copy of the State Department letter.
The applicant then has 15 days to rebut or supply additional information. 4 9 "Eager young lawyers," one examiner told me, sometimes treat this notice as an invitation to provide several pounds of
additional material. On rare occasions the new information is
returned to the State Department for further review, but usually the
matter is simply scheduled for final consideration by an examiner
after the rebuttal period has passed. In New York, this whole process can last seven or eight months from the time of the interview;
the process almost surely will require at least four months. For this
reason, no effort is made to return the file to the original interviewer.
In any event, he probably would have no independent recollection of
the case. Several examiners told me that the State Department views
"count for a lot,"' 0 although all were aware that they were not
bound by the Department's position.
(granting preliminary injunction to aliens prohibiting revocation of work
authorization until adjudication process for asylum claim had been completed).
149 Under a recently implemented procedure described below, if State responds
with a preprinted sticker indicating simply that it has nothing to add, the district

office may proceed to a negative decision without issuing a notice of intent to deny.
See Don't Deny Asylum Cases Just Because of BHRHA "Sticker" Responses, INS Says, 66
INTERPRETER RELEASES 351 (1989).
150 An internal study of INS asylum procedures confirms the great weight

carried by State Department letters. See ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 142, at
57-64. A GAO study based on 1984 advisory opinions found that the Justice
Department's final decision agreed with the State advice in 96 percent of the cases
worldwide. See GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, ASYLUM: UNIFORM APPLICATION OF
STANDARDS UNCERTAIN-FEw DENIED APPLICANTS DEPORTED 22, 42 (1987).
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TABLE I
ASYLUM CASES FILED IN

INS

DISTRICT OFFICES

Fiscal year

Total received

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

24,291
16,622
18,889
26,107
60,736
101,679

Source:

Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Table I provides statistics on the rising caseloads of the district
offices, and Table II shows approval rates by nationality for fiscal
year 1988 and cumulatively for the last five years. The statistics show
the number of "cases." Because a case may represent applications
for several members of a nuclear family, who are treated together in
accordance with INA § 208(c), actual numbers of asylum seekers are
higher than what is shown in the Tables. Moreover, the tables do
not include applicants who apply only before the immigration
judges.
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TABLE II

GRANTS

AND DENIALS BY NATIONALITY
ASYLUM APPLICATIONS FILED IN INS DISTRICT OFFICES
June 1983-September 1988
Cumulative'

Country

Approval
Rate for
Cases
Decided

Cases
Granted

TOTALb

27.8%

Iran
Romania
Czechoslovakia
Syria
Ethiopia
Poland
Afghanistan
China
Vietnam
Hungary
Nicaragua
Uganda
Somalia
Philippines
Cuba
Yugoslavia
Pakistan
Liberia
Lebanon
Honduras
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Egypt
India
Bangladesh

61.7%
61.4%
44.7%
39.4%
39.0%
38.0%
37.0%
32.6%
31.3%
30.0%
27.9%
26.0%
24.1%
18.0%
13.3%
13.3%
13.0%
10.5%
7.0%
4.3%
2.7%
2.1%
2.0%
1.0%
1.0%
0.2%

Fiscal year 1988

Cases
Denied

Approval
Rate for
Cases
Decided

Cases
Granted

Cased
Denied

Cases
Pending

28,416

73,753

39.1%

5,531

8,582

73,109

12,459
895
123
186
1,340
2,686
402
167
68
175
7,255
91
143
82
321
53
63
30
113
18
667
45
36
8
4
1

7,727
562
152
285
2,089
4,365
684
345
149
407
18,688
258
449
372
2,080
344
420
255
1,499
398
23,805
2,086
1,713
754
379
416

75.0%
82.9%
44.8%
65.7%
77.0%
53.7%
39.5%
69.7%
80.0%
28.9%
53.1%
51.7%
67.9%
10.0%
31.9%
9.2%
57.8%
15.0%
36.6%
7A%
2.7%
5.0%
31.5%
0.5%
15.0%
16.6%

764
345
13
25
441
433
36
60
8
24
2,786
15
55
4
30
6
33
3
56
10
110
24
6
1
3
1

254
71
16
13
131
373
55
26
2
59
2,455
14
26
36
64
59
24
17
97
125
3,822
447
13
19
17
5

1,373
341
72
100
525
2,099
91
142
9
172
21,054
34
122
94
13,873
176
89
32
222
512
24,375
6,191
399
32
29
10

a Since May 1983, INS has kept asylum statistics by number of cases; each case, or

application, may include more than one individual. The table cumulates the data
only from the time this statistical uniformity was established.
b The total includes all nationalities, not only those designated here.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, as compiled in REFUGEE REPORTS,
Dec. 16, 1988, at 14.

2. Immigration Court
Claimants whose applications were denied in the district office
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may renew their asylum applications before the immigration judges
when deportation or exclusion proceedings begin. If the alien
applies for asylum only after those proceedings have been initiated,
immigration court will provide the only available forum.15 1 In either
case, the process is virtually identical. It is initiated by filing Form I589, along with any accompanying documents, with the docket
clerk.' 5 2 The clerk then forwards a copy to the State Department.
Although the regulations seem to preclude (with limited exceptions)
State Department referral if the district office earlier received an
advisory letter,' 5 3 docket clerks now routinely transfer the files without checking for earlier letters. Not only is this arrangement less
cumbersome for the clerk, but it also fits better with the desire of the
Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) to assure the independence of the present proceedings from earlier INS consideration.
State Department officers reported that they received less complete
files from the immigration courts, perhaps because some docket
clerks resist mailing lengthy documentary attachments. In any event,
State clearly receives nothing equivalent to the district office examiner's notes. Some judges even provide a cover sheet pointedly stating that no assessment of credibility or other review has been
performed before transmission to the State Department.
151 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.3(b), 208.9 (1989). Many aliens first express a wish to
apply for asylum when the case comes before the immigration judge on "master
calendar," a short while after the order to show cause (which initiates deportation
proceedings) has been served on the alien. At the master calendar hearing, the alien
pleads to the order to show cause and makes known any defenses or applications for
relief from deportation. The overwhelming majority of asylum applicants admit
deportability; asylum is then usually the only issue in the deportation proceeding.
152 Technically, an applicant in the immigration court is seeking the benefits of
both asylum under INA § 208 and withholding under § 243(h), whereas examiners in
the district office can award only asylum under § 208. This distinction makes
virtually no practical difference, and Form 1-589 is identical in both settings.
It is also possible that an asylum claim will be lodged later in the process. For
example, the regulations still provide that an alien be expressly advised of his right to
apply for withholding at the time the immigration judge designates a country of
deportation. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1989). The alien can then receive 10 days to
fill out the 1-589 and thereby initiate consideration of a persecution claim. See id. An
alien can also apply for asylum after the issuance of a deportation order by filing a
motion to reopen, but the alien then carries the additional burden of explaining the
failure to apply earlier. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (1989). This burden can be substantial.
See, e.g., INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 109-110 (1988) (analogizing a motion to reopen
to a motion for a new criminal trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence-a
motion in which the moving party "bears a heavy burden"). If reopening is granted,
the matter will return to the immigration judge for consideration. See 8 C.F.R.
§§ 103.5, 242.22 (1989).
153 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7, 208.10(b) (1989).
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After State's views are received, the case can be calendared for a
hearing. The timing varies depending on caseload, but delays of a
year are not unknown. Asylum cases receive no priority in calendaring unless the applicant is detained, in which case the judges place a
high priority on prompt adjudication. Detention is more likely in
exclusion cases than in deportation." 4 The immigration court in
New York has worked out arrangements with attorneys to permit
time for interviews with clients when the clients are brought in to the
court facility in Brooklyn, thus obviating frequent trips to the remote
detention facility.1 5 5
Procedure in court conforms, by and large, to a standard adversarial model of a trial-type proceeding. Most asylum seekers, at least
in the districts with high volume, are now represented in immigra-6
15
tion court by counsel or accredited nonattorney representatives.
The burden of proof is on the alien. Counsel will usually elicit the
key particulars of the story from the client on direct examination and
will also offer available supporting materials, often derived from the
reports of human-rights NGOs such as Amnesty International,
Americas Watch, or the International Commission ofJurists.1 57 The
154 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5, 235.3 (1988). The background of the detention policy
is set forth in T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 722-24. See also Amanullah
v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 4-8 (1st Cir. 1987); Singh v. Nelson, 623 F. Supp. 545, 556
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (generally upholding detention of asylum seekers, in part as a
deterrent measure). For critiques of detention of asylum seekers, see Helton, supra
note 116; Levy, Detention in the Asylum Context, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 297 (1983).
155 Detention arrangements bring frequent complaints from applicants'
attorneys, particularly when detention is carried out by private contractors, as has
sometimes been the case, for example, in New York City. I was told that "these are
guys who usually guard construction sites," that some of them "know nothing" about
American Correctional Association accreditation standards, and that they often make
life quite difficult for attorneys who are simply seeking access to their clients.
Interview with Arthur Helton, John Assadi, and Jeff Heller, Attorneys with the
Lawyers' Comm. for Human Rights, in New York City (Nov. 15, 1988); see also
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRIMINAL ALIENs-INS' DETENTION AND DEPORTATION
AcTIvrrIES IN THE NEW YORK CITY AREA 24-27 (1986).

156 See 8 C.F.R. § 292.2 (1988) (providing for accreditation of such
representatives). Part 292a requires district directors to maintain a list of free legal

services programs available in the area. These lists can be somewhat misleading,
both because the lists get out of date and because some of the organizations listed
have in recent years become more selective in accepting cases.
157 The closest analogues in this country to the documentation centers used by
European adjudicators are the private documentation centers put together by
refugee advocacy organizations. Many specialize by region. See, e.g., New

Documentation Center Announcedfor Salvadoran Asylum Cases, 60 INTERPRETER RELEASES
975 (1983) (reporting on new center, established by the American Civil Liberties
Union Fund of the National Capitol Area and the Center for National Security
Studies, gathering information on El Salvador). At least one commercial
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INS trial attorney then cross-examines. In busy districts, trial attorneys have little time to prepare the cases. Sometimes they are only
able to review the file for the first time while direct examination is
proceeding. Moreover, trial attorneys are not generally expected to
develop extensive additional information or other sources of
evidence.
This insufficiency in preparation time and resources results in
several disadvantages, which are compounded by the failure to
assign clear responsibility for the development of other sources of
information. Cross-examination is impoverished under these circumstances. One trial attorney stated ruefully during his interview
that he necessarily does what he was always taught in law school not
to do: He asks questions when he has no idea where the answers
might lead. Sometimes a useful line of inquiry develops. Often it
does not. All he can do is probe apparent soft spots and inconsistencies in the story. Given so little to work with, his incentives are to
magnify the weaknesses in the testimony even if there might be an
innocent explanation.
Second, an early review of the file might have revealed the need
for additional and specific information on country conditions.
Review on the day of the hearing will be too late, even if the information would have been relatively accessible. An example may be helpful in illustrating this point. Suppose the applicant claims that he
fled to avoid forced conscription into the army or a guerrilla unit.
Cross-examination can do little to explore whether such dragooning
really takes place; it can only probe the wellsprings of this particular
alien's belief. If the State Department response said nothing about
the issue (perhaps because the initial papers did not make sufficiently
clear that this was the basis of the claim), the record may contain no
useful general information. on this crucial question. The applicant's
assertions will therefore stand "uncontroverted," whatever may be
the real state of affairs in the home country. BIA member Michael
Heilman expressed particular concern about this inadequacy, especially given the Board's strict adherence to the requirement that
decisions be based on evidence of record in the particular
proceeding. 158
organization has become involved. The Data Center in Oakland, California recently
mailed a brochure to members of the American Immigration Lawyers Association
advertising its Political Asylum Documentation Service, available for $50 per hour of
search time, plus photocopying and postage.
158 Telephone interview with Michael Heilman, Member, Board of Immigration
Appeals (Sept. 22, 1988).
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Some trial attorneys also reflected thoughtfully on the wider
implications of applying the adversarial system to these matters. The
government's real interest will not always be to oppose the claimant;
some of the applicants deserve asylum. But the INS attorney may
have little idea which type of case is before him until well into the
proceedings. Moreover, as one attorney told me, even when it
appears to be a strong case, his instincts (and perhaps his inevitable
role under this structure) lead him to react in a particular way:
"When it's there in the courtroom, I'm 'agin' it."' 5 9
There are currently seventy-five immigration judges. As Table
III indicates, asylum cases have risen from ten percent of immigration court caseload in 1985 to over thirteen percent in 1988.
Because asylum cases tend to present the most difficult and challenging issues appearing in a judge's caseload, however, they occupy a
much higher percentage of actual work time. Statistics on dispositions have only recently been maintained. In fiscal year 1988, immigration judges received 11,025 new asylum cases and disposed of
them as follows: 1,647 cases were granted (representing 2,276 individuals); while 5,626 were denied. The overall grant rate was twentythree percent. A total of 4,364 cases were pending in immigration
courts at year's end.' 6 °
159 Interview with former trial attorney, in New York City (Nov. 14, 1988).
160 EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (EOIR), ASYLUM STATISTICS
FOR PERIOD 10/1/87-10/1/88.
The slight discrepancy
between these numbers for asylum cases received and those in Table III is
unexplained. Until very recently, EOIR published only limited statistics on asylum
cases and did not reveal grant and denial rates by nationality. In the spring of 1989,
however, it decided to compile such figures and make them available to the public.
They show, for example, a noticeably higher grant rate for Salvadorans (12 percent)
and a lower one for Nicaraguans (37.4 percent) than the comparable rates in the INS
district offices, which are shown supra Table II following note 150. The complete set
of EOIR statistics, with details by nationality, appears in REFUGEE REPORTS, May 19,
1989, at 5.
[IMMIGRATION JUDGES]
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TABLE III
CASES RECEIVED, IMMIGRATION JUDGES

Fiscal
Year

Deportation

Exclusion

Motion to
Reopen

Totala

Asylum
Casesb

Percent
Asylum

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

102,044
89,680
64,133
71,308
118,906

9,122
9,576
9,178
10,167
14,020

3,521
3,555
2,711
2,387
2,398

114,687
102,811
76,022
83,862
135,324

11,663
11,156
8,659
11,200
20,331

10.2%
10.9%
11.4%
13.4%
15.0%

' Immigration judges also hear a fourth category of cases, involving release on bond.
But because asylum is not an issue in such proceedings, these totals omit that
category in order to obtain a meaningful base for comparison.
b EOIR does not break down asylum receipts according to the type of procedure
(deportation, exclusion, motion to reopen) in which the application is received. The
percentage is therefore stated as a portion of total combined caseload in those three
categories for the year.
Source: Telephone interviews with Gerald Hurwitz, Counsel to the Director, EOIR
(Mar. 8, 1989, Mar. 28, 1990).

3.

State Department Role

The State Department is required by statute to publish annual
reports on human rights conditions in all foreign countries.1 61 This
requirement derived from congressional efforts to strengthen human
rights policy during the Kissinger era at the State Department, rather
than from any concern for asylum proceedings. Nevertheless, the
reports have proven to be extremely useful in asylum adjudications,
both in the United States and around the world. Every district office
asylum unit and every immigration judge receives a copy, and I have
seen well-thumbed issues in the offices of asylum adjudicators in
Western Europe and Canada-and indeed in the offices of UNHCR
and refugee advocacy organizations.
The controversial portion of the State Department's role relates
to its preparation of advice letters in individual asylum cases. The

Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) performs the central functions in the asylum advice process. Its asylum
unit, headed by a career foreign service officer, is largely staffed by
retired foreign service officers, doing part-time work under contract.
Such officers are able, to a considerable extent, to specialize by

region of origin. In the summer of 1988, for example, one officer
assumed responsibility for claims from Eastern Europe and some
161

See 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d) (1988).
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East Asian countries. Another concentrated on the Near East and
South Asia. Three officers were responsible for Central and South
America.
When files arrive from either district offices or immigration
courts, they are logged into a central bureau computer and assigned
to the appropriate officer for review. Until early 1988, BHRHA
returned an opinion letter in each case, many of them standard form
letters, announcing whether the Department believed that the particular applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution.' 6 2 In almost
all cases, BHRHA officers have initially drafted the letters after simply reading through the file. Very few cases have stimulated further
specific research. After drafting, the letter is cleared with the appropriate country desk in the regional bureaus of the State Department.
Critics have sometimes targeted the regional bureaus as the source
of political bias in the letters. State Department officials, however,
deny that diplomatic commitments to other nations have ever
entered into the advice-letter process.'
Moreover, as the number
of cases has expanded, the regional bureau clearance process has
become more and more routine. Apparently, regional bureaus often
grant blanket clearances, relying on the BHRHA officer to bring any
unusual cases requiring more thorough scrutiny to their attention.
In February 1988, State introduced a new system. INS and
EOIR still send all files to State as before, but the Department no
longer invariably returns an advice letter. Instead, its response takes
one of three forms. First and most common, a sticker is affixed to
the returning papers, stating that the Department has nothing to add
164
and referring generally to the latest human rights country reports.
Second, the officer might return the file without an individualized
communication, but instead with a general update sheet. Those
sheets report, for example, a change of government since the last
country report was written, or provide more detailed information
162 Form letters have often drawn criticism, but volume made such an approach
virtually unavoidable. See generally In re Vigil, Interim Dec. No. 3050, slip op. at 12
(BIA Mar. 17, 1988) (finding form deportation letter not to constitute an error
because it is not binding and immigration judge may determine weight it deserves).
163 See Burke, Compassion versus Self-Interest: Who Should Be Given Asylum in the
United States?, 8 FLETCHER FORUM 311, 320-22 (1984); Dietrich, supra note 141, at 6772.
164 The text of the sticker is reprinted in 8 AILA MONTHLY MAILING 118 (1989)
(reporting further on INS cable clarifying that no "notice of intent to deny" is

necessary when the State Department responds with a sticker). Because examiners
apparently tended to treat stickers as negative opinions, INS recently had to send

further guidance to its offices emphasizing that stickers are not to be considered as
"adverse evidence." 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 351 (1989).
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than the country report about specific issues (such as the treatment
of a particular religious group or punishments for those who left the
country without exit permission). Third, the Department still sometimes returns a more detailed advisory letter in cases where it has
65
something specific to add.'
The new sticker system has received mixed reviews. Several
people interviewed, including William Robie, the Chief Immigration
Judge, find the change a big improvement.16 6 The stickers make it
clearer than the old form letters did that the Department has nothing
to add. It is then more clearly left to the immigration judge to decide
based on the record-which can include the annual State Department country report and any generic update sheets that are available. Others, especially district office examiners, but also some
immigration judges, regard the stickers as a dereliction of duty; they
want more guidance from State. One State Department officer (who
also dislikes the sticker system) reported frequent receipt of files
from district offices with a marking on the cover sheet: "No
67
sticker." 1
Asylum applicants have frequently challenged the use and accuracy of State Department letters, or have sought access to their
authors for cross-examination. Although some letters have drawn
sharp judicial criticism,i68 by and large the courts have approved the
practice, even in the immigration court setting.' 6 9 In one such case,
Judge Henry Friendly, in dictum, advised certain changes that would
minimize any due process problems arising from introduction of the
letters without making their authors available for cross-examination.
In the future, he recommended, such letters should be confined to
dealing with "legislative facits" such as the extent of persecution in
the home country, and refrain from recommending an outcome in
the specific case. If so modified, Judge Friendly suggested, they
would deal with matters "on which the safeguards of confrontation
and cross-examination are not required and on which the IJ needs all
See 53 Fed. Reg. 2893 (1988) (notice announcing the new system).
Interview with William Robie, in Falls Church, Va. (Aug. 12, 1988).
167 Interview with Christopher Squier, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 12, 1988).
168 See, e.g., Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 199-200 (5th Cir. 1975); Kasravi v. INS,
400 F.2d 675, 676-77 & 677 n.1 (9th Cir. 1968).
169 See, e.g., McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 95 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986); Hotel and
Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 594 F. Supp. 502, 510-14 (D.D.C.
1984), aff'd by an equally divided court, 846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988). For BIA
descriptions of the appropriate use of State Department advice, see In re Vigil,
Interim Dec. No. 3050, slip. op. at 12 (BIA Mar. 17, 1988); In re Exilus, 18 I. & N.
Dec. 276, 278-80 (1982).
165

166
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the help he can get."' 70 For roughly 13 years after Judge Friendly's
admonition, the Department persisted in sending letters that commented on the specific case, i.e., on adjudicative facts. The new
sticker system (ironically, adopted primarily for budgetary reasons)
now brings practice more in line with the scheme Judge Friendly
envisioned.
4.
a.

Administrative Review

The Board of Immigration Appeals

There is no appeal from the district office decision, although
renewal in immigration court obviously provides an opportunity to
secure relief if the original denial was unjustified. Decisions in immigration court, however, are appealable to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA), under the standard procedures allowing review of
decisions in exclusion and deportation cases. Both the applicant and
the INS can appeal, although appeals by the latter are far less
frequent.
The Board, created by Justice Department regulations rather
than by statute, consists of five members and conducts business at its
headquarters in Falls Church, Virginia. It hears appeals in exclusion
and deportation cases, and also reviews a variety of other immigration-related decisions.' 7 1 Exact statistics are unavailable, but
informed guesses place asylum at about one-quarter of the BIA's
caseload. Owing to their greater complexity, however, asylum cases
occupy about half its work-time.
To cope with a rising workload, new regulations, enacted in
1988, authorized temporary assignments of immigration judges to sit
with the Board, and for the first time allowed consideration of cases
by three-member panels.1 72 Oral argument is possible if the Board
approves, but such approval remains rare. It is far more common for
the Board to consider the matter on the briefs alone. Each appeal is
decided by opinion, but only a small fraction of those opinions are
published as precedent decisions. 7 ' The BIA appeal process can
consume considerable amounts of time, although precise statistics
170

Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055, 1062 (2d Cir. 1976).

171

See Legomsky, Forum Choicesfor the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the

Immigration Process, 71 IowA L. REV. 1297, 1302-10 (1986).
172 See 53 Fed. Reg. 15,659 (1988) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1) (1989)).
173 For a useful look at BIA practice, see Note, A Refugee by Any Other Name: An

Examination of the Boardof ImmigrationAppeals'Actions in Asylum Cases, 75 VA. L. REV. 681
(1989).
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are not maintained. The greatest delays derive from backlogs in typing the transcript of the hearing; periods of eight to twelve months
are not uncommon. The Board then requires several additional
weeks or months before issuing a decision.' 74 Cases involving an
applicant in detention, however, receive priority. In these instances,
the transcript can be prepared in a matter of weeks, and the Board
will also expedite its own decision process.
TABLE IV
CASES RECEIVED, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Fiscal Year

Total Cases

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

4,911
8,608
8,204
10,191
11,186

Note: The EOIR computer system did not separately code asylum appeals before
1989, but observers agreed that asylum cases are appealed more often than other
decisions by immigration judges. The percentage of asylum cases should thus be
considerably higher than the percentage of receipts for immigration judges, supra
Table III following note 160.
Source: Telephone interviews with Gerald Hurwitz, Counsel to the Director,
EOIR (Mar. 8, 1989, Mar. 28, 1990).

b.

The Asylum Policy and Review Unit

The Asylum Policy and Review Unit (APRU) was established in
the Office of Legal Policy of the Department of Justice in 1987, at
least partly in response to the Medvid incident (the forcible return of
a Ukrainian seaman to a Soviet ship docked in Louisiana)."' Its genesis also reflects the dissatisfaction of the Justice Department under
Attorney General Meese with the tenor of the handling of certain
cases by the State Department and INS. An APRU official complained, for example, that State failed to stay sufficiently "up to date"
174 See Legomsky, supra note 171, at 1331 (reporting rough estimate of three
months' mean for BIA disposition-presumably from the time the BIA actually
receives the case; that is, after the transcript and briefs are received). Transcript
delays are so costly that the system should explore other means of presenting an
adequate record on appeal. For an innovative suggestion of using videotapes for
these purposes in asylum cases, see E. RATuSHNY, supra note 64, at 57-58.
175 The regulation officially establishing the Unit appears at 52 Fed. Reg.
11,043 (1987) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 0.23b (1989)). See also New Asylum Policy and
Review Unit Created, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 439-40 (1987); Attorney General
Announces New Asylum Policy Unit, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 472-73 (1987).
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on developments in some countries.1 76 Critics of APRU provide a
harsher assessment of its origin. They believe it was created to
assure a higher grant rate for persons fleeing Eastern Europe or
other Marxist countries-apparently a matter of strong concern to
77
the Department under Mr. Meese.
APRU receives the whole file in every case denied in the district
offices, and a copy of the approval letter in granted cases. Either
way, APRU almost always receives the material after the alien has
been notified of the result. The office carefully keeps its distance
from cases being considered in EOIR (by the immigration judges or
the BIA), in order to honor the latter's quasi-judicial independence.
In a handful of cases, apparently, an applicant rejected in EOIR has
been given a new round of review in the district office as a result of
APRU concern. APRU is not strictly an appellate body. Asylum
applicants do not initiate its consideration, although knowledgeable
lawyers are now becoming more aware of the office's role and of
course cannot be prevented from writing with concerns about allegedly unjustified denials.
Most of APRU's review work is performed by three attorneys in
the office. If they believe an application was improperly denied, or
spot trends indicating undue restrictiveness with respect to certain
groups, APRU makes its concerns known to the Central Office of
INS. Sometimes this results in reopening and correction in the district office. At the time of interviews (July 1988), however, the Deputy Director expressed concern about whether messages
communicated in this way adequately get through to the districts.
He further described APRU's role as a "safety valve," assuring that
persons at risk are not wrongfully sent home; the office's individual
case review serves mainly to spot egregious cases. About forty such
cases had been pursued with vigor in the district offices. 7 INS,
however, believes that APRU's functions are duplicative, and INS
176

Interview with Robert Charles Hill, Deputy Director, APRU, in Washington,

D.C. (July 28, 1988).

177 See, e.g., Pear, supra note 40 (reporting on the consideration of regulations
that would provide a presumption favoring asylum for persons from "totalitarian"
but not from "authoritarian" countries; the proposal later drew considerable
criticism and was never officially made public).
178 Interview with Robert Charles Hill, Deputy Director, APRU, in Washington,
D.C. (July 28, 1988). As of April 5, 1989, the Director reported: "APRU has worked
with INS to obtain the reversal on approximately 40 cases. In another approximately
40 cases, no agreement could be reached with INS, and APRU recommended, and
the Deputy Attorney General approved, grants of asylum. In addition, approximately
50 cases are currently being discussed by APRU with INS." Letter from Henry L.
Curry to David A. Martin (Apr. 5, 1989).
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Commissioner Nelson urged Attorney General Thornburgh to abolish the office, allowing INS to allocate APRU's annual budget to
79
other parts of the adjudication system.'
5. Judicial Review
Applicants ordinarily secure judicial review of asylum denials in
accordance with the regular arrangements for review of exclusion or
deportation orders under INA § 106.180 Exclusion cases therefore
proceed to district court on a habeas corpus petition; deportation
cases are heard in the court of appeals based on a petition for review.
In practice, this distinction makes little or no difference in the operative scope of review. Courts review denials of the mandatory protections of § 243(h) to check that the ruling was based on "substantial
evidence."'' Denials of asylum under § 208 are subject to a bifurcated standard of review. The "substantial evidence" test applies to
factual determinations that underlie the judgment as to whether the
person has a well-founded fear of persecution, but if asylum is
denied in the exercise of discretion, that denial is reviewed only for
"abuse of discretion"-intended as a more deferential standard.'8 2
Whatever the precise formula, the actual vigor of scrutiny covers a
83
wide range, from highly deferential to highly demanding.'
Deportation is automatically stayed once a petition for review is
served on INS. 8 4 Stays are riot automatic in exclusion cases or while
179 See 66 INTERPRETER RELEA1SES 3 (1989) (asserting that from Apr. 1987

through Dec. 1988, APRU cost the INS appropriation $750,000).
180 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1988). Some cases appear to hold open the possibility of
judicial review in district court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of
denials in the district office, but the better view postpones court consideration until
immigration court and BIA remedies have been exhausted. See, e.g., Chen Chaun-Fa
v. Kiley, 459 F. Supp. 762, 765 (S.I).N.Y. 1978).
181 See, e.g., Chavarria v. Department of Justice, 722 F.2d 666, 670 (11th Cir.
1984); McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1981). But see MarroquinManriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that an "abuse of
discretion" standard should be used, because of the "necessary application of
expertise in the determination that a fear of persecution is well-founded"), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1259 (1984).
182 See, e.g., Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518, 1519 n.1 (4th Cir. 1986); VidesVides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d
562, 567-68 (7th Cir. 1984).
183 Compare Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987) and DamaizeJob v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986) (close review of immigration judge's
credibility rulings) with Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986) and
Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985) (great deference to
agency's credibility determinations).
184 See INA § 106(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (1988).
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a motion to reopen is pending, but in light of the possible effects of
an erroneous removal, district courts have been quite hospitable to
the issuance of a stay."8 5 Given federal court caseloads, pursuing
judicial review can considerably lengthen an applicant's stay in the
United States. But as Table V indicates, only a small proportion of
asylum applicants pursue direct review in court. The information in
the Table is somewhat misleading, however, as class actions or other
suits seeking broadly applicable injunctive relief, rather than direct
review in single cases, have provided the setting for some of the most
important judicial rulings on asylum processing.' 6 Some of these
cases have resulted in multi-year stays of removals and in orders
necessitating reopening of hundreds of proceedings. The Director
of the Justice Department's Office of Immigration Litigation reports
that asylum issues "take a huge portion of our time." 187
185

See, e.g., Bazrafshan v. Pomeroy, 587 F. Supp. 498, 501 (D.NJ. 1984) (stating

that we "cannot let the rigors of administrative procedure reshape our ideas about
life and death").
186 See cases cited supra note 3.
187 Telephone interview with Robert Bombaugh, Director of the Justice
Department's Office of Immigration Litigation (Mar. 8, 1989).
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TABLE V
DIRECT REVIEW IN FEDERAL COURT

Fiscal year

Total
applications
for review

No. presenting
asylum issue

Percent
asylum

Deportation'
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

425
427
396
161
179
275

116
116
115
43
49
.120

27.3%
27.2%
29.0%
26.7%
27.4%
43.6%

Exclusionb
1984
1985
1986

18
25
19

3
19
7

16.7%
76.0%
36.8%

1987

18

6

33.3%

1988
1989

12
66

9
57

75.0%
86.4%

These statistics probably undercount asylum cases. Petitions for review are logged
in on the Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) statistical system at the time of filing,
but it may not be apparent until later stages that an asylum issue is presented. An
effort is made to go back and correct or amplify the entries, but a few cases are
overlooked in the process. That correction process is still underway for the most
recent fiscal years; it is therefore likely that those years' asylum statistics will rise,
perhaps substantially.
bExclusion cases are almost certainly undercounted. Review is obtained by petition
for habeas corpus in the district courts, and the local U.S. Attorney's office represents
the government. Not all such offices report full statistics to OIL.
Source: Telephone interviews with Robert Bombaugh, Director of the Office of
Immigration Litigation, Dept. of Justice (Mar. 8, 1989, May 10, 1990).

6.

Actual Deportations

It is difficult to obtain precise information on actual removals of
unsuccessful asylum seekers, but by all accounts, the numbers are
quite low. A 1984 GAO study found final deportation orders issued
in only 3.5 percent of cases of persons initially denied asylum, and
over half of those individuals apparently had not yet been removed.
Another one percent had left on their own. Although a very high
percentage of the sample of 21,032 aliens were in an uncertain status
(and some might have left), these numbers are disturbing, particularly because actual deportations are essential to. send any kind of
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deterrent message to persons in the home countries contemplating a
journey to the United States to apply for asylum.1a 8
Deportations falter at two stages. First, applicants denied asylum in the district office will receive orders to show cause (thus initiating deportation proceedings) only if the investigations section
completes the paperwork. These sections are overburdened, and
failed asylum applicants do not occupy a high enforcement priority.
Second, when a deportation order becomes final, the respondents
are usually promptly served with a notice to leave the country. But if
they fail to do so, enforced deportation will occur only if INS takes
the initiative to locate and apprehend the person. Again, failed asylum seekers occupy a low enforcement priority.189
There are exceptions to these patterns. If the individual is held
in detention, a final deportation or exclusion order will almost
always result in prompt removal. Moreover, several officers in district offices reported to me that voluntary surrender for deportation
picks up just before holidays. Apparently, the individuals are ready
to go home, and they present themselves to INS because the agency
is likely then to pay the costs of transportation. It is not surprising
that such behavior by unsuccessful
asylum applicants evokes cyni190
cism on the part of the officers.
7.

The Role of the UNHCR

In the late 1970s, the State Department made arrangements
with UNHCR for its review of all Haitian asylum applications, then
the most controversial portion of its caseload. If UNHCR disagreed
with a draft State advice letter, it raised its concerns with BHRHA
188 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 150, at 25; P. Fagen, supra note
141, at 54-55. The problem is by no means confined to asylum cases. Other studies

have noted the general inability of the INS system to secure actual deportations. See
E. HARWOOD, supra note 66, at 41-46. In 1986, INS also changed the regulations to
eliminate the 72-hour advance notice to surrender for deportation given to aliens

already subject to a final deportation order, in part because an INS study found that
more than 76 percent of recipients absconded after receiving such letters (often
known familiarly as "bag and baggage" letters or, even more familiarly, as "run
letters"). See 51 Fed. Reg. 3471 (1986) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 243.3) (proposed
Jan. 28, 1986); id. at 23,041-42 (1986) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 243.3 (1989)).
189 See generally E. HARWOOD, supra note 66, at 30, 122-30, 184 (discussing
enforcement practices).
190 See id. at 41-46 (reporting the same phenomenon). Harwood recounts the
story of one alien who showed up two days befor& the date shown on his "bag and
baggage" letter for deportation to El Salvador. The INS office made him wait. One
officer explained: "What they have to realize is that deportation is a privilege, not a
right." Id. at 46.
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and a negotiating process ensued before the final letter was sent.
Sometimes the Bureau persuaded UNHCR to change its views. In all
other cases of initial disagreement, the State Department accepted
the UNHCR position. 1 '
Although there have been frequent calls for expanding this practice to cover all asylum cases, during the 1980s the trend went in the
opposite direction. The Reagan administration took a more skeptical stance toward international organizations (to put it mildly), and
UNHCR's access declined.' 9 2 Although the Washington office
retains some contact with State and INS to communicate its general
views on, for example, proposed regulations, its role as systematic
reviewer of individual cases has long since ended. It now performs
three other functions: (1) helping asylum seekers, on occasion, to
locate pro bono counsel; (2) filing amicus curiae briefs in cases (usually class actions) likely to have wide impact on asylum processing;
and (3) sending a letter to applicant's counsel expressing UNHCR
views on the particular application. UNHCR receives far more
requests for the last service than it can possibly meet. It tries to be
selective and write such a letter only in strong cases, and only at the
stage when the matter is already before an immigration judge. It is
then up to counsel to introduce the letter in an appropriate manner
193
into the immigration court proceedings.
8.

The August 1987 Proposed Regulations

Throughout the 1980s, INS has been considering further
reforms to the asylum process to make it more expeditious and effective. The most thorough effort at crafting reforms was built upon an
internal study carried out by Richard Spurlock, a retired district
director hired as a consultant for these purposes in 1985. Because of
the sensitivity of the issues, the potential costs, and the multiple
agencies involved, each with its own particular angle of vision and
191 See U.S. Refugee Programs. Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1980) (testimony of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State). Secretary
Vance expressed satisfaction with this arrangement and stated: "[tihis doublecheck
which we have developed by working with the U.N. High Commissioner is a sensible
and wise way of checking our standards and seeing that they are being fairly applied."
Id.
192 See Burke, supra note 163, at 325 (presenting argument of one official of the
Reagan Administration against UNHCR participation in asylum adjudication because
determining who may stay "is a fundamental attribute to sovereignty").
193 An example of such a letter may be found in Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp.
970, 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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bureaucratic turf to protect, the proposals did not result in formally
promulgated draft regulations until August 1987.194
Those proposed rules ranged widely and contained some
improvements broadly supported. But the central change touched
off a storm of controversy. The regulations proposed to establish a
new corps of asylum adjudicators in INS, responsible to the Central
Office's Office of Refugee Asylum and Parole, which would consider
all asylum issues, no matter at what stage of the proceedings the asylum claim was filed."' The immigration judges would have been
removed from asylum issues altogether, thus ending the provision of
two possible rounds of de novo consideration.
If the alien were already in deportation or exclusion proceedings at the time of the asylum claim, those proceedings were to be
adjourned to permit consideration of the case by the new adjudicators. The State Department was to receive a copy of all asylum applications and retained the option of communicating its views to the
adjudicators, but the proposal probably would have led to a reduced
role for the Department. If asylum was denied, the matter would
return to the immigration court for consideration of any other
defenses, and for issuance of a final deportation or exclusion order.
Under the proposed regulations, the immigration judge had no
authority to reconsider the asylum claim. The alien could still appeal
to the BIA, however, and the Board retained authority to review the
adjudicator's asylum decision.
These regulations evoked a strong reaction from refugee advocates. Although some had earlier expressed openness to the idea of
a single corps of expert adjudicators, all were deeply concerned
about the adjudicators' lack of independence under the August draft.
The asylum office was to remain in INS, instead of being moved to
EOIR or a wholly new independent agency. Moreover, initial indications about staffing and training held little promise of significant
upgrading in the quality of personnel
or procedures over that
19 6
already in the district offices.
Although some comments filed in response to the rulemaking
suggested measures that would address these concerns directly,
14 See 52 Fed. Reg. 32,552 (to be codified 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 236, 242, 253)
(proposed Aug. 28, 1987).
195 See id. Although the regulations did not so state, INS initially envisioned
stationing these officers in seven or eight cities throughout the country, with some
provision for "circuit riding" to hear claims lodged in more remote locations.
196 See Helton, The ProposedAsylum Rules: An Analysis, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1070, 1073-74 (1987).
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while retaining the basic idea of a single round of adjudication
before a specialized set of adjudicators, NGO opposition soon
focused with vigor on one particular cure: reinstatement of the
opportunity for de novo consideration by the immigration judges.
The campaign was so intense that the matter moved directly to the
desk of the Deputy Attorney General, who decided to accede to the
NGO position. On the day the comment period closed, the Justice
Department told the press that new regulations would issue reinstating the judges in the process.19 7 Finally, in April 1988, new proposed regulations appeared, implementing this decision, but
continuing with plans for a centralized corps of adjudicators to
replace the district office examiners.' 9 8 To date, continuing internal
disputes have prevented final promulgation. 199
C.

Evaluation

Almost no one regards the current asylum adjudication system
as an effective and efficient scheme for deciding on what Judge Kenneth Starr (now Solicitor General) has called "this most sensitive of
human claims in the international community." 20 0 If accuracy,
speed, and fairness are the key objectives in asylum adjudications,
the current system achieves them in only a small portion of cases.
1. Speed and Fairness
a.

Two Bites at the Apple

Despite nominal agreement on all sides that expeditious proceedings are needed, the current system rarely achieves prompt
finality. The most obvious culprit is the wasteful provision of two
venues for de novo rulings in asylum-exactly the problem targeted
in the August 1987 proposed rules.2 ' Those rules, of course, met
197 See Arocha, Political Asylum Revision Dropped, Wash. Post., Oct. 30, 1987, at
A23, col. 1. This was followed by a formal announcement to this effect in the Federal
Register in December. See 52 Fed. Reg. 46,776 (to be codified 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208,
336, 242, 253) (proposed Dec. 10, 1987).
198 See 53 Fed. Reg. 11,300 (to be codified 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 236, 242, 253)
(proposed April 6, 1988); Helton, Asylum Rules Revisited: An Analysis, 65 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 367 (1988).
199 See, e.g., 66

INTERPRETER

RELEASES

3

(1989)

(suggestion

by

INS

Commissioner that asylum adjudication function should remain in the district offices
as before).
200 Reyes-Arias v. INS, 866 F.2d 500, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
201 See Kurzban, Restructuring the Asylum Process, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 91, 98,
111-12 (1981).
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with such strong opposition that the Justice Department beat a hasty
retreat and reinstated the role of the immigration judges in revised
proposed regulations issued in April 1988. But the nature of the
objections, the proposed remedy of the NGOs, and the Administration's ultimate response merit further inquiry.
Most of the opposition to the August 1987 proposed rules
derived not from a belief that the immigration court provides the
ideal setting for consideration of asylum claims. Indeed, the judges
are often criticized in other venues, on a variety of grounds, by the
same people who attacked the 1987 proposal. The opposition
derived instead from concern about the quality of decision-making
that could be expected under the precise form of unification that was
proposed. The centralized corps of asylum adjudicators, who would
have become the sole arbiters, would not likely have been much different, in training, background, or outlook, from the current examiners who make the decisions in the district offices. Opponents of the
new regulations were able to collect affidavits with numerous stories
of brusqueness, mishandling, errors, and apparent bias on the part
202
of some of those officials.
Early internal versions of what became the 1987 proposed regulations had considered assigning the newly centralized adjudication
function to a different set of officials-attorneys at a higher civil service rank. But the Administration ultimately chose instead a version
that would keep the position one for journeyman immigration examiners, and OMB initially assigned to the new positions a relatively
low grade (relative, that is, to the magnitude and challenge of the
adjudication required) of GS-11 and GS-12 for supervisors. The
administration decided, in short, to attempt reform on the cheap, by
shifting boxes on the organization charts rather than investing adequately in a new system and new personnel that might break through
the established, and destructive, patterns of polarization and distrust
that have paralyzed effective reform for years. The vigorous reaction
from the NGO community should not have been a surprise, given
that the adversarial forum was being replaced with such a stingy
alternative.
Some old government hands in the immigration field, familiar
with the shifting patterns of NGO advocacy over the last fifteen
202 See supra note 144; see also Note, Asylum Adjudication: No Placefor the INS, 20
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 129, 143-44 & n.104 (1988) (arguing that "[t]he
impartiality of the INS as an adjudicatory authority is compromised by the emphasis
on enforcement which pervades the entire agency and by the direct effect this
mentality has on decision-making").
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years-sometimes favoring nonadversarial procedures, sometimes
treating the immigration judges as indispensable-conclude that the
position of the NGOs is always and only a tactical one, meant to preserve "two bites at the apple" whatever the proposal on the table.
But to be fair, there is no inherent inconsistency in the advocates'
position. If speed were no concern, it might well be that the best
possible system does involve two rounds of de novo consideration in
different institutional settings: first a nonadversarial hearing to foster responses from hesitant or fearful applicants, followed by an
adversarial, trial-type hearing that we traditionally identify as the
best way to honor due process when the stakes for the individual are
high.2 "3 Arthur Helton, a leading figure in the asylum debates,
stated forcefully during her interview for this study that the fight
over the 1987 regulations has left the NGO community deeply committed to "bifurcated proceedings," that is, to a system that allows
two separate forums for initial, de novo consideration.2 "4 NGOs will
probably resist stoutly any departure from the victory they feel they
justifiably won in October 1987.
But here is the rub: Speed is a concern, a vital concern. It must
come to be seen as such by the NGOs as well as government officials,
including high level Justice Department officials who step in on
immigration matters only when political controversy bums high.
Without speedy denials, the system will either attract large numbers
of marginal claimants or else force resort to other costly and troublesome deterrents which indiscriminately burden genuine refugees.
Restoring the "two bites" system thus implicated far greater costs
than were appreciated in October 1987, by either the NGOs or the
Justice Department.
b.

Administrative andJudicialReview

Delay also derives from the clogged dockets of the immigration
courts and from backlogs at the BIA. Shortening those delays
requires additional resources, rather than major institutional redesign, 20 5 and remains within the general control of the Justice Department, provided, of course, it receives adequate appropriations.
203 See Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REv. 1141, 1145
(1984) (identifying Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which imposed extensive
requirements for trial-type hearings, as the "high watermark of procedural due
process in the administrative setting").
204 Interview with Arthur Helton, in New York City (Nov. 15, 1988).
205 The recent rules changes allowing the BIA to sit in panels of three should
help reduce that backlog. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1) (1989).
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(This is a powerful proviso, of course, in these days of Washington
lip-reading.) One particularly important element in the delay, however, derives from the lengthy period of time required to obtain transcripts of immigration court proceedings. That period can now run
eight months or more, although cases involving detained aliens are
given priority and can be processed within a matter of weeks. If
expeditious final rulings are to be received, EOIR must either
arrange for a quicker turnaround of transcripts or else experiment
20 6
with alternatives to full transcription of each hearing.
Major delay also potentially derives from the provisions forjudicial review, although this does not appear to affect a significant proportion of cases at present. Several refugee attorneys stressed
during interviews that judicial review is sought only if the case
appears particularly strong-in part because of the pro bono nature
of the representation, and in part because such attorneys worry
about developing bad law that would serve to undermine stronger
cases later. This practice thus contrasts importantly with the use of
other stages of the process, because immigration attorneys, I was
told, consider renewal of asylum cases in immigration court and
administrative appeals to the BIA to be routine steps in all but the
most farfetched cases.
Changes to the judicial review provisions would therefore not
appear to be warranted at this time. If these patterns change, and
judicial review someday comes to cause delay in a far higher percentage of cases, then reform could be considered at that point. Statutory changes would then be needed. Other nations confronting the
problem ofjudicial delay have tried two approaches: (1) by speedily
identifying a class of applications adjudged "manifestly unfounded"
and strictly limiting judicial review for that class; and (2) more ambitiously, by limiting the scope ofjudicial review in virtually all asylum
cases to a summary proceeding that is highly deferential to the
administrative outcome, but affords some opportunity for judicial
correction of gross error or abuse. These approaches will receive
greater, albeit preliminary, attention below in connection with proposed reforms.
c. Is Delay Really a Problem?
Before turning to the alternative approaches, however, one fur206 A Canadian study has recommended the use of videotapes, with briefs citing
the location on the tape where crucial matters appear. See E. RATUSHNY, supra note
64, at 57-58.
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ther set of objections to the above evaluation should be aired. Refugee advocates sometimes argue that the problems of administrative
and judicial delay are exaggerated. They agree that the current system allows, at least theoretically, for six layers of consideration
(three administrative and three judicial) in exclusion cases, and five
in deportation cases, but they point to the absence of statistics showing that many asylum seekers actually avail themselves of all these
opportunities. 207
It is certainly true that the case for administrative simplification
cannot be made convincingly on the basis of currently available statistics. EOIR maintains and. releases only limited statistics on asylum
caseloads, and it is impossible to tell how many of its asylum cases
represent renewals of applications initially rejected in the district
offices. 20 8 The GAO stud) based on 1984 applications found that
only seven percent of applicants denied in the district office renewed
their claims before the immigration judges. 2 9 But this statistic is
suspiciously low, and may be attributable to the fact that time limitations on the study precluded the GAO from tracking all of the cases
initially denied through to the applicants' actual removal from the
country or to some other resolution of their status. It would be
entirely possible that many aliens involved simply were not
processed for deportation until after the study period ended, particularly because the study found a low INS priority on initiating such
deportation cases. 2 ' 0 Everyone interviewed for the present studyincluding immigration lawyers-thought that the seven percent figure was too low, although most placed their rough guesses of actual
renewals in the 20-30 percent range, an estimate still not terribly
high. Similarly, judicial statistics (again limited) do not show massive
211
court litigation over asylum.
These statistics, however, almost certainly tell a dated story.
Before the full implementation, in 1988, of sanctions on employers
See, Kurzban, supra note 201, at 96-97.
208 It may be that the more complete EOIR statistics being released as a result
of a policy change in early 1989 will someday provide greater insight into these
issues. See supra note 160.
207

209 GENERAL ACCOUNtING OFFICE, supra note 150, at 20, 33.

At the time of the

study, 77 percent of the claims had been filed only in district offices and 16 percent
only in immigration court.
210 See id. at 27-29 (describing methodology), id at 38 (showing that for 81
percent of the cases INS had taken no "deportation action" by the close of the study
period).
211 See supra Table V following note 187.
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who hire undocumented aliens, 2 12 persons denied asylum in the district office had little incentive to pursue matters further. Most could
probably find work and enjoy the benefits of a "de facto asylum" that
carried few risks, despite their undocumented status.2 13 Such aliens
had no reason to rush further review, because they always retained
the option of renewing the asylum application in immigration court
if and when the INS caught up with them and initiated deportation
proceedings. Moreover, because of enforcement priorities, deportation has not been an imminent threat.
Since Congress's adoption of employer sanctions, all of this has
changed, although it is still too early for reliable statistics. The
"walk-in" rate is up considerably in the district offices, and evidence
suggests that, unlike in earlier years, many people now choose to file
2 14
affirmatively for asylum in order to receive work authorization.
Once denied, they then have incentives to press INS to initiate
deportation. In a striking role reversal, the immigration bar and refugee support groups have been urging INS to hasten arrangements
for the issuance of orders to show cause in these circumstances, in
order to assure an early forum for rearguing the asylum claim and,
by no means incidentally, to renew work authorizations.21 5 Past statistics thus furnish no reliable guide as to the magnitude of the delay
problem under the present multilayered administrative system, given
the new employer sanctions.
d. Rights to Counsel
One further element of possible delay lurks in the current system, owing to a major feature meant to enhance fairness to the applicant. Statute and regulation provide a right to counsel in the
immigration court proceeding, although at no expense to the gov212 The employer sanctions scheme, INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1988), was
enacted as part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99603, 100 Stat. 3359.
213 See generally Martin, The End of De Facto Asylum, supra note 105, at 163-64

(1987-88).
214 See B. Frelick, The Back of the Hand: Bias and Restrictionism Towards
Central American Asylum Seekers in North America 17 (U.S. Comm. for Refugees
1988).
215

See Memorandum from Ignatius Bau and Robert Rubin (July 13, 1987),

reprintedin 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES app. II at 882, 886 (1987); see also INS Advises on
Work Authorizationsfor Denied Asylum Applicants, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 718 (1988).
Similar incentives may someday operate at the judicial review stage, at least as long as
the work authorization regulation remains unchanged, but that appears a more

remote prospect, given the reluctance of most experienced asylum attorneys to take a
weak case to court. See supra text following note 206.
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ernment. They also mandate the provision of a list of pro bono
counsel available in the area.2 16 When asylum claims rise numerically, the limited numbers of pro bono attorneys are easily
swamped.2 17 This situation places immigration authorities in a difficult position as they try to keep pace with rising intake-a perfectly
legitimate and praiseworthy bureaucratic objective. Inevitably, they
have incentives to press for waivers of counsel or else to deny
repeated continuances requested because of free counsel's limited
availability. Recent court decisions, however, are imposing increasingly demanding requirements to assure a knowing waiver of counsel
rights. Concomitantly, courts are increasingly insistent that the
immigration judges allow continuances until pro bono counsel
becomes available. 2 18 Obviously, in times of major influx, or in areas
where counsel is limited, this stance can cause backlogs to increase
substantially.
Court reversals for failure to honor these (qualified) counsel
rights are particularly demoralizing to the system, for such reversals
inevitably come months or years after the initial proceedings and all
later phases of administrative consideration, at a time when the
deportation or exclusion order is administratively final. Moreover,
such reversals plainly require complete rehearing in the immigration
court, possibly followed again by administrative and judicial
review. 21 9 If the system is to be prepared reliably for speedy determinations despite a fluctuating caseload, the problem of counsel
must be solved, either by wider provision of government-paid counsel 2 20 or by assuring fairness to the applicant even in the absence of
counsel.
216 See INA §§ 242(b), 292, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b), 1362 (1988); 8 C.F.R. pts. 292,
292a (1989).
217 For an example of these complications, see Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865
F.2d 328, 329-32 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
218 See, e.g., Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 92-93 (9th Cir. 1988); Castro O'Ryan v.
INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312-13 (9th ,Cir. 1988); Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676
F.2d 1023, 1031 (5th Cir. 1982). Some cases are more tolerant of the agencies'
efforts to process cases in this manner. See, e.g., Committee of Central American
Refugees v. INS, 682 F. Supp. 1055, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Vides-Vides v. INS, 783
F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir. 1986).
219 Class actions challenging broad features of asylum processing can likewise
lead to this result. See supra note 3.
220 At least one commentator regards the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) as
a possible solution to these problems. See Note, Applying the EqualAccess to JusticeAct to
Asylum Hearings, 97 YALE LJ. 1459 (1988). But EAJA is at best a half-measure that
affords only marginal relief, becaure attorneys and agencies cannot know up front
whether or not they will actually be compensated from the public treasury. It may be
years before the fee question is settled. At best EAJA may attract a few more
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The reforms proposed below center on a nonadversarial model
that could provide a full and fair opportunity to present an asylum
claim, even if the individual is unrepresented. Although efforts
would be made to accommodate counsel's schedule, the proposed
system is designed to proceed with fairness on a fairly prompt timetable, even if the applicant expresses a desire for pro bono counsel
but insufficient numbers of counsel are available to meet the
demand. It must be acknowledged that such a proposal will be
highly controversial. Due process, at least when the stakes are high,
is often closely associated with adversarial trial-type proceedings,
which usually require professional counsel.
If the nonadversarial model is not accepted as the way of providing fairness to unrepresented asylum applicants, some carefully
crafted alternative is imperative. It is essential to maintain the system's capacity for expeditious processing, without the risk that a
court will send the case back to square one months or years later.
The best alternative is probably for Congress to amend the statutes
to eliminate the ban on government-paid counsel-not for all immigration matters but only for nonfrivolous asylum cases.
Because of unpredictably fluctuating caseloads, it would probably be best, if such a course is chosen, to follow a public defender
model, assigning the representation responsibility to a permanent
staff of government-paid attorneys. 2 2 ' Such a staff would provide
other advantages as well, because of the expertise they could develop
concerning country conditions over the course of litigating numerous cases. Naturally, applicants could still retain private counsel or
engage unaffiliated pro bono attorneys when aVailable, but the pace
of proceedings would no longer be so dependent on private charity."' Obviously, the cost of such a system would be substantial, and
attorneys into initially pro bono representation, and groups currently providing
assistance may be able to expand their staffs using EAJA awards from past cases. But
unless the expansion far exceeds expectation, pro bono attorneys are still unlikely to
be able to keep pace with new arrivals in times of large influx. Either delays will
continue or many applicants will remain without representation-again risking
judicial remand many months hence.
221 Arrangements could be made for adequate insulation of these officers to
assure an independent litigation posture, or perhaps the function could be
performed under contract with a nongovernmental organization that would agree to
maintain an adequate legal staff at the necessary locations, paid from government

grants. Britain has arrangements of roughly this sort with the United Kingdom
Immigrants Advisory Service (UKIAS), although not all of UKIAS's representatives
are lawyers. See generally EUROPEAN CONSULTATION ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, ASYLUM
IN EUROPE:
222 As

A HANDBOOK FOR AGENCIES ASSISTING REFUGEES 371 (3d ed. 1983).
an added benefit, NGOs might then find it easier to target their own
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the visibility of an appropriation for such purposes, at a time of
extreme budgetary stringency, makes this course politically unlikely.
But the current statutes (allowing counsel only "at no expense to the
government") provide only illusory cost savings. Although no
money goes directly to the applicant's counsel, the government
incurs substantial expenses, primarily from detention prolonged by
the period necessary to wait for the pro bono counsel to become
available. Other indirect costs are harder to quantify but probably
more substantial-for example, the burdens on local services caused
by massive influxes of asylum seekers. 22 3 A speedy system is imperative if such burdens and costs are to be reduced.
2. Accuracy
a.

Difusion of Responsibility

The current system fails to focus responsibility for this difficult
and challenging decisionmaking on one set of officials. It thus
enhances the risk of improper denials of asylum, even if all officials
act in good faith. Over the years, INS spokespersons have sometimes responded to complaints about asylum denials by pointing out
that all cases are checked with the State Department, which has
expertise concerning these matters, and that INS almost always follows the Department's lead.1 24 At the same time, however, State
Department officials have often felt that it was INS or the immigration judges who really performed the important part of asylum decisionmaking. Department officials, after all, see only the printed
page. Much of the adjudication must turn on credibility judgments-clearly a task principally for Department ofJustice adjudicators, who see the applicants in person and can test the stories
through direct questioning.2 2 5 The system thus courts the risk that a
negative State Department opinion will induce some relaxation in
Justice Department care in examining individual cases. Yet that
scarce resources on cases they regard as most deserving, or as critical for establishing
an important factual or legal precedent.
223 See Appendix (for rough cost estimates).
224 See generally ASYLUM ADJuDICATIONS, supra note 142, at iii, 61-64. Similarly, a

1983 study of asylum processing in New York noted "a certain discomfort with
asylum cases" among immigration judges that led to heavy reliance on State
Department views and some disavowal of responsibility. See P. Fagen, supra note 141,
at 16.
225 See ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 142, at 60. I also encountered this
attitude with some frequency during my own service in BHRHA (known simply as
HA in State Department lingo) from 1978 to 1980.
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opinion may have been issued in recognition that a cold record is not
fully revealing, and in anticipation that the alien will have another
chance to bolster his case before an adjudicator he will see in person.
It is not an easy thing to send a person back to a land where he
claims he faces persecution. Unsurprisingly, officials may therefore
seek at times to minimize their own role in such results. But arrangements that unintentionally help to meet that psychological need may
entail systemic costs. A system that provides undue comfort in going
along with negative results may fail to create adequate incentives for
2 26
the care needed to spot the truly meritorious case.
The reduced role for the State Department under the new
sticker system should ameliorate this problem. A more complete
focusing of the decision on a single set of adjudicators would provide
even greater assurance. It would also give applicants the opportunity to make their cases in person to the official who will be responsible for all phases of the decision.
b.

PoliticalBias

For decades the asylum adjudication system has been attacked
for the bias of its results.2 2 7 No completely reliable scientific test of
these claims is possible, and a GAO study chartered to discover
whether asylum applications were given neutral consideration could
only conclude that the matter was "uncertain. ' 228 Nevertheless,
even a quick glance at the statistics in Table II raises serious questions about the high grant rates for applicants from communist countries (particularly Poland, where political activity became much freer
after the lifting of martial law in 1984), and the strikingly low rates
for El Salvador and Guatemala. Moreover, testimony about bias
comes in highly persuasive form from published accounts by INS
2 29
insiders as well as from INS's critics.
226

See Anker & Posner, supra note 31, at 76; Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 193-94.

227 See, e.g., G. LOESCHER &J. SCANLAN, supra note 2, at 170-219; N. L. ZUCKER &

N. F. ZUCKER, supra note 61, at 142-76; Helton, PoliticalAsylum Under the 1980 Refugee
Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243, 260-62 (1984); Kurzban, A

CriticalAnalysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865, 876-78 (1982); Note, Political
Bias in United States Refugee Policy Since the Refugee Act of 1980, 1 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ.495
(1986) [hereinafter Political Bias]; Note, Behind the Paper Curtain: Asylum Policy versus
Asylum Practice, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 107, 107-09, 124-26 (1978).
228 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 150.
229 See ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 142, at 59 n.*; Meissner, supra note 2,
at 57, 63 (describing the pressures that skewed decisionmaking, with special attention
to Poland and El Salvador; the author was Acting Commissioner of Immigration from
1981-83 and Executive Associate Commissioner from 1983-86). In unguarded
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Much of the outsiders' criticism blames bias on the role of the
State Department (recently modified) in providing advisory letters
on every case considered in the district offices and immigration
courts. 23 0

Clearly that practice provides an opportunity for diplo-

matic considerations to intrude on what the statute ordains should
be neutral, case-by-case decisionmaking. 23 1 For this reason, it would
be far better to remove the Department from any substantial role in
the decisionmaking system. '3 2 No matter how conscientious the
State Department may be irt performing this function, the aura of
distortion is bound to linger. Moreover, the Department itself would
benefit from such separation. When the home-country government
is angered by an asylum grant, its ire can be more easily deflected by
our diplomats if the Department can credibly state that it had no role
in the decision.

23 3

Removing the State Department from asylum processing has
moments, some Reagan Adminisiration spokespersons also revealed that they
regarded asylum adjudications as inherently political. For example, in arguing
(unsuccessfully) for extradition reform legislation that would have transferred from
the courts to the State Department the authority to decide whether a particular
offense was "political" and hence non-extraditable, the Deputy Legal Adviser stated:
"[A] decision on the 'political offense' exception is (as the name suggests) inescapably
politicalin nature, and inextricably intertwined with the conduct of foreign relations.
It is an issue best left to the Executive branch to decide-much as the decision to offer
politicalasylum is an executive decision. " Extradition Reform Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R.
5227 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 32 (1982) (prepared statement of Daniel W. McGovern) (emphasis added).
230 See, e.g., Posner, Comments and Recommendations on Proosed Reforms to United
States Immigration Policy, 36 U. MIAIM L. REV. 883, 887 (1982) ("[O]ne of the most
troubling problems with the current immigration system is the State Department's
involvement in the decisionmaking process."); Political Bias, supra note 227, at 537
("The chief problem concerning residual political bias in asylum adjudications is the
critical role that the State Department plays in assessing asylum claims.").
231 See, e.g., Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055, 1062 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting "some
likelihood of the Department's tempering the wind in comments concerning the
internal affairs of a foreign nation"); Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 n.1 (9th Cir.
1968) ("A frank, but official, discussion of the political shortcomings of a friendly
nation is not always compatible with the high duty to maintain advantageous
diplomatic relations .... ); Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 194, 234-35.
232 For an argument that the State should retain its role, see Burke, supra note
163, at 325.
233 Some system should still be worked out for regularly notifying the State
Department of cases received, to help prepare it for cases that will spark political
controversy with the home government, to assure identification of any asylum
seekers who may prove to be defectors with sensitive information, and perhaps to
allow for the Department or the intelligence agencies to introduce confidential
information bearing on the claim, pursuant to procedures permitting use of such
information in limited circumstances. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 208.10(c), (d) (1989)
(setting forth procedures for disclosure of non-record evidence). Each eventuality is
rare in asylum cases.

REFORMING ASYLUM ADJUDICATION

1990]

1333

been advocated for years. But many critics fail to think through carefully the continuing risks of political bias even then, unless other
important changes are made as well. The "coast of Bohemia" problem would still be present. 23 4 Indeed, it would probably be aggravated. As Lippmann observed in his classic study, those who know
less about the realities of an issue or a far-away land are more likely
to rely on the "pictures in their heads" to cope with a challenging
and complex mass of data.2 35 Without State Department advice,
nonexpert adjudicators will be confronted with just such a dilemma.
A 1986 episode, widely reported in the newspapers, reflects the
impact of such stereotyped thinking. The district director in Miami
decided in April of that year to end all returns of aliens to Nicaragua
from his district, because of concern that they might be persecuted
by the Sandinista government. He was quoted as saying: "I would
personallya-not just as a Government official, but personally-have
trouble sending people from a Communist country back to that
country."23 6 Although this position was at odds with State Department information (as reflected in the annual country reports and in
the fact that numerous advisory letters for Nicaraguans were still
negative), and contravened Congress's explicit decision in 1980 to
adopt a neutral standard to replace former provisions that expressly
favored refugees from Communist countries, the Justice Department
apparently made no effort to discipline
the district director or other23 7
wise bring his actions back into line.
The phenomenon is not confined to the district offices. Some
immigration judges also volunteered to me during office interviews
that they considered a certain country (usually a Communist country) too dangerous for return, although none offered very complete
or convincing reasons for this judgment. Certainly they did not
claim that it was based on State or Justice Department policy or on
country guidelines or across-the-board authoritative findings. It was
234 Even today, the State Department's advice is not always followed. Some
impressionistic evidence, however, suggests that the failure to follow the advice has
its own bias that compounds the favoritism for those who flee Communist countries.

See T.

ALEINIKOFF

235

W.

& D.

LIPPMANN,

MARTIN,

supra note 3, at 705.

supra note 81, at 30-49.

236 Pear, Key FederalAide Refuses to Deport any Nicaraguans, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17,
1986, at Al, col. 1.
237 See id.; Dreifus, supra note 72, at 35. It appears likely that this action, along
with other Department leniency toward Nicaraguans over the last two years, became
well-known back in Nicaragua and played a role in eventually encouraging large
numbers of people there to think about migration to the United States. The fruits of
that encouragement were felt in the Harlingen district, at a rate of several thousand
marginal applications for asylum each month during the winter of 1988-89.
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simply based on their views about current world conditions. In the
context of the conversations, I would not regard these comments as
deliberate bias; they were meant as sincere efforts to implement the
statute's commands in light of that person's understanding of homecountry conditions. But especially when matched up with competing
stereotypes that may lead to great skepticism of claims from Central
Americans other than Nicaraguans, the potential for inaccurate
23 8
results and for unfairness is manifest.
Most immigration judges, it should be stressed, strive conscientiously to apply the legal standards fairly based on the records before
them. But the potential for improvement remains. Some better way
should be found to correct as much as possible for the unintended
bias that derives from the adjudicators' inevitable creation of internal
maps, particularly if the State Department is to be removed from
routine involvement. Systematic effort should be undertaken to
replace stereotypes with detailed and accurate information, helpfully
digested. The "coast of Bohemia" problem can never be eliminated,
but it can be minimized.
c.

Inadequate Use of Existing Expertise

The immigration judges' role is firmly anchored in the adversarial model; by and large, they are expected to remain as passive
arbiters ruling on records developed by the parties.2 39 Initiative by
the judges to learn more about country conditions is not officially
encouraged. EOIR Chairman Milhollan has specifically rejected an
AILA suggestion that judges should receive more training on country conditions, and reaffirmed the traditional adversarial model.2 40
238 See P. Fagen, supra note 141, at 21 (finding that presumptions based on

national origins distorted asylum adjudications).
239 In this respect, of course, EOIR is simply trying conscientiously to move
away from a problematic past, when immigration procedures were harshly criticized
for their inquisitorial character and for the mixture of enforcement and adjudicative
roles for the special inquiry officers. See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at
87-91. This effort is praiseworthy in most immigration-law settings, but certain
elements fit uneasily in the asylum proceeding. Most troublesome is the assumption
that the judge is a kind of blank slate at the beginning of each new case. See generally
S. LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ADJUDICATION 2-3 (1988) (identifying a "neutral and passive decision-maker" as a key
element of the adversarial model). This specialized kind of adjudication, unlike most
other matters within the immigration courts' jurisdiction, cannot be performed well
unless the adjudicator brings to the case cumulative expertise concerning country
conditions. See E. RATUSHNY, supra note 64, at 15-18, 51.
240 New immigration judges, however, are given specific training on asylum
matters as part of their standard two-week training course, including presiding over a
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He stressed "that it was the attorney's responsibility to offer
whatever evidence he or she deems appropriate to meet the alien's
burden of proof in asylum cases. "241
Officially, therefore, immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals must decide asylum cases based only on the record
created in the specific case.2 42 In reality, particularly when numerous cases are received from the country involved, the judges and the
Board cannot help but remember, and, to some extent, use information learned in other cases. In fact, some immigration judges have
become quite knowledgeable about conditions in those countries,
especially in Central America, whose nationals account for a high
percentage of asylum claims. Indeed, this is a praiseworthy practice
that probably helps improve the quality of decisionmaking, even
though it violates the formal requisites of the adversarial model.
One immigration judge I interviewed had in his office an impressive array of books, including biographies and recent nonfiction bestsellers, that reflected some of the political developments in foreign
countries whose nationals were sometimes encountered in the courtroom. He said he tries to do a fair amount of such reading, in order
to have a better "feel" for the cases that come before him. I worried
a bit about the evenhandedness of the readings; most dealt with the
victims of Marxist regimes, and the judge's readings seemed to have
led to a special reluctance to return anyone to such countries. Nevertheless, this extracurricular reading program is admirable-far
preferable to the attitude encountered in some decisionmakers who
rested content with whatever information the parties happened to
add to the record. But such helpful approaches should not be left to
the initiative and energy of individual adjudicators. We should
instead devise a system that provides more systematically and honestly for such learning, and also gives assurance that adjudicators
develop as balanced a picture as possible from their readings.
simulated deportation case wherein asylum is the chief issue. But this training can
only be scheduled when there are enough new judges (about eight) to justify the
session. Therefore some judges may hear numerous cases before attending the
sessions. In addition, annual conferences of the judges usually offer some program
on asylum, at times including presentations by refugee advocacy groups and human

rights organizations.
241 Report of Meeting Between American Immigration Lawyers Association and Executive
Officefor Immigration Review Department ofJustice, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES app. III at
743, 749 (1988) (reporting on AILA-EOIR meeting).
242 See In re M-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 222, 225-26 (1956).
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Consistency and Quality Control

An important component of fairness is consistency of outcomes
among decisionmakers. 24 3 Ifjudged only by asylum decisions in the
immigration courts, the consistency goal would appear to be wellserved, primarily through the mechanism of BIA review. Even now
when the Board ordinarily sits in two panels, it remains a sufficiently
small and cohesive body that it can reasonably assure similar outcomes for similarly situated aliens. Moreover, because both INS and
the applicant can appeal to the BIA, the Board is in a position to
police against both false positives and false negatives.2 4 4
A substantial body of asylum claims, consisting of the applications that are granted in the district office, however, escapes this
checking process. These applications amounted to 39.1 percent of
cases decided there in FY 1988, and 27.8 percent as a cumulative
percentage for cases decided over the past five years. 245 Of course,
anyone unfairly denied asylum in the district office may renew the
application in immigration court, where consistent results are more
likely. The problem thus is one of inconsistent positives-a less disturbing result, perhaps, than inaccurate negatives resulting in return
to the home country of a truly deserving asylum-seeker. One might
possibly argue that false positives are not a genuine problem, that
they reflect merely the system's commitment toward giving asylum
seekers the benefit of the doubt.
Such a view should be resisted. False positives, in the long run,
also harm the system, in two ways. First, the general patterns in asylum cases are communicated'back to the home country. 24 6 An exces243 In a well-functioning system, consistency should also go far toward serving
the goal of accuracy. The claim here is more modest, because of doubts about the
validity of some of the BIA's doctrines, making it too hard for some nationalities to
win asylum and too easy for others. See, e.g., In re Fuentes, Interim Dec. No. 3065,
slip op (BIA Apr. 18, 1988); In re Maldonado-Cruz, Interim Dec. No. 3041, slip op.
(BIAJan. 21, 1988), rev'd, 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989). Nevertheless, even within
such a framework, the value of fairness would be served by assuring that Nicaraguans
in Miami receive the same consideration as Nicaraguans in Nebraska, and that
Salvadorans in Texas are treated no more harshly than Salvadorans in California.
244 This BIA capacity, however, is unfortunately undercut to a certain extent by
APRU's role. Although APRU is scrupulously careful not to intervene in the quasijudicial proceedings before the immigration judges and the Board, it does
occasionally reopen discussion with INS on the merits of a case after a deportation
order is administratively final. To the extent that this leads to a later grant despite
the EOIR denial, it undermines some of the consistency the BIA attempts to obtain.
245 See supra Table II following note 150.
246 See supra note 118 (discussing sociological studies of the role of social
networks in stimulating or facilitating migration).
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sive pattern of false positives can thus help stimulate a larger flow of
marginal asylum applicants. Such a communication process appears
to have played a role in the surge of Nicaraguan applications in
Texas in the winter of 1988-89.247 Second, when the false positives
are systematically biased in favor of certain groups, as appears to be
the case at present, they undermine public confidence in the system
and perhaps increase the chances that courts will be tempted to overturn accurate denials of other nationalities in an attempt to restore
some rough parity. False positives, when systematically favoring certain groups, also violate the underlying premises of the system.
Those premises require neutral adjudication, committed to providing asylum to those, and only those, sufficiently at risk of persecution
in the home country.2 4 8
The 1980 regulations were crafted with some attention to the
problem of false positives. Some advocates had urged that the regulations allow prompt grants of asylum by district directors in meritorious cases, without referral to the Department of State. The Justice
Department decided against this approach, in part to assure greater
consistency by checking overhasty grants by examiners. 24 9 But this
limited check never worked with great efficiency, because State had
no way to follow up on cases in which asylum was granted by the
examiner in spite of a negative advisory letter. In any event, this
consistency check has virtually evaporated now, when the majority of
referred cases come back with a sticker that simply indicates that
State has nothing to add.
247 See Frelick, INS Seeks Tougher Approach on Asylum, Work Authorization, But Faces
Legal Challenge, REFUGEE REPORTS, Jan. 27, 1989, at 1, 2 (reporting that Associate
Attorney General seeks to rescind earlier Meese policy that was quite generous to
Nicaraguans, viewing it as "a contributing factor to the current situation" in South
Texas).
248 See generally Kurzban, supra note 201, at 115. This careful insistence on
neutrality and consistency in ruling on asylum applications under INA §§ 208 and
243(h) would not preclude the granting of temporary residence rights to specific
groups chosen by the political branches, based on a combination of political and
humanitarian factors, through EVD or special legislation, for example. But decisions
of that sort, to shelter a wider category of needy individuals, should be clearly seen as
such-political decisions rather than quasi-entitlements. Such clarity both avoids
distortion of asylum adjudication and focuses appropriate responsibility for such
safe-haven decisions in the political branches.
249 This theme was voiced frequently in internal government meetings in which
the author, then a State Department official, participated in 1980. See generally
Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the
Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness,and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974) (describing elaborate quality control systems, based on
sampling and follow-up, used by some social-welfare adjudication systems).
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Finally, it could be that the Asylum Policy and Review Unit was
meant to bring greater consistency to this body of decisions. APRU's
method of operation and limited staffing, however, force APRU to
place its greatest emphasis on cases in which asylum was denied in
the district offices rather than when it was granted. In doing so,
APRU unnecessarily duplicates the roles played by other units
involved in the process. Indeed, the Asylum Policy and Review Unit
is hard to justify under any vision of sound asylum adjudication process. It adds a layer of procedure, and it seems likely only to confuse
the guidance that INS examiners attempt to follow in adjudicating
cases, heightening the risks of inconsistency. After all, those examiners already are mandated to consider the views of the State Department, and they are bound to follow the legal doctrine developed by
the BIA.
Why was APRU created? If inadequacies in State Department
information led to this step., obviously it would be more effective to
address the specific deficiencies at State-or else to replace that
Department with another method of providing up-to-date information. If, instead, direct review through the normal channels (involving the immigration judges and the BIA) was failing to assure proper
outcomes, it would have been far better to address those deficiencies
directly, rather than by throwing another agency at the problem.
IV.

A.

PROPOSED REFORMS

Specialized Adjudicators

Any cure, short- or long-term, for the ills afflicting our present
asylum adjudication system should build upon one central change.
The United States should create a corps of specialized, well-trained
professional adjudicators 2 50 to preside at the asylum adjudication
proceedings and to make the initial determinations in a single, unified procedure, replacing the two wasteful rounds of wholly separate,
de novo consideration now available. The adjudicators should have
no other function in the immigration system, nor should they rotate
to this post from other enforcement responsibilities. This change
250 Similar suggestions have been made for many years. See, e.g., Anker &
Posner, supra note 31, at 74 ("To insure that applicants receive the sympathetic
assistance necessary to a fair resolution of their claims, asylum cases should be
separated out from routine immigration cases and handled by specially trained
officials."); SELECT COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 173-74. For a sensitive discussion
of the risks and advantages of specialized adjudication systems, see S. LEGOMSKY,
SPECIALIZED JUSTICE (forthcoming Oxford University Press 1990).
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would greatly improve the system's accuracy, fairness, and speed,
whatever other reforms might ultimately be adopted. The change
would better equip us to welcome refugees promptly, as our tradition demands, as well as to deport unqualified applicants expeditiously. Nearly all other Western countries have built their systems
around such specialists. It is high time that the United States joined
their ranks.
To attract high-quality professionals, the new office should set
the grade and salary of the adjudicator's position at a level equivalent
to that enjoyed by immigrationjudges. 2 5 ' Asylum adjudicators make
decisions every bit as complicated and challenging-and as important to the government and the litigants-as other cases that fall
within present EOIR caseload. This means that costs for the new
system, at least for the first several years, will run considerably above
the recent experience under the current system, particularly because
several dozen adjudicators will be needed.2 5 2
We must develop the capacity, however, to accept short-term
expenditures in order to avoid larger long-term societal costs, costs
that are unavoidable as long as we remain vulnerable to influxes of
marginal asylum applicants. The new system, if effectively implemented, should finally straighten the many kinks that now prevent or
greatly delay actual deportation of unsuccessful applicants. Once it
becomes widely known that the system has that capacity, future
influxes should decline significantly (barring major outbreaks of persecution in this hemisphere). Such results are, doubtless, years away.
Expending enough now to do the job right, however, is an indispensable investment.
Canada's recent experience reveals the need to consider the
long-range effects of the expenses. In January 1989, Canada implemented a promising new system, built around a corps of independent, professional, full-time adjudicators supported by its own
documentation center.2 53 At that time, the system was confronted
with a backlog of 85,000 cases and an intake level that had run to
45,000 in 1988. To deal with this task, by the summer 1989, the new
Immigration and Refugee Board had hired not only the sixty-five
251 Early internal papers that ultimately led to the August 1987 proposed rules
discussed an option of making the new adjudicators "attorney examiners" with the
higher rank that classification carries. Unfortunately, INS chose the cheaper option,
making the asylum adjudicator's position ajourneyman-examiner position, at the GS
11 or 12 grade.
252 See Appendix (for the cost estimates).
253 See sources cited supra note 112.
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permanent full-time members authorized by statute for its refugee
division, but also an additional eighty or more members with two- or
three-year terms. It also planned to add another fifty or more over
the next year to help eliminate the backlog. All such officials were
hired at a high rank, with a salary in the range of $50,000 to $60,000.
Canada expected
to spend over $70 million in 1989 on asylum adjudications. 2 5 4 This outlay is considerable. The proposal offered here
differs from the Canadian model in several important particulars,
partly in order to develop a less costly system. Significant expense,
however, cannot be avoided.
The most important qualifications to be sought in recruiting and
selecting asylum adjudicators are interest in international affairs and
demonstrated awareness of and sensitivity to life in other cultures. 2 55
Although current adjudicators could, of course, apply for such positions, an effort should be made to assure a wide diversity of backgrounds among those hired, both to provide the necessary crosscultural sensitivity and to signal that the new system marks a clean
2 56
break from a problematic past.
254 Interview with Jerry Robbins, Director General, Operational Policy and
Planning, Immigration and Refugee Board, in Ottawa, Canada (Dec. 19, 1988). The
figures are translated into US dollars.
255 Several persons interviewed for the study (most of whom were from
countries other than the United States) stated that characteristics other than legal
training may be most important in identifying good asylum adjudicators. They urged
that serious thought be given to hiring nonattorneys. Canada has taken this
approach for the majority of the adjudicators (Immigration and Refugee Board
members) recruited for its new system, even though the position carries a salary that
would be sufficient to attract attorneys. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. In
an early draft of this study, I thus suggested recruitment among nonattorneys with

the requisite international experience and sensitivity, without, of course, precluding
lawyers. This suggestion, however, drew a strongly negative reaction, from

government officials and refugee advocates alike. Not only will the adjudicators have
to follow fairly complicated developments in the burgeoning American case law on
asylum, but also, and perhaps more importantly, they Will very often be dealing with
lawyers for the applicants, in the course of conducting the proceedings and
constructing the factual record. That record, in turn, is meant to be the basis for
both the initial decision and further review, which will be entirely under the
stewardship of lawyers. I have therefore withdrawn the suggestion. At least for the
American administrative context, dominated as it is by lawyers and infused with the
American cultural preference for an adversarial form ofjustice, asylum adjudicators
should be trained attorneys.
256 A provision in an early Simpson-Mazzoli immigration reform bill would have
created a separate unit of immigration judges to decide asylum cases after special
training, but, in an extraordinary measure apparently meant to demonstrate a
complete break with the past, it provided that no one who had served as an
immigration judge before the date of enactment could hear asylum cases. See S. 2222,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 124(a)(2), 128 CONG. REc. 21,671, 21,675 (1982) (proposing
new Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a)(2)). The 1983 version of the bill

1990]

REFORMING ASYLUM ADJUDICATION

1341

A demonstrable change from the past, fortified by a visible commitment of added resources to assure professionalism, would also
serve other useful functions. First, such a change would maximize
the chances of gaining the support, or at least the acquiescence, of
refugee advocacy groups. (Indeed, a major effort should be undertaken to encourage NGO participation in shaping the final details of
any such plan.) The August 1987 proposed regulations foundered,
in part, because they did not sufficiently indicate a genuine departure, nor did they reflect any real commitment of new resources.
Second, a major shift to an impressively professional group of
adjudicators might also send an important message to the courts.
The shift would show that the new system was not cobbled together
solely as a hasty reaction to the recent rise in the numbers of asylum
seekers, but that the reform attended to the needs of asylum seekers
truly in danger of persecution at home. The history of dealings
between agencies and courts in the asylum field suggests that a fresh
start is well-advised. 25 7 The object of these reforms is not to launch
a system that will work only after years of paralysis resulting from
test cases. The object is to create a system that can work fairly and
efficiently after only a brief start-up period, and that can actually lead
to swift grants and denials-the latter leading to prompt deportation. This objective cannot be achieved unless the courts25are
pre8
pared to defer to the agency in the vast majority of cases.
Many Western countries have developed adjudication staffs
whose members specialize by region or even by country of origin.
Such specialization would be ideal, for it would improve still further
the development of expert and detailed knowledge to be brought to
eased this restriction, however, simply preventing such service until the judges
received special training in international relations and international law. See S. 529,

98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 124 (a)(1), 129 CONG. REC. S6970, S6975 (daily ed. May 18,
1983).
257 See cases cited supra note 3 (describing the years of litigation which resulted
when Haitian asylum seekers initiated the first major challenge to the government's
procedures for asylum adjudication). In the Haitian Refugee Center litigation, the

element most damaging to the government's case may have been the revealing fact
that INS tally sheets for reports on the "Haitian program" contained room only for
the number of denials; it had no line for reporting on grants of asylum. See Haitian
Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1031-32 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). Not
surprisingly, the courts concluded that the effort was meant to clear dockets without
attention to the merits of individual cases. See id at 1040.
258 See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 249, at 806-07 (suggesting that an important
factor determining whether a reviewing court will take an interventionist or a
deferential stance is the court's "confidence or lack of confidence in the integrity of
the underlying administrative process").
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bear in the cases. 2 59 Nevertheless, such a system is probably not
fully attainable in this country, owing primarily to geography. In
Switzerland, for example, the full federal government adjudication
staff can remain in Berne. Applicants simply come to the capital via
an inexpensive train ride for their interviews with the appropriate
country specialist. The United States is too vast for such a system.
Nevertheless, there may be some chance for a limited specialization
in various locations where particular nationalities have congregated
(such as Poles in Chicago or Nicaraguans in Miami). In any event,
most current asylum seekers come from Central America and the
Caribbean. Recruitment efforts should therefore focus on persons
already familiar with the cultures of that region, and all adjudicators
should receive training and ongoing information on country conditions there.
The new system should be expressly based on an understanding
that these adjudicators will develop expertise about country conditions over time and may apply their cumulative learning to each case
they encounter. As developed above, such expertise will help serve
several important objectives. It will facilitate adequate questioning
at the hearing to cover all necessary details, help in assessing credibility, and undergird the ultimate evaluation of the risk the applicant
would face if returned. Training must emphasize that the adjudicator's mission is as much to help substantiate meritorious claims as it
is to issue prompt denials when the claimant is unqualified.
Other elements, some detailed in succeeding sections, would
also serve to develop and preserve the needed expertise. Perhaps
most important would be a well-staffed documentation center,
independent of the State Department. The task of this documentation center would be to amass unclassified information on country
conditions from a wide range of sources, including both the State
Department and private human rights organizations, in order to
make this information available in as accessible a form as possible.
Many other nations have devoted resources to official documentation
centers of this type. Canada, in particular, has pioneered several
innovative and useful techniques, including frequently updated
259 See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 234 (advocating a system where
decisionmakers can improve their ability to judge the credibility of an application by
becoming "thoroughly familiar with conditions, events, political parties, and social
groups" in particular countries); Kilin, supra note 107, at 239 (recommending that
officials be knowledgeable of the particular cultural background of the asylumseekers whose cases they decide, in order to prevent cross-cultural
miscommunication and impaired decisionmaking).
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country profiles and background information on all significant
source countries.260 In addition to assuring that they remain current
on developments in source countries, adjudicators should be able to
use the center, with the help of its staff, to search for information
about particular legislative facts. For example, if the claimant asserts
that he was involved in a major demonstration in November 1983 in
the capital city and that the demonstration was violently suppressed
by the police, an adjudicator could seek confirmation of such an
event from the center. Or, if the claimant asserts that government
soldiers forcibly impress young men into the armed forces, the adjudicator could ask the documentation center staff to provide whatever
information is available from its database on such matters. (Fairness
constraints on the use of such information are discussed below.)
The center's resources should also be open, of course, for use by
asylum seekers and their counsel.2 6 '
Because this new system would develop its own capacity for
obtaining and evaluating a wide range of country condition information, routine referral of cases to the State Department should be
eliminated.2 6 2 Individual adjudicators might still refer a particular
matter when it appears likely that State Department information, not
otherwise available through the documentation center, would be
particularly helpful. But solicitation of State Department views
should be the exception, not the rule.
There remains the "coast of Bohemia" problem. Indeed, when
I described early versions of this proposal to some private attorneys,
they expressed deep concern that expert adjudicators of the sort
proposed here might become overly dogmatic in their own distinctive views of conditions in the home country. And with the removal
of any second-round de novo consideration before the immigration
260 See Rusu, supra note 112. See generally Rudge & Kjaerum, The Information
Aspects of Refugee Work-Time for a Full-ScaleInformation Strategy, REFUGEE ABSTRACTS,
Dec. 1988, at 1; Thoolen, Refugees and Information Technology, REFUGEES, Oct. 1988, at
34, 36 (advocating an international refugee documentation network).
261 Ideally, the new system would follow a practice carefully adhered to in
Switzerland. The Swiss system specifically provides that 10 percent of each officer's
work week be set aside for keeping current on the latest information received in the
center regarding countries for which she has responsibility.
262 Arrangements should still be made for referral of "urgent action cases,"
such as those involving defectors and diplomats, to the State Department so that it
may handle the immediate diplomatic consequences. Or perhaps only basic
biographic data on each applicant could be provided to the State Department, solely
for the purpose of screening by the national security agencies, rather than generating
a letter containing State Department views on each application.
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judges, advocates would lose at least one important opportunity to
correct for such bias.
No system can be designed that escapes this problem altogether.
But it hardly seems prudent to retain multiple layers of de novo consideration on the chance that the pictures inside the head of the second adjudicator will cancel out those inside the head of the first.
Such a system is a recipe for stalemate or confusion, even though
fewer deportations may actually result while litigation drags on. A
better approach, though hardly foolproof, is to craft a system candidly aware of the risk of such distortions and dedicated to avoiding
them.
The best cure for dogmatic stereotyping is steady provision of
reliable information-constantly forcing the participants to redraw
the pictures inside their heads to conform more completely to the
new, more detailed, and more accurate information.2 6 This kind of
corrective is far more likely to be successful under the proposed system than under the present system, if only because the adjudicators
will be confronting such information full time, rather than considering asylum cases as a fraction of their workload. Other strategies,
such as weekly regional updates prepared by the documentation
center staff, ongoing training procedures, and well-targeted monitoring, can offer further assurances, if pursued with sufficient determination by the agency.
B.

OrganizationalLocation

Who exactly would perform such monitoring and arrange for
ongoing training? That is, where would this new office be located,
and what would be its lines of accountability? Earlier studies have
sometimes argued for a fully independent asylum adjudication office,
headed, for example, by a multi-member board appointed by the
President and removable onaly for cause. 2" Independence would
indeed carry perceptible advantages. Principally, it would help
ensure reasonably neutral decision making, insulated from foreign
policy influences and sheltered from dominance by an enforcement
perspective.
But full independence of this sort might not provide adequate
assurance to those who worry primarily about asylum as a loophole.
263
264

See W. LIPPMANN, supra note 81, at 402-405.
See Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 234-35 & n. 170; see also N.L.

ZUCKER & N.F.
ZUCKER, supra note 61, at 276-77 (citing numerous studies advocating a refugee

authority independent of political considerations).
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And, in any event, full independence is not likely to be politically
acceptable. Traditionally, Congress has insisted upon keeping a
wide range of functions and authorities in the immigration field,
whether they relate to enforcement or adjudication, under the control of the Attorney General.
It remains possible, however, to achieve most of the objectives
of independence while retaining general responsibility in the Attorney General. The obvious location for a new unit of this sort would
be within the Executive Office of Immigration Review. Created in
1983, that Office has evolved over the last several years into a major
subunit of the Justice Department concerned exclusively with adjudication and review, and freed of entanglement with enforcement
functions. Although EOIR reports to the Attorney General, it is sufficiently removed from foreign policy and enforcement responsibilities to afford reasonable assurance of neutrality and independence in
asylum adjudications." 5 The August 1987 proposed regulations
might have been more acceptable if they had placed their new corps
of asylum adjudicators within EOIR, rather than keeping the unit in
INS.
The proposal, therefore, could be framed in this way. Statute or
regulation should create within EOIR a new Asylum Board, headed
by a chairperson responsible directly to the Attorney General. The
chair would supervise a staff of asylum adjudicators, hired as
265 As a practical matter, the Attorney General exercises his authority over
EOIR decisions only through use of his "referral" power under 8 G.F.R. § 3.1(h)
(1989)-for example, because it would set a wide-ranging precedent. Referrals are
rare, and in any event they are publicly known and visible, thus minimizing the risk of
improper invasion of adjudicative neutrality. See also United States ev rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) (limiting other opportunities for control by the
Attorney General of Board of Immigration Appeals decisions). Similar procedures
should likewise shield the determinations of the asylum unit.
Some commentators appear to assume that any adjudications still under the
responsibility of the Attorney General will be inevitably tainted with an enforcement
outlook. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1363-66 (1983) (asserting that the "implicit threat of abolition"
of the Board of Immigration Appeals by the Attorney General "undermines the
independence of the Board'sjudgment"). Seegenerally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RiGHTs ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 40.43 (1980)
(citing several explanations for the emphasis on enforcement activities by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service). This approach is too mechanical.
Functional independence and neutrality grow from and are nourished by a far wider
range of ties and reinforcements; judgments about .independence based solely on
inspection of an organization chart or tenure protection provisions are likely to be
misleading. See J. MAsIiw, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE-MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY CLAIMS 41-44 (1983); T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 91,
451-53.
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described above, who would probably be located in several offices
distributed around the country as caseloads require. The chair
would also be a member of any administrative appellate unit dealing
with asylum (to be discussed below).
C. Nature of the Proceedings

Because the asylum adjudicators would lack jurisdiction over
other immigration law issues, under this proposal, asylum determinations will obviously be separate from deportation or exclusion
proceedings. Those who walk in to a district office to apply affirmatively for asylum should receive the necessary form and be given
enough time to complete it and gather any desired supporting information. Once the form is returned, the case can be referred to an
adjudicator. Denial by the adjudicator would foreclose future consideration of the issue in deportation proceedings. If the asylum
issue is raised only after the alien is already in proceedings, the
immigration judge should adjourn the hearing, pending a decision
on the asylum claim by the specialized adjudicator.2 6 6 Alternatively,
special arrangements could be made, particularly when the party
concedes deportability and suggests no other relief from deportation, for speedy entry of a conditional deportation order-conditional on the outcome of the asylum adjudication. Careful thought
should be given to streamlining these procedures so that, if the asylum claim is not accepted, a fully effective deportation order can take
effect as soon as possible.
Other questions about the nature of the proceedings are more
basic, for they go to the fundamentals of how evidence will be
presented and tested, both in the interest of the applicant and in the
interest of the government. Recommended here is a nonadversarial
model that assigns to the adjudicator the major responsibility for
developing the record, including the marshaling of both positive and
negative information, and adds certain measures to assure fairness
for the applicant and a complete opportunity to present her best
case.
The choice of a nonadversarial model may seem surprising in
266 The August 1987 proposed regulations spelled out detailed arrangements
for such a procedure. They also provided possible procedural models for
consideration of asylum claims that arise only after deportation proceedings have
ended, and for limited opportunities for reopening denied claims based on changed
circumstances. See 52 Fed. Reg. 32,552, 32,554, 32,558-59 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
pts. 208.3, 208.18) (proposed Aug. 28, 1987).
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light of constitutional due process considerations. 26 7 Under a
Mathews v. Eldridge26 8 analysis, it is customary to consider that asylum
seekers have a most vital private interest at stake. And, although the
government's interests may also be weighty, particularly in light of
the pressures created when asylum applications are numerous, it
remains customary to think of adversarial trial-type proceedings as
the best guarantees-perhaps indispensable guarantees-when indi26 9
vidual stakes are high.

But a closer look at the Supreme Court's procedural due process
jurisprudence reveals that the Court does not prescribe adversarial
procedures as a requirement in all settings where important interests
are at stake. 2 7' Fundamentally, due process requires the opportunity
267 See generally Scanlan, Asylum Adjudication: Some Due Process Implications of
ProposedImmigration Legislation, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 261 (1983) (analyzing a number of
constitutional difficulties with the changes proposed by the Senate version of the
Simpson-Mazzoli "Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1981").
268 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Eldridge established the Supreme Court's framework
for resolving procedural due process issues. This framework requires courts to
consider three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id.at 335. This analysis has often been criticized as inadequate, primarily for focusing too much on accuracy and too little on the "dignitary" interests of the individuals
involved. See, e.g., Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
Cm. L. REv. 28 (1976) (asserting that "the failing of Eldridge is its focus on questions
of technique rather than on questions of value"). Those critiques may have less
weight in the immigration setting, but, in any event, Eldridge remains the governing
standard.
269 See Mashaw, supra note 249, at 772, 775 (describing and criticizing this view).
See generally Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: PoliticalAsylum
and Beyond, 44 U. Pi-r. L. REv. 165 (1983) (arguing for greater acceptance of
nonadversarial procedures).
270 See, e.g., Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,
320-334 (1985) (finding that a veteran's difficulty in procuring legal representation
for Veteran's Administration benefit claim procedures caused by a $10 attorney's fee
limitation does not violate due process requirements); Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S' 584,
606-09 (1979) (holding that an adversary proceeding to determine the
appropriateness of decisions to commit children to state mental hospitals is not
required where an inquiry has been made by a staff physician); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (stopping short "of construing the Due Process Clause to
require, countrywide, that hearings in connection with short suspensions [from
public school] must afford the student the opportunity to secure counsel, to confront
and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to
verify his version of the incident"); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971)
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to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."271
What is meaningful should be decided, not in the abstract, but only
after careful attention to the specific adjudicative task at hand.2 72
Eldridge is not to the contrary. In fact, the Eldridge analysis-and particularly its middle factor-asks us to move away from rigid reliance
on the classical trial-type hearing model and to inquire instead into
what makes the most sense for assuring fairness in the precise adjudication at issue. That middle factor invites us to undertake a careful
comparative inquiry, weighing the relative merits of the adversarial
and nonadversarial models in the asylum context. Viewed in this light,
an adversarial asylum hearing, presided over by a passive judge who
officially knows nothing about the relevant issues except what
appears in the record, should be seen as a poor servant of either
fairness or accuracy.
First, several of the bas:ic assumptions that underlie our usual
preference for trial-type procedure do not apply here. That preference derives from the view that rebuttal evidence, cross-examination,
and confrontation provide "the best way to resolve controversies
(approving significant role for presiding administrative law judge in questioning
applicant for social security disability benefits, as against claim that this practice
unconstitutionally mixed the role of prosecutor and judge, and upholding use as
evidence of written physicians' reports supporting nondisability, notwithstanding the
reports' hearsay character, the absence of cross-examination, and the directly
opposing testimony by claimant and his medical witness).
271 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
272 See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 696 (1979) (noting that the due
process clause is not necessarily violated when "some leeway for practical
administration" of a statute is allowed). Many other writers, including two eminent
federal judges, have urged that American due process inquiry expand its horizons
and acknowledge that fairness can often be well served by procedures other than
trial-type hearings. See, e.g., Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1031, 1052-55 (1975) (challenging the strictly adversarial nature of the U.S.
legal system and suggesting more investigation into alternative systems of justice);
Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1287-91 (1975) (advocating
an investigatory model for administrative hearings under which an independent
decision maker would have the responsibility for developing all the pertinent facts);
Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 263, 314-16 (1978)
(explaining that much of U.S. criminal trial procedure, most notably the active roles
of prosecution and defense counsel, is of only recent historical origin and peculiar to
the American legal system); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-09 & n.16
(1979) (approving nonadversarial procedures in the context of parental commitment
of children to state mental institutions because "[t]he judicial model for factfinding
for all constitutionally protected interests, regardless of their nature, can turn
rational decisionmaking into an unmanageable enterprise"); O'Barr & Conley,
LitigantSatisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAw & Soc'y
REV. 661, 666-67 (1985) (criticizing the restraints placed on witnesses in formal
adjudication).
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But cross-examina-

tion and confrontation are rarely among the tools used by an asylum
seeker in an asylum proceeding, for a fundamental reason: The government offers its own witnesses only on rare occasions. In the overwhelming majority of asylum cases, the only witness actually
testifying (as opposed to communicating in some fashion through

documents) is the applicant himself, perhaps joined by family members. Therefore, the only cross-examination that takes place, most of
the time, is that of the trial attorney who endeavors to expose inconsistencies or weaknesses in the applicant's own account. It could
hardly be thought unfair to the applicant to replace such interrogation (designedly adverse) with questioning done instead by an examiner who has been instructed that her role is to develop a full record
and not to strive zealously for a negative outcome.
The other information in the record is usually documentary,
such as newspaper accounts or human rights reports. Very little of it
relates specifically to the individual; virtually all of it has to do with
legislative facts.2 74 Reports concerning legislative facts may, of
course, be rebutted, and occasionally it will be in the applicant's
interest to attempt to do so-for example, to challenge something
273 3 K. DAvis, supra note 93, § 15.3, at 144. Professor Davis amplifies those
reasons as follows:
The reason we use trial-type procedure, I think, is that we make the
practical judgment, on the basis of experience, that taking evidence,
subject to cross-examination and rebuttal, is the best way to resolve
controversies involving disputes over adjudicative facts, that is, facts
pertaining to the parties. The reason we require a determination on the
record is that we think fair procedure in resolving disputes of adjudicative
facts calls for giving each party a chance to meet in the appropriate
fashion the facts that come to the tribunal's attention, and the appropriate
fashion for meeting disputed adjudicative facts includes rebuttal evidence,
cross-examination, usually confrontation, and argument (either written or
oral or both). The key to a fair trial is opportunity to use the appropriate
weapons (rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argument) to meet
adverse materials that come to the tribunal's attention.
274 The only likely exception may be an account of earlier statements the
individual applicant gave to immigration officials, usually at the time of
apprehension. For example, the account may say that the applicant told the officers
he came to find ajob. If the applicant disputes the accuracy of that account, it may be
necessary to call the recording official to the hearing. But most often, the applicant
does not challenge the fact of the earlier statements; he challenges their significance
or seeks to explain them because of his reluctance to touch on risky subjects in the
presence of uniformed officers. Here, too, the applicant's own testimony will be the
relevant tool, not confrontation or cross-examination. For discussion of "legislative
facts" see supra notes 93, 99-105 and accompanying text.
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asserted in the State Department's human rights country report. But
again, the usual adversarial tools are not necessarily of great assistance here. Rebuttal customarily takes the form of supplying competing documentary evidence that tends to controvert the asserted fact.
The nonadversarial model proposed here makes full allowance for
such submissions, along with argument based thereon. Moreover,
unlike the present system that makes regular provision only for State
Department input, the model here places responsibility on the adjudicator to consider not only State Department information, but also
human rights reports from other reasonably available sources.
Second, an adversarial model functions well only when each of
the three key roles (the judge plus the parties' representatives) is
played by a professional who is well-equipped to deal with the subject matter and the techniques at hand. In asylum adjudication, satisfying this prerequisite is not simply a matter of assuring the presence
of lawyers, for the ordinary generalist lawyer's tools often are insufficient to carry out an adequate inquiry, even into the immediate adjudicative facts. Substantial country expertise, supplemented by
sensitivity to cross-cultural difficulties, is necessary even to perform
an effective direct examination of one's own client. One manual for
volunteer attorneys in asylum cases illustrates the need for such
qualities: It recounts the story of "one lawyer who, upon hearing
that his client had been chased by armed men in civilian clothing in
El Salvador asked, 'Well, why didn't you go to the police?' "275
In short, the relevant expertise, detailed knowledge about conditions in source countries, is simply too scarce. One cannot expect
three participants in the adversarial proceedings (two lawyers and
one judge) to have this expertise except in rather unusual circumstances. Adopting a nonadversarial model would allow us to target
resources on making sure that the one key participant, the adjudicator, is well equipped-equipped not only to make the final judgment,
but also to frame questions throughout the hearing that will promote
accurate understanding of the adjudicative facts at issue.
The nonadversarial procedures in asylum cases should thus proceed roughly as follows. The applicant would have the opportunity,
as at present, to provide whatever information he wished when filing
the Form 1-589 (or preferably, a better designed application form).
He might choose to supply lengthy answers to the form's questions,
275 COMM. FOR HEALTH RIGHTS IN CENT. AM. AND THE FATHER MORIARTY CENT.
AM. REFUGEE PROGRAM,
HEALTH VOLUNTEERS

POLITICAL ASYLUM: A HANDBOOK FOR LEGAL AND MENTAL

44 (n.d.).
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submit supplementary affidavits or accounts, or file general human
rights information on country conditions. If the adjudicator is not
already familiar with conditions in the source country, he will be
responsible for establishing such acquaintance, with the aid of the
documentation center, in advance of the proceedings. Such preparation would, of course, include review of all material supplied with the
application.
At the actual hearing, the applicant should first be invited to
recount the important elements of his case and to add anything he
wishes. The adjudicator would then pose questions meant to flesh
out the account as necessary, to test its consistency, and to home in
on the issues that appear, under the facts of the particular case, to be
crucial to the ultimate judgment about risks faced in the home country. No government counsel would appear. If it developed that further information had to be gathered to enable effective examination,
the adjudicator could adjourn the proceeding. But such postponements should be rare. The proceedings should be recorded verbatim, as occurs now in immigration court.2 7 6
If the asylum seeker has a lawyer (for example, through the
efforts of an NGO), counsel could of course be present to advise and
reassure the applicant throughout the proceeding. Beyond this,
counsel's role should supplement that of the adjudicator, by posing
further questions to expand or clarify and to put on other evidence,
in those cases where such evidence is available. Most of the time the
case would focus only on the factual inquiry, but, in those cases
where substantial legal issues arise, counsel could, of course, offer
argument on points of law.
The proposal is designed for reasonably full and certainly fair
development of the affirmative case, even for inarticulate asylum
seekers who appear without counsel, or with counsel insufficiently
familiar with asylum cases or home country conditions. 2 77 The pro276 Eventually, however, it may be possible to find more expeditious ways to
preserve the record for appeal. See supra note 174 (discussing use of videotapes).
277 The setting would thus bear many similarities to social security disability
proceedings, where the presiding administrative law judge is under an affirmative

duty to develop both sides of the case. See Mashaw, supra note 249, at 779-83. Courts

have found ways to police this requirement, particularly in instances where the
applicant appears pro se. See, e.g., Bluvband v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 886, 892, 895 (2d
Cir. 1984) (finding that the administrative law judge presiding over the disability
hearing failed to help the claimant ferret out all the relevant facts and adequately
develop the record). Some 70 percent of the disability claimants are unrepresented.
See 3 K. DAvis, supra note 93, § 14:17, at 86; see also Mashaw, supra note 249, at 78182. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has specifically upheld this structure against
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posal is therefore meant to enable speedy but fair decisions in a
heavily burdened system, without being entirely dependent upon the
availability of pro bono efforts from the private bar.27 8 If reasonably
available, however, counsel's role should be welcomed, primarily for
the way in which prehearing consultation can serve to sharpen the
issues and especially to encourage reticent applicants to tell the
whole story. The less the case has been developed beforehand by
counsel, the more time the adjudicator will probably have to devote
in order to identify the crucial factual elements on which the affirmative case rests. But clearly no adjudicator will be able to spend the
thirty hours or more that private attorneys report spending, on occasion, to develop the full trust necessary to coax out the whole story.
This deficiency must be acknowledged. But the system simply cannot be expected to go that far, on governmental resources, to help
bring forth facts that are that elusive. Claimants bear the burden of
coming forth with the evidence. The system cannot be designed for
the chance (although it is admittedly real) that in a small percentage
of the cases such delay and coaxing will unearth a meritorious case.
D.

Fairness and the Treatment of Legislative Facts

The expert knowledge developed by the adjudicators would be
used primarily to ask detailed and focused questions, to help evaluate the answers received, and to make the required predictive judgment about future risks the applicant would face in the home
country. Using expertise in this manner should not present significant fairness difficulties; specialized adjudication is customarily
assigned to administrative bodies specifically to take advantage of
due process challenge. See, e.g., Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 209 (1972);
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).
278

As a further measure of reassurance to unrepresented applicants, especially

those from backgrounds that might make official proceedings intimidating, it might

be possible to emulate a feature of the Swiss system. The Swiss government pays a
small stipend to volunteers, recruited by an umbrella refugee assistance organization,
who have a right, by statute, to attend each asylum adjudication interview. See Loi sur
l'asile du 5 octobre 1979 § 3, Recueil officiel des lois et ordonnances de la
Confederation suisse [ROl 1980, at 1717, 1718, amended Modification du 16
decembre 1983, RO 1985, at l,fiurther amended Modification du 20 juin 1986, RO
1987, at 1674 (taking effect Jan. 1, 1988) (codified at Recueil systematique du droit
f~d~ral [RS] 142.31). They are there primarily as observers, and they clearly do not
see their role as lawyer-substitutes for the applicant; they do not meet with the

applicants beforehand. But their presence can serve as an additional guarantee of
fairness, and they also are generally permitted to pose questions at the end of the
procedure to clear up any confusion or ambiguities.
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such cumulative learning and specialization. 2 79 But if some facts
developed by the expert adjudicators become central to particularized determinations crucial to the ultimate ruling, fairness may
require additional steps before relying on this outside information.
An example will help to clarify this point.
Suppose that the applicant claims he will be persecuted because
he was a local organizer with the XYZ political party, a radical splinter group operative in a certain province of the home country. He
offers evidence of a government crackdown on the organization, and
indeed the country profile from the documentation center likewise
reports the crackdown. But after examination, the adjudicator is prepared to rule as follows:
I find the asylum seeker not to be credible in his claim of
involvement with the XYZ party. I reached this conclusion primarily on the basis of certain questions I posed to him. I asked him
who A was and I asked him who B was, and he did not know. A and
B are key leaders of the XYZ party in that region (citing the sources
of this information). Anyone even minimally active with XYZ
would have known that. Therefore, his testimony regarding
involvement with that group is not worthy of belief. Because his
claim rested solely on that ground, his application for asylum will
be denied.
In Professor Davis's conceptual scheme, this information about
A and B is a legislative fact because it is not a fact concerning the
immediate party. Hence, it need not necessarily be placed on record
by means of live testimony subject to cross-examination; official
notice is appropriate. 2 80 But because the information is being used
279 See, e.g., E. Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in FormalAdministrative
Hearings, 1971 DuiE L. J. 1, 43 ("In reaching a conclusion, the examiner or agency
may rely on its special skills . . .just as a judge may freely use his legal skills in
reading statutes and applying decided cases in the preparation of his opinion."); W.
Gellhom, Official Notice in Administrative Adjudication, 20 Tzx. L. REv. 131, 136 (1941)
("The conventional process of proof presupposes, in the main, that each case is a
separate entity, which the trier of fact approaches with a more or less blank mind.
The hypothetical foundation for that conventional process is absent when the trier of
fact is an experienced governmental agency.").
Supreme Court precedents also support this notion. See, e.g., FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 813-14 (1978) (holding that because
the determinations were "primarily of ajudgmental or predictive nature," the agency
could apply its expert knowledge; "complete factual support in the record [for the
agency's conclusions] is not possible or required"); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.,
344 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1953) (a board may use its "cumulative experience," which
"begets understanding and insight by which judgments not objectively demonstrable
are validated or qualified or invalidated").
280 See 3 K. DAvIs, supra note 93, § 15.10, at 184. Some cases take a narrower
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here as the crucial basis for a credibility judgment, fairness may
demand specific notification to the individual, with an opportunity to
rebut. The Administrative Procedure Act makes provision for such
situations in adjudications covered by its terms. It provides: "When
an agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to
an opportunity to show the contrary."281
A variant of a procedure now used in district offices, when the
examiner is prepared to deny an asylum claim based on information
received from the State Department, might be employed here to
afford the party an opportunity to rebut. Under the reformed system, the adjudicator could simply issue a "notice of intent to deny,"
giving the reasons as described above and citing the source for the
information about A and B. The asylum seeker would then have a
specified period of time (district offices now allow fifteen days) to
rebut the information, either by showing that the source was mistaken and that A and B were not involved with the XYZ party, or by
providing other reasons why the asylum seeker could not be
expected to know them. This procedure should be sufficient to satisfy due process requirements.28 2
It should be emphasized, however, that in most asylum adjudicaview of official notice, apparently limiting it to the much smaller range of facts that
may be judicially noticed-i.e., facts that are common knowledge or cannot
reasonably be disputed. See, e.g., Sosna v. Celebrezze, 234 F. Supp. 289, 290 (E.D.

Pa. 1964) (holding that court's use of medical textbooks to bolster reports of
examining physicians without notice to claimant was contrary to the Administrative
Procedure Act); Glendening v. Ribicoff, 213 F. Supp. 301, 302 (W.D. Mo. 1962)

(holding that the "consideration of ... extra-record medical information was
erroneous as a matter of law"). But the better authority is to the contrary,
acknowledging that a wider scope for official notice is the concomitant of agency
expertise. See, e.g., McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1986) (approving use
of official notice in asylum cases and emphasizing that it is a broader concept than
judicial notice). Some cases taking a restrictive approach to official notice base their
concern on the fact that such a practice may effectively shift the burden of proof from
the agency to the individual. See Dayco Corp. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 180, 186 (6th Cir.
1966); cf E. Gellhorn, supra note 279, at 45. But in asylum cases, the individual
clearly bears the burden of proof in any event. Cf Zamora v. United States, 534 F.2d
1055, 1062 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J., dictum) (approving use of State Department
information in asylum cases, without making drafter of State letter available for crossexamination, so long as letter speaks only to legislative facts).
281 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1988) (emphasis added). See generally 3 K. DAVIS, supra
note 93, § 15.10, at 184; E. Gellhorn, supra note 279, at 42-49.
282 It might be possible to justify the issuance of the hypothetical ruling in the
text even without advance notice of intent to deny, so long as an administrative
appeal system is available on terms that would permit the alien to file rebuttal
information in that forum. In the analogous situation under the APA, § 556(e)
requires only that the opportunity to rebut be made available "on timely request."
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tions this procedure will not be necessary. Most decisions will not
"rest on" official notice of specific legislative facts of this character.
Instead, the adjudicator will simply employ her general knowledge in
making the ultimate predictive judgment about the risks the applicant would face on return.
E. Administrative Review

The objective of expeditious proceedings demands that the system achieve final deportation orders quickly, primarily to serve as a
deterrent against others in the home country with marginal cases
who may be thinking of coming to the United States to file for asylum. Obviously, any provision for administrative or judicial review
will undercut that objective to some extent. Yet to leave the decision
in the hands of one official, without even a cursory review on the
administrative record compiled at the initial stage, would be intolerable when so much is potentially at stake for the individual. Some sort
of review is indispensable.
1. Administrative Review or Not?
Because of the habeas corpus clause in the Constitution,2 8 judicial review in some form appears inescapable. (Appropriately channeled judicial review is also highly desirable as an outside check on
the administrative agency.) It is therefore tempting to consider eliminating administrative appellate review altogether, in the interest of
speedy finality. After all, if judicial review must be available, then
any administrative review simply adds a third layer of consideration.
Canada yielded to this temptation. The 1988 legislation establishing its new asylum adjudication system eliminates any centralized
administrative review by a body equivalent to our BIA. If the United
States should choose to follow that model (it is not the one favored
here), it should at least take the other steps Canada pursued to minimize the risk of inconsistency and error despite the absence of
administrative review. In Canada, proceedings on the merits of an
asylum claim are invariably heard by a panel of two members of the
Immigration and Refugee Board. The asylum seeker needs to persuade only one of them that the case is meritorious in order to
284
achieve a favorable result.
283

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cI. 2.

284 See [Canadian] Immigration Act §§ 46.02, 69.1(10), ch. 35, §§ 48.02,
71.1(10), 1988 Can. Stat. 903, 919, 938; see also sources cited supra note 112. A
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Nevertheless, several people interviewed in Canada acknowledged that the new system remains vulnerable to the vice of inconsistency. For example, if it comes to the attention of the chairman of
the Immigration and Reffigee Board that a panel in Vancouver is
granting asylum readily to members of a certain dissident group, but
panels in Montreal are consistently denying asylum in such circumstances, the chairman has no direct measure available for achieving
unified Board policy on the issue. Informal controls, primarily
through the use of legal opinions or other advice from the Board
general counsel's office, will probably ameliorate the inconsistency
problem, but such measures are only advisory. Theoretically, consistency could be established in Canada through judicial review. But
judicial review under these circumstances is heard in different courts
at various levels and in various locations, rather than before a single
tribunal. In this situation, consistency via the judicial route may take
a long time to achieve.
In addition, centralized administrative review is desirable
because of the difficult nature of the decisions that asylum adjudicators must make. This difficulty is best illustrated by use of a hypothetical. Assume that human rights reports reveal a gradually
increasing pattern of government suppression of labor union activists in a Central American country. The first reports mention isolated arrests of certain leaders. Subsequent reports indicate that
some of these detained leaders have been tortured. A few weeks
later a wider circle of prominent union activists are arrested,
although many still remain at large. At some point, the government's pattern of persecution crosses an important threshold, to the
point where all union activists found in this country should be recognized as refugees based solely on their status as union activists.
Determining when that line is crossed, however, is a difficult judgment call. In the midst of this evolving pattern, it would not be surprising for adjudicators initially to reach differing results.
Consistency would be best served if a centralized forum exists for
making a definitive and binding decision as to when the line is
crossed-or at least for assuring that union activist asylum applicants
in Miami are treated the same as their counterparts in California.
2.

The Recommended Framework

A reformed U.S. asylum adjudication system therefore should
helpful codified and annotated version of the Canadian Act is
IMMIGRATION

AcT OF

CANADA

THE ANNOTATED

(F. Marocco & H. Goslett eds. 1989).
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retain an administrative appellate body, both to make such difficult
judgment calls and to monitor for consistent implementation of the
standards throughout the country. Its basic role would be to consider appeals from denials by the initial adjudicators; consideration
would be based on the administrative record and briefs filed by the
asylum seeker as appellant. The appellant should be allowed a limited time, perhaps ten days, for the filing of an appeal. Likewise, the
time allowed for briefing should be subject to fairly strict limitations.
Even if the initial stage before the adjudicator is not adversarial, it
may be worthwhile to treat appeals in a more adversarial manner,
using INS appellate attorneys (as under the current system) to represent the government's interest when the matter reaches the administrative appellate body.
For reasons sketched earlier, it might also be advisable for the
appellate authority to perform some monitoring role with respect to
grants of asylum. Although inaccurate grants provoke less concern
than erroneous denials, a broad pattern of undeserved grants serves
to undercut the public's confidence in the system's fairness. To
guard against this phenomenon, the staff of the appellate body might
regularly receive and review decisions in all asylum cases, appealed
or not, to watch for aberrant patterns. (The staff at this level, being
centralized in one location, could probably specialize by region or
country.) In limited circumstances, the appellate body could then
use the device of certification 28 5 to bring an unappealed case, positive or negative, before it for further review. This sort of monitoring
would provide a useful quality-control mechanism.
Thus, the appellate caseload would consist primarily of appeals
initiated by denied claimants, supplemented by a handful of other
cases brought before the body on its own initiative. Given adequate
staffing, and assuming a solution to the transcript problem, this process of review-strictly on the record created below-should add
only a few months to the overall delay, and then only in cases
accepted for full appellate consideration.
There remains the question of the composition of the appellate
body. Clearly the current Board of Immigration Appeals could perform this function; approximately half of the BIA's time is already
devoted to asylum cases. Although the question is a close one, in the
end, I recommend against assigning these functions to the BIA.
Fairly or not, some NGOs identify the BIA as a significant source of
285

See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(c), 3.7 (1989). A similar procedural mechanism provides

for "referral" of cases to the Attorney General. See id. § 3.1(h).
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the biased results that they believe the system has achieved over the
past several years. Creation of a new Asylum Board would help signal the reality of a fresh start, making the more restrictive elements
of the new scheme more acceptable. Moreover, asylum is likely to
generate a substantial portion of contested cases under the immigration laws for the foreseeable future, thus justifying the creation of a
new and permanent unit.
An Asylum Board, as a separate administrative appellate body
focusing solely on asylum -cases, also will have a better opportunity
to develop the necessary expertise in the function, including detailed
acquaintance with home country conditions.2 8 6 Members of the
board should be attorneys, because difficult legal questions under
the asylum provisions of the immigration laws will have to be settled
in this forum. 28 7 The Asylum Board should be located organizationally within EOIR, and as indicated earlier, the chairperson of the
Asylum Board should have general oversight and administrative
28 8
responsibility over the corps of adjudicators.
3.

Country Guidelines

Some earlier reform proposals have suggested country guidelines or profiles as a device that would help streamline the process
and simplify the adjudicative task. 28" For example, by 1981, it
286 In the press release announcing the creation of APRU, the Justice
Department emphasized that asylum decisions are "distinct from the normal
operation and administration of the immigration laws." Attorney General Announces
New Asylum Policy Unit, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 472-73 (1987). A new Asylum

Board would thus allow appropriate specialization on the part of the BIA.
287 Recent cases have presented the BIA, for example, with difficult legal
questions concerning the appropriate standards for asylum claims by conscientious
objectors, see In re A.G., Interim Dec. No. 3040, slip op. (BIA Dec. 28, 1987), or by
participants in a coup plot. See Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
288 The Asylum Board would also provide a logical centralized forum for
receiving the views of the UNHCP (the Board being the rough equivalent of the State
Department under the ad hoc arrangements worked out in the 1970s for UNCHR file
review in Haitian cases, see supra note 191 and accompanying text). UNHCR officials
stated to me that their preferred point of access is at the administrative appellate
stage. Interview with Richard Stainsby, UNHCR Senior Legal Adviser, in
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 1988). Several other countries have made arrangements for
routine file review by UNHCR officials in this manner. Many NGOs place a high
priority on a well-targeted UNCHR role, and its expertise could be of genuine
assistance to the decisionmakers.
289 See, e.g., SELECT COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 169-171 (recommending that
"group profiles should be developed and used by processing personnel and area
experts to determine the legitimacy of individual claims" and expedite the process);
Verkuil, supra note 203, at 1172 (suggesting that a list of countries with clear good or
bad human rights records be prepared and updated); Scanlan, supra note 2, at 637-38
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became clear that the regime in Iran had begun systematic persecution, often including summary execution, of adherents of the Baha'i
faith. The State Department issued a policy statement announcing
that Baha'is who escaped Iran should be considered refugees ipso
facto. 29 0 A similar firm guideline might have been possible in 1978,
declaring that anyone who escaped the indiscriminately murderous
policies of Pol Pot's Cambodian government should be considered
to have a well-founded fear of persecution on return. With such a
guideline in place, the adjudicators would be freed of responsibility
for the ultimate predictive judgment about whether the threat level
crossed the threshold leading to recognition of refugee status.
Instead, adjudicators would be able to focus on a narrower and more
easily ascertainable issue: whether the individual claimant was truly
an Iranian Baha'i or a Cambodian (and possibly whether she fell
within one of the exclusion or cessation clauses of the refugee
definition).
With the removal of the State Department from any major role
in refugee matters, responsibility for discerning such patterns and
issuing appropriate guidelines to asylum adjudicators-if guidelines
are to be used at all-would appropriately devolve on the Asylum
Board. The Board would remain primarily an adjudicative body, but
the guidelines could be viewed as a natural outgrowth of the regular
monitoring of country conditions that the Board should perform
anyway in discharging its adjudicative responsibilities.
A large dose of realism, however, should curb extensive expectations about the likely utility of country guidelines. First, in view of
the current caseload, which comes predominantly from Central
America and the Carribean, appropriate occasions for their issuance
are likely to be exceedingly rare. Clear patterns like those occurring
in the Baha'i or Cambodia examples are unlikely to manifest themselves very often. 2 91' Guidelines are useful only when they can be
(suggesting similar country profiles). The comparison is often made to overseas

refugee programs, where country guidelines (more in the nature of group
presumptions of refugee status) are sometimes employed. But such an approach is

not workable in asylum. Rougher judgments on refugee status are tolerable in
overseas processing because other screening tools provide an enforceable cap on the
number who will actually be admitted to the country, however many are initially
adjudged to meet the refugee definition. See supra note 38.
290 See State Dept. Reaffirms Policy on Asylum for Iranian Jews, 62 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1000 (1985) (describing earlier policy announcements on Baha'is, as well
as on Christians and Jews from Iran).

291 Some European officials reported that clear patterns appear in a larger
proportion of their caseload than occurs in the United States. They mentioned

situations like that in Turkey, where opposition groups are highly organized and
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based on particularized characteristics that sharply distinguish a certain group from the rest of the population. Most persecution in
countries significantly represented in the current asylum caseload
does not follow such crisp patterns. If guidelines can only say that
"prominent" union activists or "visible" governmental opponents
are likely to be persecuted, the subsequent adjudicative process will
have to cover almost all the same ground it would cover in the
absence of guidelines. The adjudicator would still have to pursue in
detail the applicant's own personal history as a means of judging
prominence or visibility based on his past activities and any threats
made against him or his family or friends. Guidelines that must use
such vague terms are probably worse than no guidelines at all, for
they would impart an aura of misleading clarity, when the circumstances still require a highly individualized, contextual judgment.
Second, most guideline proposals envision the use of only
affirmative guidelines-guidelines that lead to a grant of asylum if
the individual matches the profile. Negative guidelines verge on
denying individuals the right to demonstrate that their own personal
threats are so great that they deserve recognition as 1951 Convention refugees regardless of the general state of human rights observance in the home country.2 ' 2 Although an approach relying only on
affirmative guidelines is thus understandable, it obviously undercuts
the utility of guidelines in streamlining adjudication. Moreover, the
risk would persist that the absence of an affirmative guideline could
be taken as an implicitly negative factor by an adjudicator.
There is a third limitation. Most proposals for the use of guidelines or profiles assume that they would be made public. 2 93 But in
nearly every country visited, asylum officials expressed great skepticism about the idea of published guidelines. One Swiss official commented: "The next week half the applications would match the
guidelines." Published country guidelines might wind up simplifying
the ultimate predictive judgment about danger levels at the cost of
encouraging more sophisticated fraud, thus complicating adjudication over whether the applicant truly belongs to a class favored by
the guidelines. Other profiles used for a variety of law enforcement
government response apparently correlates closely to the precise cell or splinter

group to which the asylum seeker belongs.
292 See N.L. ZUCKER & N.F. ZUCKER, supra note 61, at 272-73.
293 See Verkuil, supra note 203, at 1172. Verkuil goes further and suggests that
guidelines be adopted through a notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding. Such
a process, however, would appear i:o be too cumbersome to keep up with necessary
changes as country conditions evolve.

1990]

REFORMING ASYLUM ADJUDICATION

1361

and administrative purposes usually remain a closely guarded
secret.2 94 But if confidentiality is maintained (except to the extent
that the underlying information is manifest in written decisions
explaining individual grants and denials), the guidelines could be
subject to the charge that they amount to a kind of secret and unac29 5
countable decisionmaking.
On balance, country guidelines probably would cause more
problems than they would solve. They are by no means essential to a
well-functioning system, and a reformed American structure probably should be designed without provision for them.
F. JudicialReview
Under current statutes, asylum determinations are fully reviewable in court, usually in connection with review of a deportation or
exclusion order under INA § 106 (in the court of appeals for deportation, in the district court for exclusion). Courts apply either a
"substantial evidence" or "abuse of discretion" test, depending on
the precise issue.
Given overloaded court dockets, these avenues for review create
significant potential for delay. If most denied applicants were to
petition for judicial review after exhausting administrative remedies,
delays would mushroom, negating any effective deterrent message
that might derive from prompt returns. Although this appears an
unlikely prospect at present, complete assurance against debilitating
backlogs might someday require limitation or careful channeling of
judicial review, which could be achieved only by statutory amendment.2 9 n But any trimming will be highly controversial, both
SeeJ. MONAHAN

& L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND LAw 207-27 (1985).
This objection was voiced vigorously by the American Bar Association's
Coordinating Committee on Immigration Law in its comments on a preliminary
version of this study. Letter from Charles C. Foster to David A. Martin (Apr. 13,
1989).
296 Some proposals have been offered that would eliminate judicial review of
asylum decisions as part of a package of reforms grafting several additional
safeguards onto the administrative process. See, e.g., Scanlan, Issue Summaries Submitted
to the Select Commission on Immigrationand Refugee Policies by the Centerfor Civil and Human
Rights, in SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, app. C to the Staff Report (Papers
294
295

on Refugees) at 43, 67 (1981).

Short of emergency circumstances, attempts to eliminate judicial review are
inadvisable for two reasons. First, carefully framed, such review plainly can serve a
most useful checking function, assuring fulfillment of the protective purposes of our
asylum laws. See generally Legomsky, PoliticalAsylum and the Theory ofJudicialReview, 73
MINN. L. REV. 1205, 1209-11 (1989). Second, complete denial of review may not be
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because courts have performed a genuinely valuable service by correcting significant bureaucratic error or abuse in asylum processing,
and because Americans generally hold the courts in high regard as
guarantors of rights. Such changes therefore should be considered a
last resort, to be employed only if the effectiveness of the administrative changes proposed above is badly undercut by the questionable
use ofjudicial review for purposes of delay-abuse that is now rare.
Thus, the discussion that follows should be taken only as a preliminary sketch of possible changes to judicial review-changes which,
one hopes, will not be necessary.
Two primary aims, necessarily in tension, are generally accepted
for judicial review in the asylum scheme. Judicial review should (1)
play a limited but effective role in checking bureaucratic mistake or
abuse, and (2) avoid imposing undue delay. With respect to the first
goal, the court's checking function is necessarily limited; almost no
one believes feasible a system in which the courts make de novo
determinations of asylum. With respect to the second, obviously no
one favors undue delay. Although views may differ on what delay is
excessive, the discussion in earlier sections points out why expeditiousness is unusually important in the asylum setting. Delays tolerable in other administrative settings may become unacceptable here.
Should changes become necessary, close attention to these two
aims suggests a reformed judicial review scheme that might maximize each. Deterrence of unworthy asylum seekers requires speed,
but does not require the swift return of everybody who files an 1-589.
It requires swift return only of those whose cases are at best thin or
marginal. In all likelihood, such cases constitute a substantial majority of the current caseload and of reasonably foreseeable caseloads in
constitutional under article I, § 9 of the Constitution, which provides: "The Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
See generally Developments in the Lau-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038,
1263-74 (1970). Aliens being removed from the country must necessarily be taken
into custody, and it would not be difficult in many cases to allege colorable
constitutional violations-the foundation for issuance of the Great Writ. In any
event, absolute preclusion statutes tend to spring leaks. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison,
415 U.S. 361, 373 (1974) (holding that preclusion-of-review clause in veteran's
benefits legislation does not bar judicial consideration of constitutional challenges to
the legislation). A more productive course is to concentrate energies on channeling
review into forms that will maximize effective judicial checks with minimum
disruption. When substitute mechanisms are available for review in some form by
Article III judges, restrictions on the availability of habeas corpus have been held
valid. See, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 450 U.S. 372, 381 (1977) (the substitution of a new
collateral remedy that is neither inadequate nor ineffective does not suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus).
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time of major influx.2 9 7 Obviously, those with clearly meritorious

claims must be permitted to stay. But presumably these are the cases
the new corps of specialists will readily grant, thus obviating judicial
review.
This leaves a third category: difficult cases on the boundary,
understandably requiring more thorough deliberation, research, and
possible reconsideration. Provided such cases continue to constitute
a fairly small percentage of the caseload, this category of cases could
remain pending in the overall administrative-judicial system longer
without much damage to the deterrent message. 9 ' If this guess
about proportions is roughly correct, the system could grant some
form of access to Article III courts to all asylum seekers, provided
that the mechanisms permit speedy termination of review unless a
truly substantial question is raised.2 9 9
Canada's new system provides a potentially useful procedural
model. Its legislation disallows judicial review of denied refugee
claims unless the applicant first obtains "leave to appeal" from a
specified court. 0 0° This device is not familiar to U.S. lawyers. Our
system ordinarily allows review liberally without prior screening,
although meritless appeals may be disposed of summarily. Our
nearest analogue may be the certiorari process in the Supreme
Court, which is plainly a screening mechanism that we reserve for the
highest levels of appellate consideration." 0 ' Applying such a device
at the very threshold ofjudicial review is unlikely to win easy accept297 This guess would be changed if a Central American Hitler or a Caribbean
Pol Pot came to power. But we would be in a much stronger position to rally political
support for massive acceptance of refugees in such desperate circumstances if the
system has won earlier public backing through clear demonstration of the capacity to
refuse asylum when people do not qualify.
298 This threefold division of cases (unqualified, difficult borderline,
meritorious) is in principle a clear one. In practice, of course, actual location of the
boundaries will be much tougher. If administrators differ greatly from the courts on
where those boundaries lie, the latter are bound to intervene more, creating delays in
more cases and undermining the hoped-for humane and targeted deterrent.
299 For other proposals to curtail judicial review while maintaining needed
safeguards, see Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 236-38.
300 [Canadian] Immigration Act §§ 82.1-84.1, ch. 35, §§ 83.1-85.1, 1988 Can.
Stat. 903, 946-49.
301 Certificates of probable cause, needed under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1988) and
FED. R. App. P. 22(b) to appeal a district court's denial of habeas corpus to a state
prisoner, bear some similarities to this scheme, but there are important differences.
First, the threshold for issuance is lower than what is suggested here. See Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 885 (1983). Second, denial of the certificate is itself open for
reconsideration by a judge of the appellate court, whereas Canada has precluded
further review of denial of leave to appeal.
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ance. Proponents would can-y a heavy burden of persuading the relevant audiences (including the Congress) that a unique device of this
type is needed because of the special requirements of an asylum system being challenged by steeply rising numbers of applicants.
Under the 1988 revisions to Canadian law, asylum applicants
seeking court review on the merits (including review of assertions
that natural justice has been violated-the equivalent of our constitutional due process claims) must file for leave within fifteen days of
the administrative decision. The court will ordinarily make a determination on the application without a personal appearance. If leave
is granted, the matter is scheduled for full hearing in the ordinary
course. But if the judge is not persuaded that the case is worth considering, the matter goes no further; there is no appellate review of
denial of leave. What makes a case worth hearing? Unfortunately,
the Canadian legislation does not specify clearly, leaving it to the
courts to develop precise standards. 30 2 Because the new Canadian
scheme is still relatively new, it remains unclearjust what operational
tests will come to govern.
If this "leave to appeal" approach were to be adopted in the
United States, the statute should clearly state the governing standard. The exact formulation requires further attention. But the
basic idea, if both of the above stated goals are to be served simultaneously, would be to preclude full-fledged court review-with complete briefing and argument--unless there is a substantial likelihood
of reversal of the administrative action.3 0 3 This is essential. For
such a change to effect the desired results, Congress would have to
signal clearly that it expects substantial deference on the part of the
courts to administrative decisions, and hence expects leave to be
302

See [Canadian] Immigration Act § 84.2, ch. 35, § 85.2, 1988 Can. Stat. 903,

949.
303 This standard comes close to the test applied when a single Justice of the
Supreme Court considers an application for a stay pending the full Court's ruling on
the petition for certiorari. See, e.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 109 S.Ct.
852, 853-54 (Marshall, CircuitJustice, 1989) (granting stay, in part because there is a
"fair prospect" that the full Court would find the decision below to be erroneous).
Although this formulation makes general schematic sense, it has hardly been framed
in language suitable for a statute. I am not quite sure what precise formulation
should be used to get the job done. What is meant to be communicated is more a
mood or a posture for the courts, rather than a precise schema. The standard should
signal that most often the job of adjudication belongs to the agency; the courts
should not intrude too deeply into precise development of substantive standards or
their implementation in the particular case. Court review is to be used as an outside
check, an occasional chastener and reminder that accountability also runs to persons
outside the bureaucracy.
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granted only in a small fraction of overall cases. (Moreover, court
denials of leave to appeal should not themselves be appealable.) If
the proportions do not work out as sketched above, however, and if
most cases wind up being heard on the merits in the-courts, then the
"leave to appeal" arrangements, ironically, would actually serve to
compound delays, by adding an additional round of paperwork. Full
success depends on both an attitude of restraint by the courts and a
dedication to high-quality professional adjudication by the agency, to
reinforce the idea that judicial deference is fully merited.
If the scheme works as envisioned, all denied claimants would
have access to an Article III judge; no bureaucratic decision could
block that access. This fact is vital, for it preserves many of the
incentives for agency self-policing that exist in more thorough
schemes of judicial review. The officials involved in adjudication
would know that in some cases (exactly which ones cannot be known
in advance) the independent judicial branch will be reviewing their
work. But the initial access to the courts would be of a strictly limited character. Within perhaps forty-five days, judicial review in a
large majority of cases would be at an end, and the underlying
30 4
deportation or exclusion order would become fully enforceable.
G.

Deportation

When the asylum claim is finally denied, the underlying deportation or exclusion order must be promptly executed. Prompt execution assures the only effective form of deterrent that does not
depend on indiscriminate harshness meted out to all asylum seekers
whatever the strength of their claim.3 "5 Surprisingly few such deportations occur at present, however, unless the alien has remained in
detention. 0 6 The reason is simple. Asylum seekers occupy a low
priority for use of scarce investigation and enforcement resources in
the district offices. Those resources are targeted instead on criminal
304 A possible complication might arise under the proposal offered here
because deportability and asylum would be decided in different venues. The Justice
Department should be able to overcome this complication, however. In arranging
for unified judicial review, following deportation proceedings, of denials of
legalization under INA §§ 210(e), 245A(f), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160(e), 1255a(f) (1989),
despite an initial splitting of adjudication forums between Legalization Offices and
immigration judges, the Justice Department is gaining valuable experience in
working out such technical details. See MartinJudicialReview of Legalization Denials, 65
INTERPRETER RELEASES 757, 761 (1988).
305 See Martin, supra note 1, at 12-13.
306 See supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
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aliens and others apparently involved in major abuse of the immigration system.
If we were to look only at each individual category in isolation,
this ranking of enforcement priorities makes sense. Criminal aliens
do pose a greater threat to society than failed asylum applicants, who
are largely harmless and law-abiding job-seekers. Nevertheless,
enforcement priorities must be reoriented to consider more than just
individual characteristics. They must also take full account of systemic impacts. The rest of this proposal painstakingly seeks every
reasonable opportunity to streamline each stage of an inevitably
complicated procedure. That effort is for naught-any achievements
are rendered illusory-unless this last piece is resolutely inserted
into the puzzle.
H.

Emergency Responses to Large-Scale Influxes

This study was chartered at a time of relative stasis and calm
within the asylum adjudication system. For years applications in the
INS district offices had remained at an annual level of 20,000 to
30,000. Although these figures ran some ten times higher than
annual statistics in the mid-1970s, the number appeared politically
tolerable. There was no undue pressure for quick fixes or emergency solutions. It would have been an auspicious time to provide
for a phase-in of the ambitious changes suggested here, allowing for
careful restructuring of offices and processes, the recruitment and
training of new officers, and the inevitable adjustments and modifications that will appear advisable as actual implementation reveals new
problems and opportunities.
But now, toward the conclusion of the project, the political situation has altered considerably, and any changes will have to be
implemented in much less favorable circumstances. Large influxes
of Central Americans to Florida and Texas during the winter of
1988-89 strained arrangements even for basic provision of shelter
and food. "False refugees" claimed the front pages again, and the
potential for political backlash reappeared. Radical solutions have
been tendered, sometimes reflecting little understanding of the
international and domestic legal framework.3 °7 Unfortunately, crisis
is often necessary to generate the political will to make changes
rather than to limp along under the old system. But patience for
307 For example, an internal draft of draconian legislation, entitled the "Asylum
Anti-Abuse Act of 1989," has been circulated within INS. See 66 INTERPRETER
RELEASES

478-79 (1989).
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long-term solutions of the kind sketched here is in shortest supply at
such times. And even if the political leadership remains committed
to long term reform, political pressures may demand of the executive
branch a showing of visible, immediate, and effective action that will
stem the flow and dispatch pending cases quickly.
I will therefore offer a few suggestions, plus a few words of caution about some quick fixes that have been suggested. But above all,
any crisis-driven requirement for prompt action must not divert
attention from the need to start implementing the central reforms
proposed here as soon as possible. Almost every conceivable (and
certainly every reasonable) emergency response will be easier to
implement, to sustain, and to render effective, if emergency measures are accompanied by the steady phase-in of a more reliable, highquality, one-tier adjudication system staffed by a corps of true professionals, insulated from foreign policy concerns, sensitive to crosscultural communication difficulties, and equipped to make effective
use of the disparate array of information sources that must be
employed.
1. Quick Denial of Manifestly Unfounded Applications
Several countries have made use of fast-track denials of "manifestly unfounded" asylum claims (what I will call here "MU procedures"), and in time of large-scale influx, such possibilities become
attractive. A well-designed MU procedure could conceivably help
amplify the qualified deterrent message that the United States now is
trying to send to those in Central America who may be contemplating a trip northward. 0 8 But its contributions to this end would be
modest, and its complications may outweigh its advantages, at least
under current conditions.
The UNHCR Executive Committee (a body in which the United
States is a key participant) adopted a formal Conclusion in 1983 on
"the problem of manifestly unfounded or abusive applications" for
asylum.3 09 It gave cautious endorsement to the creation of an expe308 This proposal is necessarily founded on an assumption that a large majority
of the recent Central American asylum seekers do not qualify for asylum under
current legal standards. That assumption is debatable, on legal and factual grounds,
but for reasons that cannot be elaborated here, I believe it to be defensible.
309 Conclusion No. 30 (XXXIV), 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12A) at 25-26, U.N.
Doc. A/38/12/Add.1 (1983). Conclusion No. 30 states in relevant part that the
UNHCR Executive Committee:
(c) Noted that applications for refugee status by persons who clearly
have no valid claim to be considered refugees under the relevant criteria
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ditious procedure for dealing with such applications, but it warned
against over-use of such measures, particularly in view of the "grave
consequences" of an erroneous determination. 3 1 0 It therefore
emphasized that any interview used in such procedures should be
conducted by a "fully qualified official" and that the decision should
be made by the "authority normally competent to determine refugee
status." '
The Executive 'Committee was primarily concerned that
such responsibilities would devolve on border police, 3 12 who would
be ill-equipped to carry out the role and might have incentives to use
MU procedures to exclude asylum seekers without an adequate effort
constitute a serious problem in a number of States parties to the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Such applications are burdensome to
the affected countries and detrimental to the interests of those applicants
who have good grounds for requesting recognition as refugees;
(d) Considered that national procedures for the determination of
refugee status may usefully include special provision for dealing in an
expeditious manner with applications which are considered to be so
obviously without foundation as not to merit full examination at every
level of the procedure. Such applications have been termed either
"clearly abusive" or "manifestly unfounded" and are to be defined as
those which are clearly fraudulent or not related to the criteria for the
granting of refugee status laid down in the 1951 United Nations
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees nor to any other criteria
justifying the granting of asylum;
(e) Recognized the substantive character of a decision that an
application for refugee status is manifestly unfounded or abusive, the
grave consequences of an erroneous determination for the applicant and
the resulting need for such a decision to be accompanied by appropriate
procedural guarantees and therefore recommended that:
(i) As in the case of all requests for the determination of refugee
status or the granting of asylum, the applicant should be given a
complete personal interview by a fully qualified official and,
whenever possible, by an official of the authority competent to
determine refugee status;
(ii) The manifestly unfounded or abusive character of an application
should be established by the authority normally competent to
determine refugee status;
(iii) An unsuccessful applicant should be enabled to have a negative
decision reviewed before rejection at the frontier or forcible
removal from the territory. Where arrangements for such a
review do not exist, Governments should give favorable
consideration to their establishment. This review possibility can
be more simplified than that available in the case of rejected
applications which are not considered manifestly unfounded or
abusive.

Id.
310
311
312

See id. paras. (d), (e), at 25.
Id. paras. (e)(i), (e)(ii), at 25.
See id. para. (e)(iii), at 25.
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to find the facts. Thus, such decision authority should be given to
the system's ordinary asylum adjudicators.
With these cautions in mind, MU procedures for the United
States might be built on the following framework. Those persons
apprehended by INS or "walking in" to INS offices who apply for
asylum, or otherwise express fear of being returned to the home
country, should be given the application form and told to complete
and file it within a limited time period. Upon receipt of the form, an
asylum adjudicator would go over the form and any other information in the alien's file to perform a preliminary screening. If the case
clearly seems to have substance, it should simply be set for the regular interview or hearing procedure. If it looks as though the claim
might be manifestly unfounded, it should be set for an early MU
screening interview, which should be recorded verbatim.
If, during the MU screening interview, the applicant tenders a
plausible basis for his asylum claim, the matter should be passed on
to the next stage, the merits hearing, which would probably take
place several weeks later. Access to the full merits hearing should be
permitted even if the applicant's present account seems to contradict
earlier statements given to the immigration officials. The individual
may be pressed about seeming contradictions, but, unless the
responses reveal clear and continuing fraud, the applicant should
make it to the next stage in the process.8 1 3 There are simply too
many possible innocent explanations for inconsistent initial statements in these settings, owing to the manifest difficulties of crosscultural communication and to the understandable reticence that
truly persecuted people may feel upon their first encounter with uniformed American officials.
The MU procedure is not the forum for resolving such contradictions. To do so adequately would require expanding the procedure until it became virtually indistinguishable from the merits
procedures. 1 4 This fact unavoidably limits the utility of MU proce818 Apparently a high percentage of the current applicants say something about
coming to the United States for ajob during their first encounters with INS, and only
later begin speaking of feared persecution. Because of cross-cultural differences, one
cannot simply apply a presumption that the first statement is the more accurate or
honest (even if such a presumption might make sense in dealing with American
citizens in other contexts). It is entirely possible that the individual muttered a nonthreatening response in the first encounter with uniformed officials only because his
entire experience in his home country taught him to volunteer nothing to people in
uniforms. The change of story, of course, should be explored fully in the merits
hearing, but it cannot be treated as dispositive in the MU procedure.
314 The Department ofJustice actually drafted a kind of MU procedure, using
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dures. If the individuals come from countries with known human
rights problems (and this includes the Nicaraguans, Salvadorans, and
Guatemalans who make up the bulk of the current influx), MU procedures will probably screen out only a handful of them. This handful
would consist mainly of persons so poorly advised by friends or
"travel agents"--or so honest-that they speak during the MU interview only about crop failures at home and job attractions here. But a
more restrictive approach carries too high a risk of quick return of
true refugees.
If the application is found to be manifestly unfounded, the consequence would be some truncation of normal procedures. Again,
many variants are possible; the most effective would require statutory change. Possible limitation by regulation alone, however, might
take the following shape: The MU determination should constitute a
final negative ruling on the asylum and withholding claims, without
the possibility of de novo consideration or further review in any
31 5

administrative forum.

If statutory changes are deemed advisable, the MU determination could also serve to limit judicial review, but with safeguards.
Limited judicial review would be possible, through a summary procedure like that suggested above for deciding on "leave to appeal."
There would be one difference. If the court found the MU determination unsupported, it would not schedule full-fledged court review.
It would simply remand the case for a full merits hearing before the
different terminology, in asylum regulations proposed in 1978. Those regulations
allowed for "summary judgment" on a shortened timetable, in cases that appeared
straightforward-i.e., that appeared to lack any genuine issues of material fact. See 43
Fed. Reg. 40,801 (1978). The 1978 proposal never made it into fully operative final
regulations, however. The agency explained its abandonment of the idea as follows:
Critics cite as hardships [rendering the summary judgment procedure
unfair] the circumstances of many newly arrived applicants for asylum
who face a language barrier and suffer from a lack of education and
limited financial resources ....
The objections to the summary judgment provisions have merit.
Upon reconsideration, this type of motion appears to be rather
sophisticated given the nature of the proceedings and situation of the
individuals .

. .

. [Also, s]ince applications for asylum most frequently

involve disputed facts a motion for summary judgment would rarely lie.
44 Fed. Reg. 21,254 (1979). These considerations have lost little force in intervening
years and may still counsel against adopting such a procedure, under whatever name.
315 An exception might be made for review solely on the initiative of the
Chairperson of the Asylum Board, much as the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer
may now arrange for review of cerl.ain administrative orders issued by Administrative
Law Judges under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a, 1324b (1988) within thirty days of the order's
issuance. See 28 C.F.R. § 68.52 (1988).
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adjudicator. On the other hand, if the court approved the MU finding, the deportation order would become final and immediately
enforceable, without the possibility for furtherjudicial consideration.
Obviously the force given an MU determination cautions that
MU procedures should not be used unless training and recruitment
have proceeded to the stage that the Justice Department has substantial confidence in the officers doing the MU interviews. The everpresent temptation will be to overuse MU determinations. A report
prepared by Professor A.M.J. Swart of the Netherlands for the Council of Europe found that exactly this sort of error was being committed. He reported that national authorities implementing MU
procedures in several European countries
are inclined to want to judge the merits of a request fully in order
to see whether it is abusive or unfounded [rather than 'clearly' abusive or 'manifestly' unfounded]. This means that criteria which
have been developed to do no more than make a first, rough selection possible, become so important that the selection itself
becomes the crucial moment in asylum procedure for all asylum
seekers.

3 16

The lack of adequately trained and equipped personnel at present may pose a substantial obstacle to effective implementation of
MU procedures as an immediate response to the current high application rate. Such a procedure would be far more reliable once a staff
of independent and professional asylum adjudicators is in placeanother reason to move quickly toward implementation of such a
new administrative scheme. Still, MU procedures should not be
expected to carry a heavy load. Even Germany, which has had several years to perfect its MU techniques, can dispose of only about
twenty-five percent of its cases in this fashion, and Canada has eliminated only about ten percent this way under its new system.3 17 A
better solution, as the UNHCR's formal Conclusion on this issue
316 Swart, The Problems Connected With the Admission of Asylum Seekers to the Territory
of Member States, in THE LAw OF ASYLUM AND REFUGEES: PRESENT TENDENCIES AND
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 65, 80 (Council of Europe 1987).
317 See von Pollern, Die Entwicklung der Asylbewerberzahlen im Jahre 1988, 1989
ZEITSCHRIFr FUR AUSLNDERRECHT UND AUSLNDERPOLITIK (ZAR) 23, 26 (from 1982,

when MU procedures were introduced in Germany, through 1988, 25.32 7o of cases
were denied as "manifestly unfounded;" for 1988, the figure was 26.38 percent);
Refugee Determination in Canada: First Quarter Review 10 (Apr. 25, 1989) (noting

that 89% of 2,037 claims concluded at the initial stage were referred for a full merits
determination). A UNHCR study estimated that manifestly unfounded or abusive
claims constituted 10 to 15 % of "unscheduled arrivals" in industrialized countries in
1984. See Jaeger, Irregular Movements: The Concept and Possible Solutions, in THE NEW
ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGESS LAw IN THE 1980s 23, 31 (D. Martin ed. 1988).
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ultimately suggests, may be instead to target resources towards
assuring speedy completion of full merits hearings and all review
3 18
stages.
2.

Disqualification for Transit Through Third Countries

Some interest has also been expressed in new rules that might
disqualify applicants from asylum or withholding of deportation if
they have passed through other countries where they could have
applied for asylum before reaching the United States. Because virtually all asylum seekers from Central America travel through Mexico,
some regard this as a nifty device to deal with most of the current
caseload.
This proposal, however, poses such serious legal and practical
problems that it should be abandoned. 1 9 Suppose a Salvadoran
files for asylum and is told that his claim will not be heard on the
merits because he should have applied in Mexico. What exactly will
be done with him? Presumably he could be sent to Mexico, if Mexico
would agree to receive hira, but the odds that Mexico would accept
such a person, much less tens of thousands of needy Salvadorans, are
almost nonexistent.3 20 The only country likely to accept him would
be El Salvador, the country where he claims he would be persecuted.
His transit through Mexico to the United States by no means proves
that he had no legitimate fears in El Salvador. Both Article 33 of the
318 In Conclusion No. 30, the

UNHCR Executive Committee:

(f) Recognized that while measures to deal with manifestly
unfounded or abusive applications may not resolve the wider problem of
large numbers of applications for refugee status, both problems can be
mitigated by overall arrangements for speeding up refugee status
determination procedures, for example by:
(i) Allocating sufficient personnel and resources to refugee status
determination bodies so as to enable them to accomplish their
task expeditiously, and
(ii) The introduction of measures that would reduce the time
required for the completion of the appeals process.
Conclusion No. 30, supra note 309, para. f, at 26.
319 Similar issues have been debated in Europe for years under the rubric of the
"country of first asylum" doctrine, and the debate there suggests the legal and
political intricacies that can be implicated. See generally Vierdag, The Country of "First
Asylum " Some European Aspects, irtTHE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE
1980s 73 (D. Martin ed. 1988); Conclusion No. 15(XXX), Refugees Without a Country of
Asylum, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12A) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/34/12/Add.1 (1979).
320 See generally J. FRIEDLAND & J. RODRIGUEZ Y RODRIGUEZ, SEEKING SAFE
GROUND:

THE LEGAL SITUATIOi OF CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES IN MEXICO 55
FAGEN & S. AGUAYO, CENTRAL AMERICANS IN MEXICO AND THE UNITED
STATES: UNILATERAL, BILATERAL, AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES (1988).

(1987); P.
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1951 Refugee Convention and INA § 243(h) obligate the United
States not to return him to El Salvador if his fears are well-founded.
In the end, therefore, a "transit" doctrine would not obviate a
ruling on the merits, at least with respect to the nonrefoulement obligation. It would only delay such a ruling and, in the meantime, possibly complicate diplomatic relations with Mexico.
3.

Ending Work Authorizations and Making Alternative
Arrangements for Subsistence Pending Adjudication

Government policymakers may yet perceive a need for some
decisive step to send a deterrent message at times of sudden influx.
Many INS personnel interviewed for this study volunteered a ready
solution along these lines: simply end the work authorizations that
are now fairly automatic for asylum seekers during the pendency of
their claims (both initially and on appeal).1 2 Additional evidence
also supports the theory that the recent rise in filings is at least partially linked to the work authorization issue.3 22
A simple end to work authorizations, however, or a raising of the
threshold to qualify beyond the "nonfrivolous" standard now contained in the regulations,3 23 will neither fully solve the problem nor
likely be sustained by the courts, unless other steps are also taken.
Before the rules were amended in 1987 to make work authorization
nearly automatic, district directors had considerable discretion in
granting such permission. In Diaz v. INS, however, a district court
issued a preliminary injunction against restrictive implementation,
finding that a restrictive policy unduly burdened the alien's statutory
right to apply for asylum and thereby frustrated the goals of the statute.3 2' The nondiscretionary 1987 regulations were issued at least in
3 25
part to conform to Diaz.
321 See 8 G.F.R.
§§ 274a.12(c)(8) (1989) (providing for employment
authorizations in increments not exceeding one year for any. alien who has filed a
non-frivolous application); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d) (1989) (requiring adjudication of
the employment authorization application within 60 days, the failure of which will
result in a grant of interim employment not to exceed 120 days). An INS
memorandum elaborates on the standards used to determine frivolousness. See
Memorandum from Richard E. Norton, supra note 146.
322 See, e.g., B. Frelick, supra note 214, at 17.
323 See 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 4 (1989); Memorandum from Richard E.
Norton, supra note 146.
324 See Diaz v. INS, 648 F. Supp'. 638, 651-53, 656 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
325 See Memorandum from Ignatius Bau and Robert Rubin, supra note 215, app.
II at 882-86 (explanation of the significance of the 1987 regulations by the attorneys
involved in Diaz).
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Nothing has happened since then to undercut the court's reasoning. It is indeed quite plausible to read Congress's enactment of
§ 208 in 1980 as creating a right for persons physically present in the
United States to have their asylum claims heard on the merits. If
work authorization is now to be denied, any lawyer for the Department of Justice is bound to be asked in court how the government
expects asylum seekers to survive during the months (and possibly
years) until a final ruling is obtained on the application. Unless the
government takes further steps to provide for such people during
3 26
the pendency of the claim, the lawyer has no respectable answer.
Courts might easily conclude that the government was trying to
starve people out of pursuing a congressionally mandated right.
And they would surely point out that a no-work-authorization policy
falls as heavily on bona fide refugees as on the abusers who are the
ostensible targets.3

27

At times of heavy influx, a policy of near-automatic work authorizations may well be ended, but the government must then provide
alternative arrangements for feeding and housing the asylum seekers. Obviously, this course would be expensive, but it could be
adopted in the hope that it would slow new arrivals and minimize
overall long-term costs. If :uch a course is chosen, these alternatives
could be provided in two ways. The first would be to detain asylum
seekers physically under the relevant portions of the immigration
statutes. Current regulations already provide for a presumption of
3 28
detention for excludable aliens who arrive without documents.
The bonding provisions governing deportation probably also allow
the Attorney General sufficient discretion, particularly during what
could plausibly be argued are emergency conditions, to arrange for
326 The problem is compounded because asylum seekers are not considered to
be "permanently residing under color of law" (PRUCOL), which is a prerequisite to
qualifying for most federally funded public benefit programs. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1618 (1989); see also Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1466 (9th Cir.

1985); Wheeler, Alien Eligibility for Public Benefits: Part I, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Nov.
1988, at 3-4; Stein & Zanowic, Permanent Resident Alien Under Color of Law: The Opening
Door to Alien Entitlement Eligibility, 1 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 231 (1986). These federal
statutory restrictions sharply distinguish U.S. practices from those of most European
countries, which routinely provide subsistence allowances and other benefits for
asylum seekers within the general schemes they have for public assistance. This
difference helps explain European countries' more ready resort to denials of work
authorization to asylum applicants, even though such denials clearly impose a larger
burden on the taxpayers.
327 See Diaz, 648 F. Supp. at 655-56.
328 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(b), 235.3(b) (1989).
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detention of a large proportion of those asylum seekers who have
already made an entry into the United States.
The second framework would emphasize the voluntary nature of
the communal shelter and feeding facilities. It would be set up primarily to assure that no asylum seekers go hungry while awaiting a
ruling on their asylum claims. If they cannot provide for themselves
through personal resources or the resources of friends and family,
asylum seekers could move into the governmental facilities. For
those who choose this course, some kind of daily check-in procedure
might be used to verify identities and to maximize the chances that
individuals can be located when a deportation order becomes final.
Presumably, they could come and go at their discretion during the
day. (West Germany uses such arrangements in the communal housing facilities it has established for asylum seekers.) This course of
action would probably cost less in direct government payouts
because a fair number of asylum seekers would prefer to move in
with their families. Of course, many of those not in the government
facility might well attempt to work surreptitiously or with false documents. Moreover, this course of action would probably also increase
the absconding rate once final deportation orders begin to issue.
Under either course, there will obviously be a need to locate
considerable government facilities for housing, but there is a wellworn path of experience here, extending back to the 1975 refugee
emergency caused by the fall of Saigon and the 1980 Mariel boatlift.
The current population of asylum seekers should, of course, be considerably easier to deal with than the Mariel population, which
included some inmates fresh from Cuban jails. Steps should be
taken to make the new facilities as comfortable as possible under the
circumstances, and to minimize some of the pathologies that are generated when enforced idleness and close quarters continue for
lengthy periods. For example, it would be advisable to keep families
together and to provide access, whenever possible, to cooking facilities, so that the individuals could prepare their own meals. The
detainees are not felons, and the government might garner wider
public support for any such deterrence policy if it attempts to ame3 29
liorate camp conditions as much as possible.
329 This policy appears consistent with what the Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy had in mind when it proposed creation of asylum
"processing centers." See SELECT COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 166-68. Moreover,
the government gained some further experience in establishing facilities of this sort
in South Texas in early 1989, as part of its response to the sharp increase in asylum
seekers arriving there. While the Department of Justice detained many of these
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Of course, one possible objection is that any steps to ameliorate
conditions limit the deterrent impact. That risk is worth taking. The
main deterrents will remain denial of work authorization (which
should be widely publicized through available media in the region of
origin), and new measures to hasten final decisions, which would
accelerate both the return of the unqualified applicants to their
homelands and the release of those who merit asylum.
In the end, the difficulties and disadvantages of any such policy
should not be minimized. Outright detention clashes glaringly with
the proud heritage symbolized by the Statue of Liberty. Less harsh
communal housing, at public expense, is apparently hard to sustain
politically, for it can be portrayed as a pure welfare program for illegal immigrants, fed and sheltered entirely at taxpayer expense.
Either course makes sense only as a temporary palliative; it would be
much better to avoid them altogether. Avoidance is possible, in the
long run, if an effective and expeditious adjudication system, as
sketched above, can be patiently implemented and sustained. That
sort of system allows for deterrence through the prompt deportation
of the unqualified, rather than through enforced idleness (at mounting governmental expense) while adjudication grinds slowly onward.
V.

CONCLUSION

Government officials reading through all the proposals offered
here may be struck by the apparent cost of the system envisioned,
compared to what we seem to have today. Until now, asylum responsibilities have been assumed by a mere handful of harried examiners
in district offices and by the surprisingly small corps of immigration
judges who shoehorn asylum in among their many other responsibilities. The true costs of the present system, however, are much
higher. They include not only the costs to localities in Florida,
Texas, and California that are scrambling to meet the elemental
needs of asylum seekers now applying in much higher numbers, but
also the costs that are likely to accrue in the future as the magnet
effect compounds.3 3 0 Absent effective adjudication reforms, we are
people in jail-like facilities, it also set up a more open Alien Shelter Care Program,
available mainly to families and unaccompanied minors. See Justice Department
Announces Fundingfor Services for South Texas Aliens, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 720

(1989).
330 See Appendix. See generally General Accounting Office Letter to Sen. Bob
Graham (Feb. 23, 1989) (GAO/GGD-89-54FS) (recounting financial effects of asylum
applicants on Miami); Schmalz, Miami Pupils: Future Hope is Crisis Now, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 21, 1989, at Al, col. 2; McCoy, Christie & de Cordoba, In Miami, Rivalries of
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unlikely to escape an expensive detention or government accommodation scheme whenever the flow reaches a high level, as the government's response to the spike in applications during the winter of
1988-89 demonstrated. 3 1
The costs required to implement the reformed system are
worthwhile if the changes can break the vicious circle in which asylum policy now seems to be caught. Quicker, seemingly cheaper
fixes are wholly illusory. They were tried in the Haitian Program of
1978. The result was only years of litigation, preliminary injunctions, remands, and duplicative reconsideration, topped off by a
major award of attorneys' fees to the asylum seekers' counsel. 3 2
The courts have repeatedly shown that they will intervene unless the
asylum "problem" is addressed by a comprehensive program that
demonstrates adequate seriousness about our Statue of Liberty tradition. Such seriousness inevitably costs money.
Refugee advocates encountering these proposals will probably
be struck instead by the possible removal of several layers of comforting checks and appeals. Those checks have probably been effective in assuring that bona fide refugees are not sent home,
particularly if a skilled advocate makes full use of all possible avenues
of attack. But the cost has been high. It has meant the creation of a
system that has great difficulty actually sending anyone home. Now
that this latter message has been received in Central America (and to
some extent all over the globe), the flow will probably continue to
rise, until political backlash imposes its own correctives-correctives
likely to be far more draconian. The effort here is to find ways to
minimize the magnet effect without impairing the quality of the judgment on the merits of the asylum claim. Indeed, the steps proposed
here, if properly implemented and carefully monitored, should significantly improve the accuracy and fairness of decisionmaking,
despite the streamlining of the system and the trimming of layers of
review.
This proposed system, centered on a nonadversarial model of
adjudication, obviously places great reliance on the role of the single
adjudicator. One refugee lawyer, apprised of an early version of
Minority Groups Fan Riot's Flames, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1989, at 1, col. 4; Thompson,
Black Anger at Refugees Fed Riots, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 1989, at A3, col. 1; Applebome,

supra note 4.
331 In February 1990, in response to a new increase in applications, INS
announced the resumption of more systematic detention of asylum applicants. See
Suro, U.S. Is Renewing Border Detentions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1990, at A22, col. 1.
332 See supra note 3.
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these proposals, marveled: "You would really have to have trust" in
the officials running the procedure. Exactly. Asylum adjudications
have been conducted for years in such an atmosphere of profound
and mutual mistrust that we may have great difficulty even conceptualizing such a system. But if we are to show true fidelity to the best of
our asylum tradition, we have to find a way to create a system that
merits our confidence. Other systems are too cumbersome to work
effectively-at least when the asylum applicant intake reaches
100,000 per year.
Asylum determinations should be made by carefully chosen and
well-trained specialists who possess focused responsibility for fulfilling our legal obligations and for implementing consistent, coherent,
and accurate policy. Courts must develop a more deferential stance
toward that expertise. It is time to create a system that will, at long
last, merit such deference and trust, even on issues that will remain
hotly controversial and about which we, as Americans, rightly care
deeply.
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ASYLUM ADJUDICATION REFORM: COST ESTIMATES
(AS OF JUNE 1989)
I.

COSTS OF THE PRESENT ASYLUM ADJUDICATION SYSTEM

A. Adjudication Costs (in millions of dollars)
Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR)
(Includes immigration judges and
Board of Immigration Appeals)

$10.0

INS: Trial attorneys and support staff
District offices
Central office
Asylum Policy and Review Unit, Department of
Justice

4.0
3.0
0.5
0.5

Asylum office, Department of State

0.5

TOTAL

$18.5

Financial data for the various units of the Justice Department
and State Department are not kept in a manner that readily permits
identification of those costs associated with asylum adjudication.
These figures therefore set forth rough, but probably conservative,
estimates for costs attributable to asylum adjudication for FY 1988,
when the system was equipped to handle approximately 20,00030,000 applications, based upon telephone interviews with officials
in each affected department.
NOTE: This list makes no provision for detention, deportation, Coast
Guard interdiction, assistance to persons eventually granted asylum,
or state and local government expenditures.
B. Detention
Detention costs $30-35 per person per day. Therefore detention of 4500 individuals for one week costs the federal government
$1 million. During May 1989, INS was detaining an average of about
3700 asylum seekers in South Texas alone.1 Other areas of heavy
concentration of asylum seekers (notably metropolitan Miami and
I See

REFUGEE REPORTS,

May 19, 1989, at 8.
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southern California) also give rise to substantial numbers of
detainees.
C. State and Local Government Costs
The arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers in a concentrated
period can have a considerable effect on local government expenditures for which there is no readily available federal reimbursement.
No overall figures are available, but a GAO report examining the
effect on the Miami-Dade County area of recently arriving
Nicaraguans, who came in large numbers beginning in mid-1988,
provides an illustrative picture of such local costs.2
GAO reported an estimated $4 million in social services provided by Dade County to Nicaraguan asylum seekers in calendar
1988 (averaging over $10,000 per day). This figure does not include
educational expenses, which were expected to be high. In addition,
the city of Miami reported spending $4,000 a day on recent Nicaraguan arrivals. Thus, not counting educational costs, local government in the Miami area incurred expenses of over $14,000 per day
3
for Nicaraguan asylum seekers during the 1988-89 influx.
II.

ESTIMATED COSTS FOR REFORMED ADJUDICATION SYSTEM

Because the recommendation proposes that asylum adjudicators
be equivalent in rank and salary to immigration judges, the following
estimates for adjudicators are based on figures provided by EOIR for
full costs of additional immigration judges and support personnel. It
is estimated that thirty adjudicators would be needed to handle each
increment of 10,000 asylum decisions4 per year (333 cases per adjudicator per year or approximately seven cases per week).
2 GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE, POLITICAL ASYLUM APPLICANTS:

FINANCIAL

EFFECT ON LOCAL SERVICES IN THE MIAMI AREA (1989).
3 This GAO report sets forth costs only for Nicaraguans in the Miami area,
although Haitian and other asylum-seekers had been arriving in increasing numbers
there. (The Miami district office of INS then ranked second in asylum application
receipts among district offices, receiving 8,214 asylum applications in FY 1988 and an
estimated 15,000 in 1989; the Los Angeles office was first with 28,491 applications in
FY 1988 and an estimated 34,000 in 1989.)
4 Roughly 10 to 20 percent of asylum applications are withdrawn or abandoned
before decision. Therefore 10,000 decisions should keep pace with 11,000 to 12,500
applications.
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Adjudication Costs (in millions of dollars) (for 30,000
decisions per year)
General administration and program direction

$1.0

Adjudication division
Adjudicators
Support staff for adjudicators

9.0
7.5

Appellate division
Board members and immediate staff
Staff attorneys and other support staff

0.5
4.5

Documentation center

1.0

TOTAL

$23.5

The estimate assumes a capacity of 30,000 decisions per year, to
show costs that would be comparable to the upper estimate of capacity for the current system as it operated in FY 1988. If the lower
estimate were used instead for comparison (a caseload of 20,000
decisions), the reformed system would cost $16.5 million.
Actual adjudication output requirements will surely be higher, at
least in the early years, given the 1989 application rate. Once the
new system is fully operational, however, it should reduce the
number of asylum applications and diminish or eliminate the need
for detention as a deterrent, thus saving substantial federal
expenditures.

